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 A b s t r a c t  
Cases of  ‘convergence’ (traits which have independently evolved in two or 
more lineages) could play an important role in the construction and 
corroboration of  adaptive hypotheses. In particular, they could inform us 
about the evolutionary histories of  novel traits. However, there is a problem 
of  causal depth in the use of  analogies. Natural Selection’s affect on 
phenotype is constrained by phylogenetic history to a degree that we are 
unfounded in projecting adaptive stories from one lineage to another. I will 
argue for two approaches to resolve this issue. First, by constraining our 
catchment area to closely related lineages we can control for developmental 
noise. Second, by integrating analogies into explanations which incorporate 
other streams of  evidence or bootstrapping an analogous model across 
many instantiations, we can overcome the problem of  causal depth. 
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 I n t r o d u c t i o n  
In 1799 Dr George Shaw of  the British Museum received a package 
from the naturalist Joseph Banks. The gentlemen of  the Empire were 
collecting samples to catalogue the diverse flora and fauna of  the realm. 
These were sent to Britain for scientific description and taxonomy. For the 
naturalists of  the empire, Aristotle’s ‘Great Chain of  Being’ still held sway – 
the kingdom of  life was divided into clear categories into which each 
member fell. They identified a Mammal, for instance, on specific criteria. A 
mammal is warm blooded, furred, feeds its young (who are born live), on 
milk and has separate chambers for excretion and reproduction. A Reptile, 
by contrast, has cold blood, thick scales, lays eggs and has a single chamber.  
The contents of  this package, a pelt, seemed to straddle several links in 
the Great Chain of  Being. It was furry and warm-blooded like a mammal, 
but had a single hole ‘down there’ and laid eggs like a reptile. There were 
also avian features, webbed feet and a bill. Shaw was, at first, sure this was 
some kind of  Antipodean prank.  
The species in question, which (eventually) settled on the scientific name 
Ornithorhynchus anatinus, commonly the Platypus, caused such incredulity 
because of  its similarities and divergences with other animals. If  the 
platypus was a mammal, then why was it so similar to non-mammals? The 
suite of  platypus traits tells us about something more than the species itself. 
It suggests that the links of  the Great Chain are not as clearly delineated as 
first thought. Indeed, the platypus was one of  inspirations for Natural 
Selection, which eventually laid Aristotelian theory to rest.  
So the discovery of  the platypus, and an examination of  its similarities 
with other animals, tested Aristotelian theory. Because the theory assumed a 
strict delineation of  groups, the platypus’ failure to fit into these groups 
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 counted as evidence against it. Conversely it counts as evidence for 
Darwinian Theory. Because evolution sees different lineages as 
phylogenetically continuous, we should expect to see border-line cases.  
Analysing the similarities and divergences between animals can tell us 
many things; I am particularly interested in two uses. First is the testing of  
regularities and background theories, as we saw with the platypus. 
According to Aristotelian theory, the platypus cannot exist. Its discovery, 
then, falsified the old theory and corroborated an evolutionary perspective. 
Second, these resemblances or lack thereof  can also tell us about the 
evolutionary relationships of  lineages. For example, the traits of  platypus 
mark it as a Monotreme. It is a mammal, but one only distantly related to 
placental and marsupial mammals. From this we can infer that a platypus 
shares a common ancestor with us in the more distant past than, say, a cow. 
Similarities between animals can tell us something about the evolutionary 
conditions required for traits to be selected. Platypus have webbed feet, 
much like a duck. A reasonable conjecture would be that both the duck and 
the platypus have webbed feet to help them swim.  
This thesis is about similarities and divergences in animal traits and their 
inferential uses. In particular I want to know how we can use data from 
extant species to inform us about both extinct and other extant species. The 
similarities between us and the great apes, our closest relatives, base claims 
about the traits of  our ancestors. We may think, for instance, that our 
ancestors lived in an arboreal environment in part because most of  our 
relatives do.  
Sometimes distant relatives can inform as well. Lineages living in similar 
environments tend to evolve similar phenotypes. This is commonly known 
as ‘convergence’. The stream-lined shapes of  dolphins and sharks, the 
‘counterparts’ of  placental mammals that have evolved in marsupial 
lineages, and the evolution of  flight in bats and birds are famous examples 
of  this phenomenon. 
What can we learn from convergence? Perhaps we gain epistemic access 
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 to regularities about how Natural Selection moulds phenotype, how lineages 
are fit to niches, by reference to convergences. If  we can understand these 
regularities, then they could provide a window into the evolutionary past of  
lineages which share those selective environments. 
Many people who study the behaviour and cognition of  animals, for 
instance, believe their work tells us not only about the particular animals 
they have examined, but about such regularities. Marino et al (2008) have 
compared the cognition and neural architecture of  cetaceans and primates. 
The brains are divergent, but (they claim) cognition is convergent. This may 
show a decoupling of  neural and cognitive evolution, suggesting that 
particular cognitive and behavioural traits will be selected for despite 
different neural histories and designs. Sayers and Lovejoy (2008) suggest 
that looking at social carnivores which “…hunt big game and cache meat, 
both of  which approximate human hunting behaviour…” may be an inroad 
to regularities about the evolution of  cooperative hunting. Plotnik et al 
(2006), upon discovering mirror-recognition in an elephant, had this to say. 
“Finding strong parallels among apes, dolphins and elephants in both the 
progression of  behavioural stages and actual responses to a mirror provides 
compelling evidence for convergent cognitive evolution.” 
These scientists imply that the study of  particular cases of  cognitive 
evolution can help us develop a general theory. These general theories could 
then be applied to construct the evolutionary pasts of  lineages we are 
interested in – our own, for instance. As we shall see, I’m not so sure this is 
the case, and will explore both my scepticism, and methods of  allaying it, in 
the next seven chapters. 
The first two chapters lay out the territory for the comparative work I 
am interested in. Similarities between lineages (or resemblance-relations as I 
sometimes call them) can be divided into two categories. Some are due to 
the inheritance of  a particular developmental system which gives rise to 
particular phenotypes. These are homologies. Others – convergences – are 
caused by a continuity of  niche, rather than inheritance. These are analogies. 
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 So the traits of  fur and warm-blood are homologous between platypus and 
other mammals – they have been inherited from a common ancestor. The 
webbed feet of  ducks and platypus are analogous. They evolved 
independently from one another in response to the same selective 
environment. 
I will argue for a particular conception of  these terms. Homology and 
analogy are best understood as explanations of  the phenomena of  
similarity. This sets me against some philosophers (particularly Paul 
Griffiths) who give homology special epistemic status. This discussion sets 
us up for the main concern of  the thesis: the criticisms and eventual 
vindication of  the use of  analogy.  
The third chapter introduces the problem of  causal depth and develops 
a general language for its discussion. The problem of  causal depth arises 
from the idea that some processes give worse ‘signals’ from the past than 
others. These processes may have left traces, but these are ambiguous as to 
their origin. Their reach from the past is ‘shallow’. 
In the forth chapter, I claim that the use of  analogies in inferences relies 
upon Adaptationism. Adaptationism has been rightly attacked in the last 
thirty years, especially by those philosophers and biologists interested in 
evolutionary developmental theory. I will show how taking these criticisms 
seriously undermines the epistemic worth of  inferences relying on 
analogies. Natural Selection’s causal strength in forming phenotype is 
‘shallow’ and so its ability to ground analogous inference is questionable. 
The fifth chapter focuses our attention onto a particular inferential 
situation where analogous inference could be useful. These outlier lineages, 
as I shall call them, limit the utility of  homology as a means of  discovering 
the past because of  phenotypic isolation. The hominid lineage, for example, 
is phenotypically isolated on two counts: It possesses a suite of  traits unique 
among primates and all its closest relatives are extinct. Without homologies, 
comparative information from analogies would be welcome. I will also 
argue for a division of  labour between analogy and homology in the 
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 retrodiction of  evolutionary histories. 
The sixth chapter  introduces the first solution to the problem of  causal 
depth that I will consider, parallel-modelling. A defender of  parallel-
modelling claims that analogies only have epistemic warrant when used in 
highly developmentally constrained contexts. Because closely related 
lineages share similar developmental systems, there is a higher chance they 
will evolve similar adaptive responses to similar niches. By constraining our 
‘catchment-area’, then, we can ensure that the environmental variables we 
are interested in are the factors which cause the evolution of  our target trait. 
The seventh chapter is about non-parallel analogies. I argue that 
although parallel modelling is a suitable approach given certain conditions, it 
is not the only solution to the problem of  causal depth. Analogies can be 
valid when they are part of  an integrated explanation. Analogous 
information can be part of  the corroborating evidence for a hypothesis. 
The validity of  these parts is taken as a whole rather than in isolation. I will 
also argue that several different analogues can be used to test and refine our 
model. Boot-strapping will both reaffirm our confidence in the regularity 
we are discovering and give us a firmer grip on the finer details of  the 
evolution of  the trait. 
Finally, in the Coda I consider means of  widening the explanatory 
framework I have lain down for analogies. I will claim that artificial physical 
structures (such as engineering and architecture) and design can occasionally 
be analogous to biological traits. If  biological evolution is a special case of  
more general evolutionary processes, then perhaps we should expect to find 
something similar to homology and analogy in any selective regime. The 
argument is simple. If  two lineages have analogous traits in virtue of  those 
traits evolving through a similar selective process, then it is open to claim 
that any non-biological design which has ‘evolved’ through a similar process 
can also be counted as an analogy. Natural and artificial selection are 
different processes but, I think, they can be relevantly similar, and able to 
inform us about each other. The upshot of  this argument is that the non-
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 existence of  biological analogues is not an issue. We can, given the right 
conditions, make our own. 
My aim in this thesis is to fill a gap. When philosophers and biologists 
examine the use of  comparative data in biology, they typically focus on the 
use of  homology and are disparaging about analogy. Those who have used 
and examined analogues have generally done so ignoring the criticisms 
which I shall rehearse. I argue that analogies can be successfully 
incorporated into evolutionary explanation. However, in order to use 
analogies we need a clear idea of  which applications shed light on our past, 
and which do not. 
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 1 .  A n a l o g y  a n d  H o m o l o g y  
Before explaining the difficulties faced by analogous inferences, we need 
to know what the term means. As we shall see, analogy is defined in 
contrast to homology, so the next two chapters will give an account of  
both.  
An analogy is an independently evolved similarity between two lineages. 
There are many documented cases of  ‘convergent evolution’ – sharks and 
dolphins have similar streamlined design, bats and birds are both winged 
and in South America a marsupial (Thylacosmilus) evolved with striking 
similarity to the North American (placental) Sabre-toothed Tiger (Smilodon). 
These count as analogous because the common ancestor between the two 
species lacked the traits they have independently evolved (an extensive 
overview of  cases of  convergence can be found in Conway-Morris 2003). 
Homology, then, is a similarity between two lineages which is present in 
the most recent ancestor. There are animals on earth which share the 
following properties: they give birth to live young who they feed on milk, 
they are warm blooded and tend to have fur or hair. We call these animals 
‘mammals’ and they are similar because they share descent – the ancestor of  
all mammals also gave birth to live young, fed them milk, and so on1. 
This first pass at a definition of  homology requires refining. It is 
presented as a definition, but is not quite an explanation. A trait being 
homologous between two lineages does not show that the similarity is only 
due to descent. Stabilizing selection may play an important role as without it 
traits may be lost. The degradation of  eyesight in cave-dwelling lineages, for 
                                                      
1 Or at least the ancestor of placental and marsupial mammals did. 




Analogy and homology are defined in relation to each other. Two similar 
traits are analogous if  they are not homologous, and vice-versa. In order to 
discover whether a similarity is independently evolved, we must first work 
out the evolutionary relationships. We must test for homology and analogy2. 
Typically definitions of  analogy have been made in contrast to homology. If  
we can define homology then we have a definition of  analogy in hand. 
Unfortunately, defining homology is not so straight-forward. 
The definition from a biological dictionary demonstrates our difficulty. 
Two structures are analogous if  “… their phyletic and/or developmental 
origin were independent of  each other, i.e if  there is homoplasy (Thain & 
Hickman 1996 pp26).” (As we shall see, tying our defintion to 
‘developmental origin’ is problematic due to both the decoupling of  levels 
of  homology and parallelisms). Homoplasy is a term from cladistics which 
we will take as interchangeable with analogy (for now). So, a definition of  
homology would provide a definition of  analogy. However, Thain & 
Hickman’s first line says it all: “Homology. A controversial term (Ibid 
p311).” We need to grasp homology before we can make headway with 
analogy. 
I will first give an overview of  the concept of  homology in the literature, 
consisting of  three accounts. The taxic account defines homology in terms 
of  the phyletic relationships between lineages. So warm-bloodedness is 
homologous between platypus and humans because the common ancestor 
of  the two lineages was warm blooded. The developmental account ties 
homology to common developmental origins. So warm-bloodedness is 
homologous between platypus and humans because the lineages have 
relevantly similar developmental systems. The transformative account ties 
                                                      
2 Paul Griffiths would disagree. He believes that homology must be tested for in order to 
show analogy, but not vice-versa. Why he thinks this, and why I disagree, will become 
clear through the chapter. 
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 homology to relationships (‘transformations’) between particular traits. And 
so warm-bloodedness is homologous between platypus and humans 
because there are relevant similarities between the traits in the two lineages.  
Following Griffiths, Brigandt, Love and others I accept pluralism about 
homology, whereby all three approaches are “…complementary aspects of  
an explanation of  the phenomena (Griffiths 2007a pp 656).” Kim Sterelny 
(personal communication) has expressed that the transformational account 
collapses into the taxic account and, at best, ought to be seen as an 
epistemic criterion for recognizing taxic homology. I am tempted to agree 
(in my arguments in the next two chapters I will come very close to it) but 
as what I have to say for the remainder of  the piece coheres with either 
conception I have opted to sit on the fence at least about that issue. My 
commitment to an account which gives analogy equal standing with 
homology will lead me to adopt a different account than that of  other 
pluralists.  
After the overview, I will describe Paul Griffiths’ account from The 
Phenomena of  Homology. He emphasizes a particular approach (the 
transformational) to homology. Despite his pluralism, the transformational 
approach takes precedence. 
This chapter sets us up for my own account, which I will describe and 
defend in the next. Though also pluralist, it contrasts with Griffiths’ 
account by taking homology as an explanation of  biological similarity. 
Defending this view will involve a positive argument for taking analogy 
seriously.  
The second chapter will close with a discussion on the relationship 
between function and physical description. I will use this to explore whether 
the identification of  two traits as ‘the same’ is problematic. For now, I will 
assume that such identifications of  similarity are robust. 
1.1  A Survey of Accounts of Homology 
There are three main accounts of  homology in the literature. Before 
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 giving my account an overview of  the current state of  play is necessary. As 
pointed out in Brigandt & Griffiths 2007, the nature of  the debate is similar 
to the species concept debate. We are not looking at definitions of  
homology so much as theoretical accounts, so they reflect different 
approaches to biological science as opposed to conflicting beliefs.  
1.1 .1  The Taxic Account 
“… unity of  type [fundamental structural similarity] is explained by unity 
of  descent (Darwin pp240).” 
According to the Taxic Account of  homology, two traits are 
homologous if  the trait was present in the ancestor of  the two lineages in 
question. So a trait, t, held by two lineages, x and y, is homologous only if  
the common ancestor of  x and y also had t. t would be analogous if  the 
common ancestor of  x and y did not hold t. To understand this, we need to 
look at some evolutionary fundamentals (I will provide a glossary for some 
of  these terms at the close of  the second chapter).  
 





On the left, the Common Ancestor (CA) of X and Y holds the trait (t), so 
the trait is homologous between X and Y. On the right, CA does not 
hold t, and so the trait is analogous 
 
 
By evolutionary theory, life is a process of  biological form (phenotype) 
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 gradually changing over time. Phenotype is generally homeostatic between 
generations because similar, heritable developmental resources (the genotype3) 
are passed from parent to offspring. Many similarities between phenotypes, 
therefore, are due to the trait being present in a common ancestor – they 
are synapomorphic.  
My father and I both have sandy-blonde hair and grow red beards. In the 
parlance of  systematics, we share the character-states of  sandy-blonde hair 
and red beards (at least when we do not shave). If  we examine our family 
tree, we will find a fair few men with these same character states. Why 
would this be? They are synapomorphies – I have a tendency to grow a red 
beard because my father has the same tendency. If  I had a red-bearded 
brother, the explanation for our similarity would be in terms of  continuity 
of  descent: we both have red beards because we share an ancestor with a 
red beard. So by the taxic account homologues are explained by descent. We 
do not just find continuity of  character-states within lineages, but between 
them as well. 
All primates form a clade, and in virtue of  this share certain 
characteristics. A clade is a monophyletic group – it includes a single 
ancestor and all of  her descendants (see Sober 1988 for a philosophically 
rigorous account). Some character-states, such as hairy bodies, five-fingered 
hands and forward-facing eyes are held in common between primates. By 
the taxic account, this is due to continuity of  descent. Because of  their 
common ancestry, all primates have similar genotypes and thus similar 
subsequent phenotypes. 
The Taxic approach is utilized by modern systematics or cladistics. 
Character-states count as data points that are diagnostic of  the evolutionary 
relationships between lineages. By quantifying the resemblance-relations 
                                                      
3 By ‘genotype’ here I do not refer to genes alone, the term here refers to whichever part of 
the developmental process is heritable, be it genetic, epi-genetic, cultural or 
environmental. 
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 between lineages, systematists hope to trace how related they are. For a 
cladist, trait similarities between species are categorized as homologies or 
homoplasies. As we have seen, homology is due to descent. Homoplasy is 
simply a similarity, a shared character-state between lineages, which is not 
homologous. If  they are independently evolved they are homoplasies. At 
this stage I will use ‘homoplasy’ and ‘analogy’ as interchangeable terms: by 
the taxic account, analogy is a similarity between character states which has 
evolved independently in two lineages. 
Not all biological similarities can be categorized by the Taxic approach, 
however. As well as similarities between organisms, such as my beard and 
my father’s, there are similarities within organisms – serial homologies. My 
left and right arms share many character-states, as do my hands and feet 
(both have similar bone structure, five digits and are at the end of  limbs).  
Each vertebra in the backbone is a separate individuated piece but they are 
all tokens of  the same type. Because the taxic account examines character-
states between organisms, it is blind to similarities within organisms.  
The difference between analogy and homology is clear from a taxic 
standpoint. When a trait has evolved in two lineages independently, 
meaning that it was not present in their most recent common ancestor, then 
they are analogous (homoplastic).  
1.1 .2   The Developmental Account 
The Developmental approach explains the mechanism by which 
homology arises in terms of  the actual physical processes by which 
individual organisms develop. If  the taxic account explains the congruence 
of  character states between lineages, the developmental account explains 
the taxic account.  
By the developmental account the similarity in beard shade between me, 
my father and my (hypothetical) brother is explained in terms of  shared 
developmental information. We all utilise the same, or at least very similar, 
developmental resources – the same genotype. The genetic information 
which ‘codes’ for red shades in facial hair passed from my father to me. Our 
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 phenotypic homology is due to an underlying developmental homology.  
The developmental account unites serial and taxic homologues under 
one umbrella. My arms and legs are similar to one another, and similar to 
my father’s arms and legs, because they are produced through the same 
developmental process4. An explanation of  these similarities would involve 
an understanding of  those processes.  
It is important to make clear that merely being a similarity in 
developmental resources is not sufficient to qualify as a homology by this 
account. Homology and analogy can operate at different ‘levels’ of  
biological explanation. If  two relevantly similar developmental systems 
evolve independently of  each other, in principle this would be an analogy at 
the developmental level. Note that by the developmental account, if  there is 
a developmental homology, there cannot be an analogy at the level of  
phenotype (see below). 
We cannot define homology at the level of  phenotype entirely in 
developmental terms, however (Griffiths 2007a). It is reasonable to believe 
that different levels of  homology are decoupled (Brigandt & Griffiths 
2007). You can have a homology in phenotype without a corresponding 
homology in genotype and vice-versa. Due to the amount of  co-option and 
drift in developmental evolution, there are cases of  phenotypic homology 
that are phylogenetically continuous but, over evolutionary time, now rely 
on different, non-homologous developmental resources. Nijhout (1985) has 
suggested this is the case for the development of  wing patterns in 
butterflies. Some closely related butterflies have homologous wing patterns, 
but these patterns are caused by different, non-homologous developmental 
processes. We also see this decoupling in sex determination. The 
male/female dichotomy is presumably homologous amongst most 
vertebrates, but different mechanisms determine sex in different lineages. In 
                                                      
4 What counts as ‘the same’ developmental process is an open question I cannot explore 
here, although it is touched upon in my discussion of parallel evolution in chapter 6. 
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 some cases (like our own), sex is determined largely genetically - activity 
during meiosis determines gender. However, in many other animals 
environmental factors such as temperature determine gender. 
Developmental homologues are used in phenotypic homoplasies as well. 
The pax6 gene, for instance, is used in the development of  the camera-like 
eyes of  mammals and the compound eyes of  insects – eyes which have 
evolved independently (Love 2007, Powell 2007, Gould 2002). It is 
homologous at a developmental level, but the eyes at the phenotypic level 
are not (see Raff  1996 pp 234-237 for examples from sea-urchin ontogeny). 
This means that we cannot reduce talk of  phenotype homology to 
developmental homology. 
The developmental approach is an important research area; it is required 
for a full understand of  how homology and analogy evolve. A preliminary 
sketch is provided in both Griffiths 2007 and Brigandt 2007. The approach 
ought to be seen as complementary, not opposed to, the taxic conception.  
The developmental approach will not be of  much help to us here, 
however. If  we lean too heavily on developmental resources we are unable 
to tell the difference between homology and parallel evolution. 
Sometimes homoplasies evolve in closely related lineages using the same 
developmental resources, these are parallelisms (Powell 2007, Gould 2002, 
Diogo 2005). The concept will be extremely important later on, but here it 
will suffice to say that because parallelisms have evolved independently they 
count as data points for a different suite of  inferences than if  they were 
homologous. That homology and parallelisms have different inferential uses 
is good reason to preserve the distinction. No matter how close the 
evolutionary relationship between the two lineages, if  the trait has evolved 
independently it has something to tell us about the conditions under which 
the trait evolves. If  the traits are homologous, then they do not (although 
they may be able to tell us about selection’s role in maintaining the trait over 
time). Because the lineages can utilize identical developmental resources in 
constructing phenotype, the developmental account cannot distinguish 
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 between them.  
1.1 .3   The Transfor mational Account 
“[homology is] The same organ in different animals under every variety 
of  form and function (Owen, quoted in Brigandt & Griffiths pp 635).” 
Before the acceptance of  Darwin’s evolutionary theory, biologists 
categorized resemblance-relations between organisms using a set of  
operational criteria. This is the transformational account. The account is 
importantly related to the taxic (it is also used by cladists) but is different as 
it focuses on homology between particular traits, rather than the lineages as 
a whole. Homology here is not envisioned as “…a single, shared character 
state, but as a range of  different states in which the same character can 
appear… (Griffiths 2007 pp648)” Consider milk-provision as homologous 
between humans and platypus. In most mammals milk is produced in 
mammary glands and expressed through specialized tissue (teats). In 
monotremes such as echidna and platypus milk is secreted through the skin. 
The echidna has two ‘milk patches’, whereas the platypus excretes the milk, 
sweat-like, from its skin. By the transformational account, human and 
echidna milk provision are homologous because they are variations on the 
same character. We can see a transformation from the platypus’ general 
excretion, to the echidna’s patches, to the placental mammal’s teats. 
To understand the difference between the taxic and transformational 
accounts, we must articulate the difference between a character and a character-
state. The taxic account infers homology based on character-states. These 
are (typically) binary states that a trait may occupy in a particular lineage. I 
either have a red beard, or I do not. A character, which the transformational 
account focuses on, considers traits at a coarser grain. Red beards and black 
beards are both variations of  the character ‘beard’.  
By the transformational account traits which are homologous are, in 
some sense, the same trait. Owen defines homologies as being the same 
organ under every variety of  form and function. To say traits have 
phylogenetic continuity is to say they are tokens of  the same type. The 
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 swim bladder is a kind of  modified lung which is used in ray-finned fish to 
control buoyancy by increasing and decreasing gas5. This is not its only 
function, however: in some fish it is still primarily used for breathing and in 
others it has been co-opted for use in hearing (Dawkins 2004). By the 
transformative account, focusing on the character, the lung and the swim-
bladder are homologous. They represent transformations of  the same 
morphological structure. A taxic account focusing on character-states may 
see the swim-bladder and a lung as non-homologous as they are diagnostic 
of  a split between the two lineages. When compared to a different lineage 
which lacks swim bladders or lungs altogether, however, the taxic account 
may see them as homologous as they will unite the groups into a clade, with 
the new lineage as an outlier.  
The criteria by which homology is set by this account are as follows: 
Traits can be similar topographically. Their resemblance-relation may be in 
terms of  position, size and structure. The eyes of  primates are homologous 
because they are all forward-facing; occupy the same space in the skull; are a 
similar size and so on. It is in virtue of  their similarity in organization that 
we recognise their homology. 
Alternatively traits could be similar due to special qualities – “… shared 
features which cannot be explained by the role of  a part in the life of  an 
organism (Griffiths 2007, pp 658).” These special qualities are arbitrary, 
such as the position of  the blood supply to the retina in the vertebrate eye 
(Griffiths’ example). Some bird species do complex and ornate dances as 
part of  their mating routine (Love 2007). There is no particular functional 
reason for them to dance as such (other birds seem to breed perfectly well 
without dancing) so it is unlikely that it evolved independently in the 
lineages. The characters can also unite clades. All spiders have spinnerets, 
                                                      
5 As surprising as it may seem, it looks like lungs evolved first. The ancestral lung evolved 
into the swim-bladders of ray-finned fish and the lungs of terrestrial mammals. See 
Dawkins 2004’s discussion and Farmer 1997 (she argues that the ancestral ‘lung’ was 
for oxygenating the heart). 
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 organs usually located on the abdomen which produce silk. Having this 
organ (or at least the vestige of  it) is considered both necessary and 
sufficient for entrance to the spider clade.  
Finally, homology can be recognised in terms of  intermittent forms, or 
transformations. The feet of  Homo-sapiens and other primates can be seen as 
variations upon a particular structural theme (Chapais 2008, chapter 1). The 
skull-shapes of  vertebrates are all versions of  the same basic design. The 
skull might be elongated for a horse, flattened for a crocodile or expanded 
for an elephant. It might have different kinds of  horns, antlers and other 
bells and whistles. Overall, however, the skulls of  all vertebrates are 
elaborations on the same character. For the systematist, this could act as a 
data-point for clade construction. 
However, the status of  analogy in the transformational account is 
unclear. By using these three criteria, biologists can determine whether 
particular characters are homologous or not, but what would it mean for a 
trait to be analogous? Analogy cannot mean dissimilar – it is independently 
derived similarity. Perhaps if  the characters are not similar enough to each 
other they may count, but to what degree? Because the transformational 
account looks at homologous relationships between particular traits, it is 
not clear how it can identify analogy.  
I will take a paradigm example of  analogy, the evolution of  similar body 
shapes in sharks and dolphins, and see what the transformational account 
will make of  them. By the transformational account shark and dolphin 
body design could be seen as homologous – they are both transformations 
of  the basic vertebrate body structure.  
Alternatively, they could not be homologous. Consider the 
transformations of  the tail and backbone in the two lineages. Sharks have 
retained the backbone structure of  their aquatic ancestors and so swim 
along a vertical axis. The cetaceans, by contrast, have been originally 
adapted for terrestrial motion and so swim along a horizontal axis, 
‘galloping’ through the sea. So the shark is a transformation of  the fish 
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 body shape and the dolphin a transformation of  the terrestrial mammal 
body shape (both of  which are sub-sets of  the vertebrate body shape). 
These two different characters both share a similarity in the method in 
which they generate forward motion in an aquatic environment: they flex 
their backbone to swing their ‘tail’. We could perhaps view this as an 
analogy – two different characters have evolved similarities.  
There are three problems with this attempt to define analogy in 
transformational terms. First, it is not clear that the move is independent 
from the phyletic relationships between the two lineages. To see the body 
shapes as independently evolved, we need an evolutionary history of  the 
lineages in question – and this is a taxic conception. So in order for the 
transformative account to give us analogy, it must collapse into, or at least 
work in partnership with, the taxic account. 
Second, whether the transformational account should view shark and 
dolphin body-design as different characters is up for debate. Analysing 
them as homologies is more aligned with the concept. It is clear that both 
are transformations of  similar designs – their resemblances outweigh their 
differences (particularly when compared with invertebrates).  
Third, this story radically limits what can count as an analogy by tying it 
to similarities in different characters. If  a similarity is within the same 
character, this could not be analogous. This would discount parallel 
evolution. Perhaps the similarities between mammal and cephalopod eyes 
could count as analogous, because there is not a transformative chain that 
links them. However, given the similarities between the two characters I 
would argue that claiming a lack of  transformative chain presupposes 
knowledge of  the evolutionary history of  the two lineages – again, it is 
reliant on the taxic conception.  
This is important for future discussion: the transformational account 
cannot define analogy – at least without collapsing into the taxic account. 
If  we are to envision the transformational account as independent, and in 
fact as having priority, over the taxic (which Griffiths does), then analogy 
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 falls out of  the picture. 
 Griffiths has argued that the transformational account is an 
‘experimental tradition’ and homology should be viewed as a pre-theoretic 
phenomena (pre-theoretic to an overarching ‘theory’ at any rate). This 
argument has important consequences for my position, so I will take some 
time explaining it. 
1.2   Is  Homology Pre-theoretic?  
In Paul Griffiths’ 2007 paper The Phenomena of  Homology he argues that 
homologies in the transformational sense are “… robust descriptive 
phenomena (pp655).” This argument is important because it explains some 
of  the reason that analogy may be in disrepute, and defusing it will give an 
impetus for my account. Griffiths’ position is best seen as consisting of  two 
claims. One I agree with. The other I do not, and will dispute. 
Griffiths argues that homology is a ‘mind-independent’, non-
gerrymandered phenomena– it is pre-theoretic. A phenomenon pre-theoretic 
if  it is not postulated in light of  an overarching theory. Some of  the 
postulates of  quantum mechanics, for instance, may not be pre-theoretic. 
Currently unobserved particles which are postulated to explain observations 
may be reliant on theory. Our commitment to the existence of  these 
phenomena is dependant on the confirmation of  the theory and its 
postulates. For some postulates in physics, the jury is currently out. Pre-
theoretic phenomena, by contrast, require explanation even if  the current 
paradigm is false. When Ptolemaic Astronomy was rejected the sun’s 
apparent movement across the sky was still a phenomena which a new 
theory had to account for. “…[H]omologies are robust phenomenon that 
stand in need of  explanation and whose reality is to some extent 
independent of  current theory (Ibid, pp651).” 
Griffiths does not only argue that homology is mind-independent. 
Homology for him is in some sense a fundamental phenomenon – the 
transformational criteria do not infer homology, they recognise, or diagnose 
it. The taxic account is merely an explanation of  homology, not truly a 
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 definition. This affects my aim of  giving an account of  analogy because it 
puts analogy on a lower epistemological footing than homology. We 
recognise homology, but analogy must be inferred – there is an epistemic 
asymmetry between them.  
‘Pre-theoretic’ does not mean empty of  all theory, but independent of  
an overriding theory6. The transformational account does contain ‘theory’ 
in the broad sense. The three criteria for identification could be seen as 
theory. However, Griffiths argues that these criteria can stand alone 
independent of  a unifying theory of  the kind usually referred to by 
philosophers of  science. Griffiths bases his position on the New 
Experimentalists of  the 1980s. 
For the New Experimentalists, the theoretical and experimental (or 
observational) aspects of  scientific work can be decoupled. The most well-
known example of  this is Ian Hacking’s work on microscopy (Hacking 
1981). When microscopes were constructed, the experimental work that 
proceeded did not test any particular theory, but collated data. The 
existence of  Microscopic phenomena can be argued for independently of  
microscopic theory. A macroscopic phenomenon may be shrunk and then 
viewed through the microscope to ensure they are similar. As Griffiths puts 
it, “These arguments for believing what is seen through a microscope do 
not appeal either to the kinds of  theories we use microscopes to test or to 
the theory of  the working of  the microscope. Instead, they provide direct, 
independent, reasons to accept the reality of  the phenomena observed with 
the microscope (Griffiths 2007 pp 652).”  
Griffiths replaces the direct testing used in the microscope case with an 
argument from success based on the work of  the pre-Darwinian 
                                                      
6 ‘Pre-theoretic’ is, perhaps, the wrong term. There is a difference between the ‘pre-
theoretic’ nature of our observation that the sun crosses the sky during the day and 
homology. Another way of reading my arguments in the next two chapters is in 
claiming that resemblance-relations are pre-theoretic (in a similar sense to the sun’s path), 
whereas homology and analogy are explanations of it. 
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 Anatomists. He cites uses of  the comparative method which correctly 
resolved disputes around homology (such as the relationship between 
human urinary-genital system in embryo and adult). That this was the 
correct analysis, as later confirmed under the aegis of  Darwinian theory, 
provides evidence that the phenomena is pre-theoretic. “A history of  
success in using these predicates in a wide range of  inductive inferences 
provides grounds for supposing that they taxonomise the phenomena in a 
way that corresponds to actual causal processes in nature (Ibid pp 653).” So 
because the anatomists were successful in their diagnoses of  homology 
despite lacking an overriding theory, we should believe that homology is 
mind-independent.  
The New Experimentalists claimed that an experimental tradition may 
accumulate knowledge independently of  theory, and Griffiths claims this 
for pre-Darwinian uses of  homology. The failure of  the theory of  
Ptolemaic Astronomy does not falsify the observations of  heavenly bodies 
that were made in the fifteen hundred years before Copernicus. When 
Copernican theory gained credence, it did so on the basis of  providing an 
explanation of  data garnered earlier. Working without an overriding theory 
like Evolution, the anatomists nonetheless provided much of  the evidence 
for Darwin’s theory. This shows that the observations and data collated was 
independent of  that theory, they preceded it. The anatomists were not 
making an inference when they diagnosed homology; they were recognising 
an overt phenomenon.  
I do not believe that the distinction between inference and recognition is 
sharp. There are border-line cases (if, for example, folk psychology turns 
out to be radically false as Paul and Patricia Churchland have argued, do 
categories such as ‘belief ’ and ‘desire’ still require explanation?). This does 
not overly affect Griffiths’ thesis, however. He just needs to claim that 
homology is significantly more robust than analogy. 
However, I do not think we ought to be convinced of  Griffiths’ 
argument from success. Consider another area where pre-Darwinians have 
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 been very successful: species identification. In the introduction I made a 
passing reference to the Great Chain of  Being which the platypus’ 
discovery upset. We may notice how successful these Aristotelian 
taxonomies were – generally pre-Darwinian naturalists got it right. Counter-
examples such as the identification of  the barnacle goose and barnacles as 
the same species notwithstanding, typically species were correctly identified 
despite lacking any evolutionary theory. Moreover, as Diamond & Bishop 
(1999) have demonstrated, folk conceptions of  the divisions in nature are 
remarkably astute. Does this success mean that we ought to privilege a pre-
Darwinian conception of  species? It is hard to see why. This success does 
support the claim that the category ‘species’ is in some sense mind-
independent – they are phenomena in need of  explanation by whichever 
theoretical framework we employ. But we do not think that a folk definition 
of  ‘species’ is somehow epistemically fundamental.  
So Griffiths has argued for homology being a mind-independent, pre-
theoretic phenomenon. I agree. He also claims that homology is, somehow, 
fundamental – it is the non-inferred target of  some evolutionary 
explanation. I do not think his argument is enough to support his second 
claim, but as the discussion falls on the relative merits of  the positions qua 
their explanatory potency, I want to go further and present reasons why we 
should be unhappy with Griffiths’ account. 
An important implication of  Griffiths’ position is the epistemic 
asymmetry between homology and analogy (made explicit in Griffiths 
2007b). If  homology is simply recognised, but analogy can only be inferred, 
then we should believe that homology is less epistemically demanding than 
analogy. We need to rule out homology before we can consider analogy. To 
support an adaptive claim about the emergence of  a trait, we may wish to 
point to an analogous example. For instance, that dolphins, sharks and 
ichthyosaurs all evolved similar streamlined shapes is good evidence that 
there is selective pressure towards that body-shape. However, to count as 
data-points for the inference, the examples must be independently evolved. 
As Griffiths correctly points out, it is the instances of  independent 
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 evolution that count, not merely any instance of  the trait. If  the traits are 
homologous, then Natural Selection has no part in explaining the trait’s 
emergence (although it may be important in maintaining homeostasis 
through time, see Griffiths 1994).  
Why should I be concerned with epistemic asymmetry? We can still 
identify analogies, albeit in a secondary step, and use them in inferences. 
There are three reasons. First, in 2007b Griffiths uses the asymmetry to 
claim that homology ought to be preferred in evolutionary explanation (as it 
is less epistemically demanding). Second, it is very hard to understand how 
it could be that we need to identify homologies in order to use analogies, 
but not vice-versa. The third, and main, reason is that I think the 
asymmetry simply does not exist – it does not exist because homology is no 
more fundamental a phenomena than analogy. 
Before moving to my arguments, it is important to point out that there is 
a sense in which we can read the epistemic asymmetry between homology 
and analogy without requiring Griffiths' second claim. To explain this, we 
need to finally distinguish between homoplasy and analogy. A homoplasy is 
a case of  independently evolved similarity - how we have up until now 
defined analogy. An analogy is a case of  independently evolved similarity 
which has evolved due to the same selective process. Perhaps the webbing 
on ducks' feet evolved in order to swim more efficiently but the webbing on 
a platypus evolved for some other purpose (perhaps an ancestor used to 
glide between coolibah trees). If  this was the case, then there would be 
homoplasy between the two lineages, but the traits would not be analogies.  
So, it is one thing to claim that a resemblance is homoplastic, but 
another to claim it is analogous. To make a claim of  analogy, we must first 
control for homology by drawing our clades and confirming homoplasy. We 
then need to show that the homoplasies are due to the same selective 
processes. We want to shift from a mere definition of  analogy, to analogy as 
an explanation. For analogies continuity of  niche explains the resemblances. 
For mere homoplasies, continuity of  niche does not explain them. We do 
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 learn something about selection from this – that the traits are open to being 
selected (at least in those lineages), but this is relatively uninteresting. 
So, if  this line of  thought is right, there is no epistemic asymmetry 
between homology and homoplasy, but there is between homology and 
analogy. In the case of  homology we control for homoplasy by cladistic 
analysis. In the case of  analogy we first control for homology by cladistic 
analysis, and then confirm that the two lineages have relevantly similar 
selective environments. This means that analogous similarities are such on 
two counts:  they are similarity in character as well as similarity in selective 
environment. 
I think this version of  the asymmetry is misconceived because a parallel 
argument can be run against homology. Let us imagine two different cases 
of  homology. In the first, the explanation of  homology is simply descent. 
Perhaps the warm-blood of  mammals has been retained across evolutionary 
time because that trait has become entrenched in the mammalian 
developmental system. In the second, descent is not the whole explanation. 
Maybe warm-bloodedness is actually extremely labile developmentally, 
perhaps some environmental factor (such as temperature) had a strong 
influence, or the genetic correlates themselves were particularly prone to 
mutation. If  that was the case, then the reason that mammals are warm-
blooded is not simply that it was inherited, but that any mammal born 
without a way of  internally regulating their temperature is selected out of  
the population. In the first case, descent plays a large role in explaining the 
similarity. In the second case, stabilizing selection plays a large role.  
So, if  we expect homology to be an explanation of  the similarity, we 
need to control for stabilizing selection. This is to divide the cladist’s term 
synapomorphy from homology. It is one thing to say a trait is 
synapomorphic in two lineages (it is held by the common ancestor), it is 
another to say they are homologous (it is held because it has been 
inherited).   This, like in the analogy case, would constitute a second step in 
the identification of  a homology. There is no asymmetry here unless we, 
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 like Griffiths, think that homology is somehow more fundamental than 
analogy. 
The next section will give reasons to disagree with the claim that 
homology is a fundamental, non-inferred phenomenon. This will prepare us 
for my account in the next chapter. 
1.3  Fitting Analogy into the Picture 
My purpose is to discuss analogy, so the approach to homology I take 
must be amenable to it7. As we saw in the last section, accepting pluralism 
about accounts of  homology does not necessarily put analogy and 
homology on equal footing. An account of  analogy is only clearly given by 
the taxic account and, if  we accept Griffiths’ arguments, the taxic account is 
of  secondary importance to the transformational (because the 
transformational account diagnoses the phenomena of  homology, whereas 
the taxic only explains it). This puts analogy on the backfoot before we even 
have a chance to discuss its epistemic status. 
This section will present two objections to Griffiths’ account, which I 
hope are extendable to any definition of  homology which gives the 
transformational approach priority. The first objection relies on the 
transformational approach’s inability to discern between parallel evolution 
and homology. The second claims that there is a tension in his account.  
If  we agree there is an important difference between cases of  parallel 
evolution and homology, then the transformational account must be 
inferential. Why? Because cases of  parallel evolution can be as similar, by 
transformational criteria, as cases of  homology. Merely examining the 
character-similarity does not tell us whether they are homologous or 
analogous. Very close similarity provides strong evidence for homology, but 
                                                      
7 One option which I suppose is open would be to take a pragmatic stance in relation to 
this issue. Just taking the taxic account would make this job simpler. I do think that it 
can be justified on stronger grounds than pragmatism, however. 
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 does not guarantee it. Only the holistic approach given by the taxic account, 
which uses a suite of  different character-states to set the relationship 
between organisms, can distinguish between homology and parallel 
evolution. 
This does not make homology mind-dependant, but it does mean we 
should reject Griffiths’ second claim – that homology is in some sense 
fundamental; that it is observed, not inferred. In response Griffiths could 
claim that our inability to observe something with certainty does not mean 
that the phenomenon is not in fact observed. I agree, but if  we want to 
preserve the distinction between parallel evolution and homology then it 
cannot be the case that the transformational account picks out homology as 
a fundamental, non-inferred category. 
 I can now move onto the second argument. 
This objection to Griffiths’ position is fairly complex. An intuitive 
version goes as follows. For Griffiths, analogy is epistemically parasitic on 
homology because homology is a robust, pre-theoretical descriptive 
phenomenon. But analogy is pre-theoretical as well. What is more it is 
recognised the same way as homology (see below). If  this is the case then 
there is a tension between the nature of  analogy and Griffiths’ account of  
homology. All else being equal, if  we can find a theory which resolves this 
tension it ought to be preferred. Here it is in more formal terms. 
1. Griffiths’ First Claim: homology is pre-theoretic 
2. Griffiths’ Second Claim: homology is a ‘fundamental’ phenomenon 
which is not inferred 
3. By Griffiths’ account, the taxic approach provides an evolutionary 
explanation of  homology (not a definition) (due to 2) 
4. The transformational approach cannot provide an account of  analogy 
(only the taxic can) 
5. Analogy is epistemologically secondary to homology (from 2, 3 & 4) 
6. Analogy is pre-theoretic 
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 7. Analogy and homology are both ‘pre-theoretic’, descriptive 
phenomena which are recognised through very similar, sometimes the 
same, methods (from 1 & 6) 
8. There is a strong tension between 5 & 7 
The argument does not show that Griffiths is wrong, but instead 
motivates my account which will resolve the tension between premises 5 
and 7 by denying premise 2. The two key premises I need to argue for are 4 
and 6. I have already argued for 4, but 6 will require more work. 
As we have seen, Griffiths’ argument for taking homology as pre-
theoretic is founded on two points. The first is an argument from success. 
Because the anatomists were largely correct in their predications of  
homology, we ought to believe that they were describing a robust 
phenomenon. The second shows that homology’s recognition is 
independent from the theory which explains it. What could provide similar 
arguments for analogy? 
There does not appear to be an argument from success for analogy, or at 
least it is beyond the scope of  this project. Most of  the work undertaken in 
evolutionary biology which could use analogy has either been informal 
theory corroboration which has not been clearly successful (Gould & 
Lewontin 1979, Griffiths 1994) or formal population biology which has 
typically been too abstract to make use of  real-world exemplars. As we shall 
see in chapter 4, there may be reason to think that analogy has been 
particularly unsuccessful, or at least it is very difficult to ascertain what its 
success would look like8. Having said this, the example of  Cuvier against 
Owen is telling. Cuvier emphasized functional continuity in his pre-
Darwinian anatomy and was at least as successful as Owen.  I will argue that 
analogy is a descriptive phenomenon based on an argument for theoretical 
                                                      
8 One case that certainly looks like success to me is the predicted life-way of a eusocial 
mammal based on insect analogues which was confirmed in the discovery of the naked 
mole-rat (Dawkins 1976). 
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 independence.  
1.3 .1  The Phenomena of Analogy 
This section will present reasons for agreeing with premise 6 of  my 
argument above: that analogy, like homology, is pre-theoretical – it precedes 
evolutionary theory. I will argue that the means of  identifying function in 
artefacts and biology, functional analysis, is independent of  evolutionary 
theory. If  this is the case, then independently evolved resemblance-relations 
in biology (analogies), functional similarities, are also independent of  
evolutionary theory (at least epistemically – they, like homology, clearly need 
evolutionary theory for explanation).   
How may we infer, from a physical description of  an artefact, what its 
function might be? For any given function, there is a range of  ways it may 
be actualized. This means that for any given structure, there are only so 
many functions which that structure might be an instantiation of. As Kroes 
(2006) puts it, “From the structural description of  a spoon I may easily 
conclude that that object is not a copying machine, and from the functional 
description of  a spoon, I can reasonably infer that the Empire State 
Building is not a spoon (pp 143).” 
Daniel Dennett (1995) has argued that the more complex an artefact, the 
more likely it is that we can identify its function. As complexity in physical 
structure increases, the range of  possible functions that structure might 
instantiate decreases. To borrow Sterelny (2003)’s example, we can be 
confident that a three-pronged spear is for fishing as opposed to hunting 
because its design features make it efficient for spearing fish but, due to its 
light weight, useless for hunting terrestrial animals.  
So, for very complex artefacts, purpose becomes less ambiguous. Recall 
Pailey’s 19th Century version of  the argument from design (Pailey 2006 
(1803)). He asks us to imagine discovering a watch in a location not typically 
visited by humans. It is suggested that we deduce that, due to the clear 
design of  the watch, there must have been a designer of  it. Ignoring this 
teleological move, let’s ask instead why we call this object a ‘watch’ in the 
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 Figure ii: Belleropon Mounted on a 
Pegasus, Peircing the Chimera 
first place. If  we are to design a working watch using clockwork, there are 
very specific constraints on our design. The clockwork must be regular 
enough to keep time, it must relate in the right way to the clock face to be 
able to represent time, and so on. Due to this, only so many options will 
work, and it would be surprising if  something meets the functional criteria 
of  being a watch, but is not. I will now move to a biological example. 
‘Wing’ is clearly a functional, as opposed to phylogenetic term. The 
wings of  bats, birds and insects (not to mention aircraft) are not 
homologous (although bats and birds use some homologous structures), 
but we are happy to identify them all as wings due to a continuity of  
purpose. So, if  a structure’s function is unidentified – if  we have not seen it 
‘working’, upon what basis could we claim it is a wing? 
There are massive constraints on 
what will create a working wing. The 
requirements depend on the mass and 
shape of  the object to be lifted, the 
physics of  the environment itself  and 
the available materials. Attaching a pair 
of  swan’s wings to a horse, as in 
Reuben’s 1635 painting (Bellerophon 
Mounted on a Pegasus, Piercing the Chimera), 
would not provide the intended result. If  
the horse somehow managed to get off  
the ground, it would not remain above it 
for long. The engineering constraints of  flight restrict what counts as a 
working wing in the same fashion that watches are restricted. 
The upshot of  these engineering constraints is that certain functional 
ascriptions can be made merely on recognition of  those constraints, and 
this is as true for designed objects like watches as it is for ‘design-like’ 
biological objects like wings. 
When we recognise an analogy in biology, we do this on the basis of  
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 resemblance-relations which in some cases would also be picked out by the 
transformational account. In the case of  a wing, we recognise topographic 
similarities in the organization of, say, a bat wing and a bird wing. Their 
make-up is very different in important respects, but they still have 
continuity of  form due to the engineering constraints required of  them. 
The similarities between dolphins and sharks can also be put in 
topographical terms: ‘stream-lined’ implies functional use, but is recognised 
in terms of  form. As pointed out earlier, in the case of  parallel evolution 
the similarities are closer and in some cases are indistinguishable from 
homologies based on transformational methods (a fuller account of  the 
relationship between function and form will be given in the next chapter). 
So, when there is striking similarity between disparate lineages we can 
sometimes refer to engineering constraints (such as aerodynamics) to 
describe that similarity. No-one denies this, but essential for my purpose is 
what follows: these ‘design constraints’ are pre-theoretical. They do not rely 
on an overarching theory of  biological form. They are a description of  the 
phenomenon, albeit a thick, theoretically informal description, as well as 
part of  its explanation. In short, we should agree with premise 6 of  my 
argument.  
If  6 is the case, then the tension in Griffiths’ account becomes apparent. 
Griffiths undermines analogy by making homology as described by the 
transformational account a robust, descriptive phenomenon which is in 
some sense fundamental: the explanatory target of  the taxic account is 
homology itself. Analogy is then epistemically parasitic on homology and is 
inferred using methods reliant on Darwinian Theory (the taxic account). 
But analogy is also a descriptive phenomenon to be explained and in some 
cases (particularly parallel) is recognised by the same criteria as homology is. 
How I think this tension ought to be resolved is the topic of  the next 
chapter.  
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 2 .  A n a l o g y  a n d  H o m o l o g y  a s  E x p l a n a t i o n s  o f  
B i o l o g i c a l  R e s e m b l a n c e - R e l a t i o n s  
This chapter will explain my account of  homology and analogy. It will be 
linked to a general story about the explanation of  similarity. The best 
account of  homology conceptualizes both homology and analogy as 
possible explanations for character-congruence. The level of  similarity is 
fixed by the transformational method, and in combination with the taxic 
approach we infer which explanation is most likely.  
The first two sections will present my account of  homology and analogy. 
I will argue that we should not view the transformational method as a non-
inferential way of  diagnosing homology, but instead an operational criterion 
for recognising resemblance-relations between characters. Homology and 
Analogy are then conceived as inferred explanations of  character 
congruence9.  
My account is deliberately vague on what will constitute a similarity. As 
we shall see, I think that all resemblances, not simply the most obvious, may 
be placed into three categories: this is my task in 2.1. Moreover, although I 
tend to use morphological examples for ease of  exposition I hope (and 
intend) that, with minimal changes, my account can be applied to 
similarities at the molecular, behavioural and cognitive levels.  
I give three reasons to prefer my account (at least over Griffiths’). First, 
in the last chapter I argued that the transformational account’s inability to 
                                                      
9 This is similar to the account given in Coates 1993 insofar as the ‘conjectural’ nature of 
homology is emphasized. “Any conjecture of homology is therefore equivalent to the 
cladists’ synapomorphy, and consequently remains transformable into an instance of 
convergence or parallelism (homoplasy) by the introduction of new data into the 
classification. (pp412) 
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 discern homology from parallel evolution suggests that homology is 
inferred. I also argued in the last chapter for a tension in Griffiths account, 
the second reason will be that my account relieves that tension. Third I will 
show how my account coheres with a general account of  similarity 
explanation.  
In the last chapter I concluded that Griffiths’ account has a tension 
arising from his claim that homology is a non-inferred description and my 
claim that analogy is pre-theoretic. I resolve this tension by denying 
Griffiths’ claim that homology is non-inferred (2 in the formal version). 
Homology is not recognised using transformational methods, biological 
resemblance-relations are. If  we take the transformational method as 
describing resemblance-relations and homology and analogy are taken as 
inferred, evolutionary explanations of  these relations, then the problem will 
dissolve. 
By my account, the fundamental phenomena, the explanatory target, are 
resemblance-relations between and within biological objects. Animal 
Design-Space is not a phenotypic free-for-all. In the scope all of  possible 
forms, nature is surprisingly conservative. Comparisons between empirical 
morphospaces (which plot measurements based on data collated from 
actual animals) and theoretical morphospaces (which plot “… hypothetical 
yet potentially existent morphologies” (McGhee 1999 pp15)) have shown 
that of  the amount of  theoretically possible forms out there, very few are 
actualized. Morphology tends to cluster; morphospace is ‘lumpy’. Although 
a theoretical morphospace may not be independent of  evolutionary theory, 
empirical morphospaces are - they are simply the measurement and 
categorization of  traits. Resemblance relations, then, are striking 
phenomena independent of  any particular overriding theory.  
One advantage of  taking resemblance-relations as the fundamental 
phenomena is that it allows explanation of  biological resemblance to fit in 
with a more general account of  similarity-explanation. Due to its reliance 
on the transformational method Griffiths’ account cannot do this.  
   
 
32
 2.1  Sketch of a  General Account of  Similarity 
Explanation 
Similarity, when it occurs, is due to some combination of  three 
explanaans. The similarity may be due to continuity of  origin, continuity of  
process, or accident. In biological terms, analogy relates to continuity of  
process and homology to continuity of  origin. 
With many surprising cases of  similarity we might apply what Sober 
refers to as the principle of  common cause (Sober 1988). When we discover 
a similarity between two objects, an explanation which postulates the same 
cause for both is preferable. Why we should prefer this will be briefly 
touched upon in the context of  cladistic parsimony in the next chapter. 
Here I just want to point out that both continuity of  origin and of  process 
both fit within this principle. Accidental similarity does not. 
We may hypothesise that similarity is due to a continuity of  origin – they 
come from the same source. Two cars may be similar due to being 
manufactured according to the same assembly instructions, or at the same 
factory. Chocolates of  the same type will resemble one another due to being 
constructed from the same materials, using the same recipe and coming 
from the same mould.  
Sometimes similarities arise independently of  each other, and this may 
be due to a continuity of  process; perhaps a purposive ‘selective’ process, or a 
mechanical process. All ignatius rock is formed by the process of  magma 
cooling, and rocks will resemble each other in virtue of  this. Artefacts built 
with similar purposes may have resemblance-relations due to being affected 
by similar selective processes. The design of  a traditional Maori Pa 
resembles a medieval castle. Both are built on high ground where possible, 
have high walls, look-out towers and so on. These resemblance-relations 
existed because the requirements of  the kind of  warfare the two societies 
engaged in were the same.  
Some independent similarities may be due to accident. It is not merely 
chance, as there may be good reasons for the similarities, but if  they are 
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 different reasons, then their similarity counts as accidental. Not much can 
be made of  accidental similarity. However, the more striking the similarity 
or the more obvious the cause of  the similarity, the less likely accident is the 
explanation. That birds and aeroplanes share characters is surely not an 
accident. 
These explanations are not mutually exclusive, and often the best 
account of  a resemblance-relation will draw upon all three. Two roman 
arches will share distinctive characters. They will be semi-circular, have an 
odd number of  slightly wedged-shaped stones (voussoirs) and require a 
great weight of  masonry on either side to avoid bulging. These 
resemblance-relations are in part due to continuity of  origin. Roman 
architects made up for a lack of  theoretical understanding by adopting strict 
formalism – there was a particular way that one built an arch and this is 
reflected in the similarity between arches from this period. They also used 
the same materials wherever possible. This alone does not account for the 
similarity, however. The arches are subject to the same physical processes 
and their design reflects their purpose. By converting a vertical load into a 
lateral one distributed across the voussoirs an arch is able to support great 
weights (Gordon pp 187-189). If  the arch design varies too much the 
weight could be unevenly distributed and it could collapse. Perhaps some of  
the resemblances between any two arches are accidental as well. Perhaps the 
rock that was used happened to have stratified into the same pattern. I want 
to look at one more non-biological (and light-hearted) example before 
returning to the fold. 
Erich von Daniken hypothesizes continuity of  origin to explain character 
congruence between the pyramids of  ancient Egypt and the Central 
American Mayans. “They [particular pyramids in the Americas] have the 
same pyramidal shapes as those in Egypt. Who copied from whom?... 
Could it be that all pyramids everywhere in the world had the same master-
builders? (von Danikan pp 33-34, italics removed)” Continuity of  origin is 
an extremely implausible explanation for the phenomenon of  pyramid 
building in South America and Egypt. How could there have been contact 
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 between two peoples separated by great distances, both spatial and 
temporal? There is very little archaeological evidence to suggest any such 
meeting. Including aliens into the mix, as von Danikan is wont to do, does 
not help the plausibility of  the hypothesis.  
Fortunately, congruence due to similarity in selective process, as in the 
castle-Pa example above, seems very plausible indeed. When desiring to 
construct a large building using heavy stone the structure of  a pyramid is 
ideal. In addition to being very strong structurally (the weight is evenly 
distributed around the base), it is also pragmatic in construction: piling 
similarly shaped stone bricks on top of  one another will create this effect.  
Accident should also be taken into account. Considering the breadth of  
possible examples for von Danikan to pick from (all buildings made by all 
ancient peoples) it is a little remarkable that he is only able to point to 
similarities between two particular cultures. When looking for similarities – 
particularly for the purpose of  testing generalizations – we must avoid 
‘cherry-picking’ our examples (a problem we will discuss in more detail for 
biology in the next chapter). 
The amount of  congruence lends credence to a continuity of  origin 
hypothesis. If  two sets of  pyramids were similar in terms of  special features 
(if  both had sphinx, for instance) or in terms of  transformations (if  we 
could see a clear development of  style between them) then it would give us 
pause. Features as arbitrary as sphinx or specific as stylistic continuity are 
very unlikely to be due to common engineering features (the justification 
for thinking that character congruence provides good inferential grounds 
for phylogenetic claims is a main focus of  Sober 1988, and discussed in 
chapter 3). 
Griffiths’ account does not fit with this general story about similarity 
selection. As opposed to just recognising a similarity, which is then 
explained in terms of  continuity of  origin (descent, homology), process 
(niche continuity, analogy) or accident, when we describe continuity of  
origin in a biological context a different set of  rules apply. We somehow 
   
 
35
 immediately recognise the similarity as homologous with (at most) minimal 
inferential considerations. This does not seem to be the case, particularly 
taking parallel evolution into account – a glance at the debates in 
systematics shows that we are frequently wrong in our initial diagnoses of  
homology. Seen in this light, Griffiths’ arguments for homology being 
‘fundamental’ are not enough to support his claim. 
With my account in hand, then, I want to turn to a case study from 
systematics and see how this can be read in light of  it. 
2.2  Similarity in Biology 
I will look at Hans-Peter Schultze’s 1994 work contrasting seven 
competing hypotheses on the phylogenies of  sarcopterygian fishes 
(Schultze 1994). The sarcopterygian, or lobe-finned, fishes are of  special 
interest because of  their relationship to tetrapods. Tetrapods evolved onto 
the land and gave rise to the amphibians, reptiles, birds and mammals in the 
late Devonian. It is supposed that the limbs of  land animals evolved from 
their bony protruding fins. A central question is whether the tetrapod 
lineage is more closely related to extant sarcopterygian lineages (lungfish for 
example) or to extinct ones (see Coates 1993 for a philosophical review).  
Examining a series of  cladistic studies, Schultze compares two 
evolutionary hypotheses. In the first a clade is formed by the extinct lobe-
finned fishes and tetrapods, extant lobe-fins being an out-group. In the 
second the extant lobe-fins and tetrapods form the clade. 
 




Clade formed by extinct Sarcopterygia and tertrapods, extant 









Figure iii Hypothesis One 
 
 
Clade formed by extant Sarcopterygia and Tetrapods, extinct 









Figure iv Hypothesis Two 
 
There is a proposed homology which Schultze rejects, and his reasons 
for doing so are revealing. 
One of  the proposed homologies between a sarcopterygian lineage, the 
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 dipnoans (lungfish) and tetrapods is between the posterior internal nasal 
opening in dipnoans and the choana (the passageway between the nose and 
the throat) of  tetrapods. Schultze rejects the homology on two grounds. 
The first is due to transformational methods, specifically topography. The 
physiology of  the two features is not ‘similar’ in the correct respect. The 
other reason is due to cladistic parsimony, ‘taxic’ methods. Because a sister 
group of  dipnoans lacks the nasal opening altogether, a tree which has the 
traits as parallel (independently evolved) is more parsimonious insofar as 
this tree postulates less evolution events (see next chapter for an 
explanation of  this). “That means that homology is denied on two levels. 
The internal nasal opening in dipnoans fails the test of  similarity in its 
position relative to surrounding structures and as a synapomorphy, i.e., not 
present in the common ancestor of  dipnoans and tetrapods. (Schultze pp 
163)”  
Testing for homology occurs, then, twice in the process. Initially 
characters are considered topographically, roughly identically to how they 
would be by pre-Darwinian anatomists. So first we must judge (for instance) 
what counts as a prominent and nonprominent snout. As stated above, 
close similarity provides strong inferential grounds for homology, but as it is 
unable to differentiate between homology and parallel analogy it cannot be 
seen as a ‘recognition’ of  homology. 
Although the test for synapomorphy will not necessarily overturn the 
initial judgement, it frequently will. Judging how much either test should be 
weighted is determined by both the ‘closeness’ of  the cladistic trees (see 
next chapter) and the closeness of  the transformative similarity. As 
cladistics is probabilistic, there will be cases where the probabilities for a 
particular arrangement are indecisive. In such cases, we may prefer close 
transformative similarity.  Unless there was some reason to give a lot of  
weight to the transformational ‘homology’ between choana and internal 
nasal openings, the test for synapomorphy would be enough to overturn the 
judgment, so long as the cladistic probabilities are strong. The 
transformational method quantifies resemblance-relations and at best gives 
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 a strong, preliminary account of  the homology of  the states. It is only when 
the trees are constructed that we confirm or disconfirm the initial 
characterizations. Due to this, we should view the resemblance-relations, 
not the homology, as the primary phenomena. 
So, to recap my account. I see the cladistic terms synapomorphy and 
homoplasy as separate from homology and analogy. The cladistic terms are 
definitions, which are determined using both taxic and transformative 
methodology. Homology and analogy are explanations of  the similarities. 
The fundamental phenomenon of  interest is the similarity between lineages. 
These similarities, in the appropriate circumstances, can be explained by 
some combination of  continuity of  origin (homology), continuity of  
process (analogy) and accident. 
I have given three reasons to prefer my account over others, particularly 
that held by Griffiths. 
1. The transformational account cannot distinguish between homology 
and parallel analogy. As a different suite of  inferential uses apply to 
these we ought to prefer a theory which preserves the distinction. 
2. My account coheres with a more general account of  the explanation 
of  similarity. 
3. I have argued against granting epistemic privilege to the 
transformative or taxic account, claiming that we ought to use both 
streams of  evidence to determine synapomorphy or homoplasy. 
Because both homology and analogy are pre-theoretical, an account 
which places one over the other will have a tension between the 
supposed epistemic asymmetry and the nature of  the phenomena.    
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 2.3  Glossary  
Homoplasy: A definition from cladistics. A congruent character-state in 
two (or more) lineages is not present in the common ancestor of  the 
lineages. 
Synapomorphy: A definition from cladistics. A congruent character-state 
in two (or more) lineages is present in the common ancestor of  the 
lineages. 
Analogy: An explanation of  homoplasy. A congruent character-state 
between two (or more) lineages is homoplastic and evolved due to those 
lineages occupying similar selective environments. 
Homology: An explanation of  synapomorphy. A congruent character-
state between two (or more) lineages is synampomorphic and the state 
has been retained due to entrenchment in the developmental system (as 
opposed to maintained by selection). 
Clade/Monophyletic Group: A phylogenetic tree including an 
ancestor and all of  her descendants. 
Character: A trait as defined by the transformational method. Human 
feet and Chimpanzee feet are both transformations of  the character 
‘feet’ in primates. 
Character-State: A trait as defined by the taxic method. Some aspects 
of  Human feet are in a particular character-state, Chimpanzee feet might 
be in a different state. 
Before discussing the uses of  homology and analogy in inferences in 
chapters 3 and 4, I want to discuss a potential misunderstanding that could 
arise in terms of  analogy. 
2.4   Function and Similarity 
To close my account of  homology and analogy I want to address two 
questions. First, it has been claimed in the literature that there is something 
odd about casting homology in functional terms, and analogy in non-
   
 
40
 functional terms. I think this issue is easily resolved if  we take function and 
physical description as being continuous. Second, I will use this discussion 
to (as promised) briefly tackle the issue of  similarity-identification itself.  
2.4 .1  Function 
We might be forgiven for thinking that a functional description of  an 
object is separated from its physical description. There is a big difference 
between an abstract teleological definition ascribed to an object and a 
physical description of  it. ‘Hammer’, it could be argued, is a functional 
definition which could be ascribed to anything which drives a nail-like 
object into a wall or post (anything which ‘hammers’). 
Compare this to a physical description of  a typical hammer:   
In the functional case we determine that an object is a hammer because 
it meets some criteria of  use; in the physical descriptive case an object is a 
hammer if  it meets some criteria of  description: it must have a ‘metal head’ 
or a ‘wooden handle’. Prima facie, these look like unrelated ways of  ascribing 
the term ‘hammer’ to an object.  
If  we were committed to this dichotomy, then we might think there was 
something odd about the way homology and analogy have been discussed 
in the last two chapters. If  we think a synapomorphy is a case of  physical 
similarity between two lineages, whereas a homoplasy is functional similarity 
between lineages, we might wonder how it is that the same criteria could be 
used to identify them.  
One place where this worry has become overt is in discussion of  
behavioural homologies (Love 2007, Rendal & Di Fiore 2007). A 
behavioural similarity is functional. Humans and birds ‘dancing’ to attract 
mates is similar insofar as both are using a set of  movements in order to 
make themselves attractive to the opposite sex. However, a homologous 
similarity is supposed to be determined by physical similarity – not 
functional similarity! “[W]hat a structure does should not enter into an 
evaluation of  homologue correspondence… The juxtaposition of  ‘function’ 
and ‘homology’ is oxymoronic (Love, pp 693).”  
   
 
41
 These kinds of  worries, in my view, are confused. There is not a 
dichotomy between physical and functional description – the two are 
continuous. This claim is found in Bill Lycan’s The Continuity of  Levels of  
Nature (Lycan 1987), “…highly teleological characterizations… have the 
virtue of  shading off  fairly smoothly into (more) brutely physical ones. 
(Lycan, pg 53)” According to this view, the functional account of  the 
hammer is at a ‘higher level’ of  abstraction than its physical description. 
‘More abstract’ simply means ‘towards the functional end of  the 
continuum’. The physical parts of  the hammer are made of  components, 
the handle and the head, which are functional descriptions. The wooden 
handle consists of  various carbon compositions in a particular arrangement, 
and the steel head a different arrangement of  iron and carbon. The atoms 
could be thought of  as playing functional roles.  
Lycan argues for his position largely from example. A neuron, he points 
out, “… may be understood either as a physiological term (denoting a kind 
of  human cell) or as a (teleo-) functional term (denoting a relayer of  
electrical charge); on either construal it stands for an insatiable – if  you like, 
for a role being played by a group of  more fundamental objects. (Ibid, pg 
57, italics removed)” A physical description of  a neuron is still functional: it 
describes in terms of  cell structure (which are functional roles played by 
atom-clusters).  
Similarly, when we describe resemblance-relations between characters, be 
they homologous or analogous, they will be at a certain level on the 
continuum. When we say that the eyes of  primates are topographically 
similar, we refer to the structure of  primate anatomy – which is as a 
functional gloss over the various parts involved. The eye, bone, skin and so 
on consist of  various cell-types playing different roles. We can see an 
analogous similarity, such as that between the shape of  dolphins and sharks, 
in terms of  organization and continuous with topography. 
By my account of  homology and analogy the target of  explanation is the 
resemblance-relation. A resemblance-relation may be at any point of  the 
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 physical-functional continuum. For example, consider these similarities 
between myself  and a platypus. We are both made of  carbon atoms. We 
both have genes. We both have hair. We both have a four-limbed body plan. 
We both put resources into raising our young (although in my case this has 
not been tested). In describing these similarities we move from more 
physical description into more functional description. 
These levels of  description, however, are part of  our initial investigation 
of  the target similarity. Once we have determined whether the similarity is 
homologous or analogous, we then parse it in terms of  phylogenetic 
(‘physical’) or selective (functional) terms. So it is our explanation, of  the 
phenomenon, rather than its physical description, which determines their 
phylogenetic or selective status.  
Alan Love (2007) has suggested that we should envision behavioural 
homology in terms of  activity-function as opposed to use-function10. Use-
function is a functional description which tells us what something is for, 
while activity-function is simply what something does. A clockwork watch is 
not designed to ‘tick’, ticking is a byproduct of  clockwork. However, this 
does not mean that we cannot give a (activity-) functional explanation of  
why clocks have the capacity to tick. Similarly, my nose and ears were not 
‘designed’ to hold my glasses to my face, but (given the design of  glasses) 
this doesn’t mean that the capacity of  my face to balance glasses cannot be 
given a (activity-) functional explanation.  
I whole-heartedly agree with Love’s claims about function generally, but 
think he is wrong that homologous functions can only be activity-functions. 
To count as a homology, all we require of  a resemblance relation between 
two lineages is it be held by their common ancestor and that the similarity is 
explained by descent. Where the resemblance relation sits on the physical-
functional continuum is irrelevant for determining whether it is a homology 
                                                      
10 Following from the tradition of using non-selective accounts of function in biology as 
argued by Amundson & Lauder 1994. 
   
 
43
 or an analogy. However, it may be very important in terms of  identifying 
the similarity in the first place.  
2.4 .2  Similar ity 
I can now turn to the issue of  identifying similarity. I have so far taken it 
as given that we can correctly identify resemblance-relations. But with some 
apparent similarities it is not obvious how we make this claim. 
Similarities in physiological characters seem straight-forward. Because we 
are discussing physical objects, similarities can be quantified (as they are in 
cladistics). The feet of  chimpanzees and bonobos look more similar to each 
other than they do to our feet. And we can do better than simply observe – 
we can measure various dimensions and compare them. Although these 
quantitative measurements are not necessarily reconcilable with qualitative 
observation they can, at least in some situations, provide independent 
reassurance of  the similarity. Things get tougher for less tangible traits, 
however. 
In the introduction, I mentioned Marino et al (2008)’s discussion of  
convergences between cetacean and primate cognition. Here is what they 
have to say about dolphin cognition: 
“Laboratory studies of bottlenose dolphins have documented various 
dimensions of their intellectual abilities. These include an understanding of 
symbolic representations of things and events (declarative knowledge); an 
understanding of how things work or how to manipulate them (procedural 
knowledge); an understanding of the activities, identities, and behaviours of 
others, (social knowledge); and an understanding of one’s own image, 
behavior, and body parts (self knowledge). All these capabilities rest on a 
strong foundation of memory; investigations have demonstrated that 
bottlenose dolphin auditory, visual, and spatial memory are accurate and 
robust. (pg 968)” 
They go on to claim that “They [primates and cetaceans] are examples 
of  convergent evolution of  function largely in response, it appears, to 
similar societal demands (pp 971).” But their claim of  cognitive 
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 convergence rests on cetaceans being able to perform the same tasks as 
primates. They successfully mirror-recognise, for instance. There is a 
similarity in task-performance – but does this mean the cognition is the 
same? 
Behavioural convergence is also problematic. A very contentious case is 
the claim that there is convergence between leaf-cutter ants and humans: 
agriculture (Conway-Morris 2003). A very coarse functional analysis of  their 
behaviour renders a similarity, but is it truly convergence? How similar do 
two traits need to be before a convergence can be claimed?  
I do not have an answer to this scepticism about similarity in behaviour 
and cognition, but I want to draw upon my points about function in the last 
section to suggest the right approach to an answer. The problem with 
identifying similarities in cognition and behaviour, as I see it, rests upon the 
functional nature of  those similarities. In both the cetacean and the ant case 
the scepticism arises from the functional analysis which is required to 
describe the similarity. They look similar in terms of  function, sure, but how 
do we know that the functional analysis we have undertaken is correct? Are 
we actually picking out a similarity, or is one being gerrymandered11?
If  I am right that physical and functional description is continuous, then 
the epistemic tasks of  identifying similarity in morphology versus behaviour 
or cognition are not different in kind. As we shift from more physical 
phenomena to more functional phenomena our problem of  identification is 
the same. In the foot-example above, for instance, how do we know which 
dimensions of  measurement are important? Brute foot-size may be an 
unsuitable criterion as it is more than likely coupled to body-size (the same 
reason we measure encephalization as opposed to brute brain-size). We 
                                                      
11 In the cognition case there is a further difficulty – the inference from the ability to 
perform a particular task to there being a particular underlying mechanism which is 
responsible for that capacity. See Andrews 2009 for a discussion of applying 
psychological properties to animals and Browne 2004 for philosophical scepticism of 
dolphin cognition-claims. 
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 need a theory which tells us which dimensions of  measurement are 
important. For (more) physical features we might rely on biomechanics, or 
neurology could suggest important features in brain similarity. For (more) 
functional similarities a different group of  theories could be utilized – 
cognitive neuroscience, behavioural psychology, and so on. 
So the identification problem exists along the spectrum, but it is much 
easier to solve for physical traits. An account of  the identification of  
functional resemblance-relations would mirror the identification of  physical 
resemblances. The more a similarity can be quantified, and the more 
traction that can be gained on the appropriate dimensions of  similarity, the 
happier we should be with the identification.  
2.5  Conclusion 
I will quickly recap my account of  homology and analogy. 
Homology and analogy are both evolutionary explanations of  
resemblance-relations (character congruence) between biological objects. If  
the similarity is homologous, it is explained in terms of  continuity of  
genotype due to continuity of  descent. If  it is analogous, we explain the 
similarity in terms of  continuity of  selective process. 
The transformative and taxic accounts of  homology are both inferential. 
The transformative quantifies the similarities on a one-to-one basis, whereas 
the taxic takes a holistic approach, using congruence to construct the most 
likely arrangement of  evolutionary histories.  
With this account in hand, we can now turn to the central problem I 
want to address, the use of  analogy in inferences.  
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 3 .  E p i s t e m i c  Wa r r a n t  &  C a u s a l  D e p t h  
The next two chapters will explain the problem of  causal depth. 
Analogous similarities between disparate lineages are too shallow to gain 
epistemic warrant for the kinds of  inferences I am interested in. They can 
support the possibility of  a hypothesis, not the actuality.  
I shall begin with a discussion of  explanation. This will provide a 
framework which can explain the issue at hand. I will define what is meant 
by ‘epistemic warrant’ and give a general account of  what constitutes a 
problem of  causal depth.  
The second half  will apply this framework to inferences reliant on 
homology. As we shall see, homologous inferences are in fairly good shape, 
but I will suggest some instances where we should be cautious of  them 
which will be built upon later on. 
A useful of  way of  understanding the argument in the next two chapters 
is in terms of  Nelson Goodman’s concept of  projectibility. A concept is 
projectible if  it can be used in an inductive inference. If  I am able to say 
that one object has a certain property, which is projectible, then I will be 
able to extend (project) that property onto other objects of  the same type. 
The classic example is the difference between ‘green’ and ‘grue’. Something 
is grue if  it is green when observed before a certain time (say, the 11th of  
January 2010) and blue when observed after that time. The observation that 
an object is green can be part of  an inductive inference. Observing a green 
emerald, I might then claim that all emeralds are green. However, observing 
a green emerald before the 11th of  January 2010 does not then allow me to 
infer that all emeralds are grue. Although an emerald’s being green prior to 
the 11th of  January 2010 is consistent with emeralds being grue, because we 
do not have enough evidence we cannot support the inference. So, green is 
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 projectible, but grue is not. 
If  the line of  thought in the next chapter is right, then biological 
analogies are not projectible. Even if  it is the case that a particular analogy 
exists – say, both sharks and dolphins evolved a stream-lined form due to 
the selective pressure of  an aquatic environment, this does not then allow 
me to infer (project) that other lineages which occupy that niche will evolve 
a stream-lined form.  
3.1  A Note on Explanation 
This section covers some conceptual ground about explanation. It will 
provide some tools that will help us analyse the kinds of  inferences I am 
interested in. I will first sketch two dimensions with which explanations can 
be analysed. These will then be used to give an account of  what it is to have 
epistemic warrant, and define what we mean by ‘causal depth’. 
A caveat: the account of  explanation given here will be fairly rough and 
ready. For my purposes I just need to exposit a framework which can be 
used to discuss the underlying justification behind analogous inferences 
(their epistemic warrant) and why we might be suspicious of  them. I will 
point to more philosophically rigorous work covering the terms I am 
employing and give as clear an exposition as possible. Before getting to the 
‘dimensions’ of  explanation I will employ I need to lay some groundwork.  
We make inferences towards a particular explanatory target; the 
phenomenon under investigation. In the previous chapter, I argued that 
homology and analogy are explanations of  resemblance-relations between 
biological objects. The resemblances are the explanatory target (the 
explanandum) which an evolutionary account explains (the explanaans). I 
will mostly stick to a single explanatory target through this section, the ‘K-T 
Extinction12’, so it will be useful to describe the phenomena. 
The K-T Extinction refers to an event roughly 65 million years ago after 
                                                      
12 Or K-Pg Event, now that the tertiary has been divided into the Paleogene and Neogene 
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 which roughly 50% of  marine genera vanish from the fossil record 
(Dawkins 2004 pp 256). It is best known as the event that marks the 
extinction of  the dinosaurs. The K-T boundary is a geological formation 
boundary between the Mesozoic Era and Cenozoic Era. A striking feature 
of  the boundary is the difference in fossil finds on either side. Underneath 
we find Mesozoic flora and fauna, above there are none. The explanatory 
target, then, is the disappearance of  the Mesozoic fossils.  
There are many questions we can ask about the disappearance of  fossils 
at the K-T boundary. We could ask why the fossils themselves are evidence 
for living creatures, why they disappeared, why some lineages have survived, 
and so on. The different dimensions of  explanation I shall outline are 
methods of  categorizing these different questions.  
Note that I am assuming pluralism (or ecumenism) about explanation. 
All of  these explanations are interesting and important in their own right, 
and their use depends upon the needs of  the particular question we want to 
answer. It is now time to introduce the first dimension of  explanation. 
3.1 .1   Robust Process vs Actual-Sequence 
A useful distinction found in Jackson and Pettit (1992) and in a 
biological context in Sterelny (2001) is robust process and actual-sequence 
explanation. These are modal terms: an actual-sequence explanation 
identifies “… the particular possible world that we inhabit (Ibid pp 131, 
italics removed).” Whereas a robust-process “… compares our world to 
others (Ibid, italics removed).” Applying this distinction to the K-T 
example, we can examine the ‘Alvarez’ theory (which claims that the 
extinction event was caused by a meteor-impact around 65 million years 
ago) in two senses.  
An actual-sequence approach will tell us about the particular asteroid 
which hit. It might give us the size, shape, speed and trajectory of  the 
object. The explanation may identify a particular crater (in the case of  the 
K-T impact, probably the Chicxulub Crater in the Yucatan), and describe 
the particular species were eliminated because of  the impact. In contrast, a 
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 robust-process explanation might include information about the formation 
of  craters, the tendency for asteroid impacts on earth and the tendencies of  
species with particular traits to become extinct in certain environments. 
So while the actual-sequence will give us plentiful information about the 
actual event itself, a robust-process account will contrast our world to 
others. For instance, maybe the extinction caused by the impact was a 
stochastic event. Those ‘impact worlds’ which are at the same time (to 
within a few thousand years) would also contain the extinction, but those at 
different times would not. The size and position of  the impact might make 
changes across worlds. Those where the impact is smaller, for instance, 
might be less likely to have extinction events. Theorizing, modelling and 
(where possible) testing these counterfactual instances can tell us about the 
probability of  this event and others like it in the past.   
3.1 .2   Fine-Grained vs Coarse-Grained 
Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit (1992) analyse explanation in terms of  
grain. The grain of  an explanation is defined in terms of  “…greater or 
lesser attention to the detail of  the producing mechanism (pp163).”  
 A coarse-grained explanation will pay less attention to the producing 
mechanism. An extremely coarse-grained answer to the question of  why no 
dinosaur fossils exist above the K-T boundary would simply be that the 
dinosaurs become extinct (and thus could not leave any fossils). 
A fine-grained explanation focuses on the producing mechanism. So a 
more fine-grained explanation might claim there are no dinosaur fossils 
above the K-T boundary because (say) a 10 kilometre-diameter bolide 
(impact meteor) hit the Yucatan peninsula creating a ‘nuclear’ winter. A 
coarse-grained explanation will tend to be more general than a fine one, but 
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 this is not necessarily the case13. 
My discussion of  physical and functional description from last chapter 
should map fairly neatly onto grain. A more functional description will tend 
to be of  coarser grain than a physical one. This is because a functional 
description abstracts certain properties of  the phenomenon in general 
terms.  
If  we take a selective-functional explanation, and increase the grain, we 
will see the explanation will become more ‘physical’. Perhaps part of  the 
explanation of  which lineages survived the K-T extinction event is that 
smaller sizes were better suited to the environment. A smaller animal 
requires less food, tends to have a shorter gestation period, and so on. 
Creatures that meet these selective-functional requirements are more likely 
to survive an extinction event. If  we increase the grain to examine how 
these smaller animals may have survived, our description will become less 
abstract. The small mammals of  the time, for instance, are well adapted for 
extremes due to their warm-bloodedness and the warmth of  their coats. 
This is still selective, but now with more detail. At an extremely close grain, 
the adaptation falls out of  the picture and we have particular stories about 
how particular individuals survived. 
To recap, there are two ‘dimensions’ I will use to analyse explanation. We 
can analyse explanations in terms of  grain. The richness of  detail of  an 
explanation, its proximity to the causal mechanism of  the phenomena in 
question, sets grain. We can analyse them in terms of  actual-sequence 
versus robust process. An actual sequence explanation tells us about the 
world we are in, while a robust process compares our world to others. 
                                                      
13 I believe an important factor in the difference between an adaptive and phylogenetic 
explanation is the functional nature of adaptation. There may be a trade-off between 
the level of functional generality required to get an adaptive (and particularly analogous) 
inference off the ground and a fine-grained explanation. However, the nature of this 
trade-off is particularly difficult to get a conceptual handle on and is not necessary for 
my account of the problem of causal depth. Matthewson & Weisberg 2009 give a very 
good account of this kind of trade-off focusing on formal modelling.  
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 I see Robust Process/Actual Sequence and Fine/Coarse grain as (largely) 
independent dimensions of  explanations. In the table below I compare four 
versions of  the ‘Nemesis’ Hypothesis, introduced by Raup & Sepkoski 
(1984). This hypothesis seeks to explain the apparent pattern in extinction 
events on earth in reference to extra-terrestrial activity. By this hypothesis, 
extinction events on earth (including the one at the K-T boundary) are 
caused by impact events and their regularity is due to the sun having a 
companion star which disturbs the orbits of  debris in the Oort cloud, 
sending them on a collision course with Earth.  
So the table illustrates the kinds of  explanations the dimensions I have 
outlined pick out. The explanatory target is: what explains the extinction 
event 65 million years ago? The fine-grained explanations include more 
information about the mechanism by which the impact event (or events) 
occur than the coarse-grained ones. The robust process explanations are in 
reference to the regularity of  extinction events on earth, whereas the actual 
sequence focuses on the event 65 million years ago. 





Figure v Explanations Plotted against Robust-Process/Actual Sequence 
and Fine/Coarse Grain 
 Fine Grain Coarse Grain 
Robust 
Process 
The sun has a companion 
star in an elliptical orbit 
which occasionally disturbs 
extra-terrestrial objects in 
the Oort cloud and sends 
them on a collision course 
with earth. The regularity 
of  this event explains the 
regularity of  extinction 
events. 
There are regular impact 
events on earth which 




The sun has a companion 
star in an elliptical orbit 
which, sometime before 65 
million years ago, 
disturbed a 10-kilometre 
meteor from the Oort 
cloud and sent it on an 
eventual collision course 
with earth. 
65 million years ago a 
meteor impacted with 
earth. 
 
These dimensions are not completely independent. For instance, as we 
shift from finer to coarser grains in a robust-process explanation, this can 
affect the number of  possible worlds which are picked out. A coarser 
robust-process explanation of  the regularity of  impact events than the 
Nemesis Hypothesis might run as follows. Large bodies in space, such as 
planets, act as ‘gravity wells’ which attract smaller extra-terrestrial objects. 
Given the right conditions, these smaller objects can get caught in a ‘death 
spiral’ which results in an impact event. This explanation is coarser grained 
than the Nemesis Hypothesis because it does not provide as specific a 
causal mechanism.  It does apply to a larger set of  worlds, however. The 
Nemesis hypothesis might be true of  solar-systems with twin stars (whether 
it is true of  earth or not); whereas the explanation in this paragraph might 
be true of  all solar systems. So as we shift to finer grain, adding more causal 
information, we sometimes restrict the number of  worlds the Robust-
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 Process explanation refers to. Having said this, I think these dimensions of  
explanation are independent enough to justify their use here. 
With this in hand, I will now sketch an account of  how inferences and 
explanations are justified. 
3.1 .3   Epistemic War rant 
Epistemic warrant is granted when there is solid ground for a particular 
inference or class of  inferences. Scientific inferences typically require 
commitment to generalizations, frequently from other sciences. We are 
comfortable with the palaeontological inference from fossil finds to ancient, 
living animals due to the underlying, geological processes of  fossilization 
and rock stratification (and there will be at least a tacit assumption that 
these processes are grounded in some other theories). A particular 
inferential structure has epistemic warrant on two grounds. We must have 
good reason to think the premises support the conclusion; we must be 
happy with the robust process which the structure relies on. If  an 
explanation, inferential structure or hypothesis has epistemic warrant it is 
‘on the table’. 
An explanation is epistemically justified based on two types of  criteria: 
super-empirical virtues and underlying processes. We may prefer a particular 
theory because it exemplifies some virtue, such as simplicity or adequacy. 
These preferences give us reason to support one theory over another. We 
may, for instance, prefer the Alvarez theory of  Mesozoic extinction over a 
different theory because it accounts for two phenomena: the increase in 
iridium at the KT Boundary (see below) and the extinction of  the Metazoan 
fauna. Super-empirical considerations are less important for my account and 
so will be dealt with when I come to them in discussion, but the idea of  an 
underlying process deserves attention. 
 An actual-sequence explanation will frequently rely on robust processes 
for justification. The Alvarez theory of  the K-T Extinction is an actual 
sequence explanation as it tells us about events in the actual world; it is a 
hypothesis about what actually happened. However, our justification for 
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 believing the theory is not derived from it alone. The main evidence for the 
theory is geological. The boundary contains ‘shocked’ Quartz (which is 
found in impact sites) and there are high levels of  iridium deposits in the K-
T boundary. Iridium is rare on earth, but common on asteroids. Here is the 
robust-process. When asteroids hit iridium-poor planets like earth with 
enough force, debris from the crater and the asteroid will coat the planet. 
This will leave a geological record of  the impact-event. Those worlds with 
impact-events will have a line of  iridium, those without will not. If  we have 
reason to believe these geological robust-processes, then we have reasons to 
believe that there was an extra-terrestrial impact at the K-T boundary – an 
important part of  the Alvarez actual-sequence explanation (see Jeffares 
2008 for a more rigorous account of  the relationship between an historical 
inference and its supporting theories). 
The Alvarez theory could also inform a robust-process explanation.  In 
Stephen Jay Gould’s Wonderful Life, for instance, he argues that evolution’s 
path at the macro-level is massively contingent due to external disruptions 
to life’s development (Gould 1989). Perhaps asteroid impacts of  the size 
required to wipe-out world eco-systems are a (relatively) frequent 
occurrence on earth. Moreover, the timing of  particular extinction events 
on earth is an important aspect of  the Nemesis Hypothesis. Examining the 
scope of  the damage caused by the impact at the K-T boundary and other 
impacts could form the basis of  a robust-process theory such as Gould’s 
contingency thesis or the Nemesis Hypothesis. That, for instance, there 
have been major impacts which do not coincide with mass extinctions 
suggests that there are other factors at play here. 
 So actual-process explanations rely on robust-processes for justification, 
and can act as data-points for justifying robust-process explanations. They 
may boot-strap: a particular process may explain a sequence which is in turn 
evidence for that process.  
I am now in a position to state my first pass at how we provide an 
epistemic warrant for a particular inference. A particular explanation gains 
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 its epistemic warrant from its relationship with other explanations and 
theories. When we examine a particular epistemic practise, we should do so 
in terms of  these relationships. The Geological practice of  reading strata as 
temporal order is grounded in other geological theories. Different kinds of  
rock will have a particular signature deposition. Silt will indicate the past 
presence of  a river, coal a swamp, and so on. They explain this in reference 
to a general theory about how environmental features will affect the rock 
deposits. If  geologists are correct in their explanation of  rock formation, 
then that feature of  rocks should be projectible onto the rock in strata. 
Inferences which read temporal order from rock strata, then, are justified 
(in part) by the relationship between the theory of  rock formation and the 
strata themselves. So epistemic warrant is concerned with how well 
supported a generalization is, and its scope: what kinds of  events it applies 
to. There are two more points I need to make about epistemic warrant. 
Although epistemic warrant can be thought of  as a property of  a 
particular hypothesis, it is much clearer when taken as contrastive between 
two (or more) hypotheses. Say we are comparing two hypotheses about 
dinosaur extinction. In the first (H1), the extinction was, at least in a large 
part, caused by the impact event. In the second (H2), the impact event 
happened after the extinction which was caused by (say) large-scale 
ecological change due to the shifting of  tectonic plates. The epistemic 
warrant for H1, as opposed to H2, consists of  both evidence and theory 
which relates the evidence to the hypothesis. So, that there is a large impact 
crater off  the Yucatan peninsula; and this crater is dated to around 65 
million years ago; and the size of  the impact would be large enough to 
create the kind of  world-scale carnage required of  a mass-extinction event 
based on impact modelling; are all pieces which count towards the epistemic 
warrant which favours H1 over H214. 
                                                      
14 I do not mean to say here that H1 or H2 cannot both be in part right, I am simplifying 
for the sake of the example… 
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 Epistemic warrant could be thought of  in two ways. A particular 
inference may lack warrant due to a paucity of  evidence. We may dislike the 
Nemesis hypothesis because we are not convinced of  the observations 
which support it, or feel that the observations are not sufficient. In this 
sense warrant is a relation between a hypothesis or explanation and its 
evidence. Alternatively, a hypothesis may be unwarranted because some 
underlying process or theory which the hypothesis relies upon does not do 
the work required of  it, or if  the theory is not sufficient to explain the 
effect. So we may be unhappy with the Nemesis hypothesis because the 
gravitational theory it relies on is incorrect. Or, because collision events do 
not always cause mass-extinctions, the Nemesis Hypothesis cannot be a 
complete explanation. Here warrant is a relation between a particular 
hypothesis and its supporting theory. It is in this latter sense that I will 
discuss epistemic warrant. So a theory lacks epistemic warrant if  a 
supporting theory is not sufficient to support it.  
And so, when we judge the epistemic warrant of  a particular hypothesis, 
explanation or regularity, we examine a) the observed evidence which 
supports the theory; b) the robustness of  the supporting 
theories/underlying processes (whether they are projectible). Epistemic 
Warrant is granted if  the evidence for the theory is strong enough, and if  
the underlying processes are sufficiently robust – if  the concepts employed 
in each process are projectible. But not all processes are created equal. Eliot 
Sober (Sober 1988) makes a useful distinction between a process being 
information-destroying and information-preserving. 
3.1 .4   Infor mation Preser vation and Destruction 
There are some processes whose reach from the past is weaker than 
others. Those weaker processes sometimes provide weaker epistemic 
warrants. I am introducing Sober’s distinction here in order to exposit a 
continuum that will allow me to explain the problem of  causal depth. 
If  a process equilibrates, which is to say that all initial conditions lead to 
the same state, then it is information-destroying. When we observe the final 
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 state, there is no way for us to infer the history of  the process. Sober’s 
example is of  dropping a ball into a (perfectly regular) bowl. The ball, after 
spinning back and forth across the surface, will always come to a rest in the 
centre of  the bowl. Once the ball has stopped moving, we can no longer 







Figure vi Information Destroying Process 
The process equilibrates – the past cannot be inferred because all 
initial conditions end in the same state  
 
If  a process has several local optima that are gravitated towards 
dependant on initial conditions, then it is information-preserving.  Imagine the 
bowl is not perfectly regular, but has several dips in its base. It might be the 
case that releasing the ball at a particular position will increase the 
probability of  it coming to rest in one or the other of  the dips. If  this is the 
case, then we could make inferences about the initial state of  the ball from 
its final resting place. 
 









Figure vii Information Preserving Process 
The process has local equilibria – the past can be inferred   
 
Information preservation or destruction is not a property of  an 
explanation, but of  a process. It is not due to a lack in our epistemic 
abilities that we cannot infer backwards from a perfectly information-
destroying process. If  we had absolute causal knowledge about states at the 
end of  the process, we would be in no better position to work out the initial 
conditions than we are in our epistemic poverty. As Sober puts it, “The 
fault… is not in ourselves, but in the bowl (Ibid pp 4).” 
A process may be information preserving or destroying either in virtue 
of  the process itself  (as Sober describes it) or in virtue of  its relationship to 
other processes. One process might interfere with another, creating noise 
which destroys whatever traces the latter process may have left. The process 
of  stratification leads to an identifiable, recoverable sequence which 
Geologists can use to delineate time periods. Stratification is information-
preserving. Noise can be created by processes such as mining, metamorphic 
transformation and erosion. These erase the signal of  temporal order from 
stratification by re-organizing them. No matter what order the rock was 
layered, the end result would not be recoverable because the order has 
become confused. We would then be unable to delineate the differences and 
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 infer a temporal order from the rock. 
So there is a relationship between epistemic warrant and how 
information-preserving an underlying process is. If  the process falls 
towards the information-destroying side of  the spectrum, some inferences 
which rely upon that process might lack epistemic warrant. Claims relying 
on information-destroying processes may not be projectible: the 
observations we take will not ground inductive inferences. Once I have 
examined how this might affect the kind of  grain available to an 
explanation we will have the problem of  causal depth. 
3.1 .5   Causal Depth 
A problem of  causal depth arises when an explanation requires a particular 
grain, and the underlying process we rely on is too information-destroying 
to ‘reach’ that grain. By examining the relationship between the grain of  an 
explanation and information-destroying processes, the problem will become 
apparent. 
A destructive process will sometimes limit available grain. Slight and 
ambiguous, traces might not provide the right information to allow choice 
between hypotheses. Although geological structures like the K-T Boundary 
do provide a temporal order to events, they are less effective in providing 
temporal scale. Does the increase in iridium mark an event of  a few 
hundred years, a few thousand, or a few million? The process of  
stratification is fairly information-destroying in regards to this question. As 
layers compress, the traces we could use to delineate time-scale are 
destroyed. Without a fine-grained timeline, we may be unable to choose 
between hypotheses.  
Consider two versions of  the Alvarez Hypothesis. One theory claims 
that the dinosaurs were wiped out quickly over a few hundred years by the 
impact. The other claims the dinosaurs were already in decline and the 
impact exacerbated events; the extinction was drawn out over millions of  
years. Both hypotheses agree on a coarse-grained version of  the Alvarez 
theory: the K-T extinction was due to a meteor impact. Their differences 
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 emerge when we increase the grain. If  we cannot find a means of  setting 
the likely time period of  the extinction event because stratification is 
information-destroying in regards to time-scale), then we lack epistemic 
warrant to choose between the two hypotheses15. 
The more information-preserving a process is the more likely it can be 
used to decide between rival hypotheses. An information-destroying 
process, however, might loose warrant as finer grains are required of  it – it 
will not help us choose between rival hypotheses16. 
 






















As grain increases an information preserving process retains epistemic 







So finally I can account for what it is to lack Causal Depth. When a 
                                                      
15 Sometimes of course independent information can be used to make these finer 
delineations. I do not mean to suggest that we cannot find means of answering this 
question, but rather that if stratification was as information destroying as I described it, 
then we would need to rely on different processes. Our grain cannot be increased 
relying on that process alone (see note 5). 
16 This discussion is importantly impoverished. As the historical sciences do not usually rely 
on a single stream of evidence , one process’ ambiguous traces could be taken in 
tandem with another’s to construct a warranted theory (Jeffares 2008). This point will 
be expanded in due course.  
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 particular process is information-destroying, either self-reflexively (as in 
Sober’s bowl case) or due to noise, then it might lack the causal depth 
required to justify fine-grained explanations or inferences relying upon it. 
When comparing two or more hypotheses, the evidence we have points 
equally towards either hypothesis. In the previous example where we 
considered two versions of  the Alvarez hypothesis, the process of  
stratification lacked the causal depth to let us choose between them. As we 
shall see this is the problem with analogous inference due to its reliance on 
adaptation. 
3.1 .6   Glossary 
Actual-Sequence/Robust Process: A property of  an explanation 
which sets its modal limits. An actual-sequence explanation tells us about 
the actual world, whereas a robust process contrasts the actual world 
with others. 
Causal Depth: A property of  a process which measures its level of  
influence on phenomena. An information-destroying process will have 
low causal depth. Explanations which rely on processes with low causal 
depth might lack epistemic warrant. 
Course/Fine Grained: A property of  an explanation which sets how 
much attention is paid to the mechanism which produces the target 
phenomenon. A course-grained explanation tends to be more general, 
functional and abstract and is more amenable to robust-process 
explanations. A fine-grained explanation is close to the mechanism, it 
tends to be more specific, physical and amenable to actual-sequence 
explanations. 
Epistemic Warrant: How much credence we give a particular 
explanation or explanatory technique, particularly when compared to 
rivals. It is typically granted on the basis of  the underlying processes and 
observations which support the explanation. (I will speak of  it as) A 
relation between a particular hypothesis and the underlying processes it 
relies on.  
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 Information-destroying/preserving: A property of  a process which 
measures our ability to infer backwards to an initial state. The more 
information-destroying a process, the more difficult it is to infer back 
from it. A process may be information-destroying by its own accord, or 
due to noise. 
Noise: When one process’ signal is interfered by another it may make 
that process information-destroying. 
3.2  The Epistemic Warrant of Homology 
This section will explain what underlying processes ground homologous 
inferences. A homologous inference relies upon homology to explain a 
phenomenon. For instance, explaining my father and I’s red-beardedness in 
terms of  common descent is a homologous inference.  
Homologous inferences gain epistemic warrant in virtue of  two related 
concepts. One is an underlying process, which I will call developmental 
entrenchment. In most situations traits remain homeostatic across 
evolutionary time. The other is cladistic parsimony, which itself  relies on a 
commitment to developmental entrenchment. By minimizing the number 
of  hypothesized evolution events in a proposed tree (using iterated 
congruency tests) we can identify the most likely evolutionary paths for 
lineages and traits.  
I will take each concept in turn. First we shall see how developmental 
entrenchment justifies homologous inferences. Second I will illustrate the 
role of  parsimony is setting phylogenetic relationships between lineages. 
Colossal Squids are the largest known invertebrates, averaging around 13 
meters long. Despite their bulk, they are extremely difficult to study due to 
their rarity and their environment. They occupy great ocean depths where 
the darkness and high pressure makes observation and collection of  
samples near impossible. Some traits are particularly inscrutable: how do 
Colossal Squids behave? One route that scientists take to answer these 
questions is to use the remarkably named Googly-Eyed Glass Squid (a tiny 
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 transparent relative) as a proxy17. What justifies the assumption that an 
enormous, rare sea monster which hunts large fish and is preyed upon by 
Sperm Whales behaves like an insignificant transparent speck in the ocean? 
The explanatory target is Colossal Squid behaviour. The hypothesis is that 
they behave like Googly-Eyed Glass Squids. So, which underlying processes 
are pertinent to setting epistemic warrant for the hypothesis? The short 
answer is that the squid are closely related, and so we should expect many 
characters (including behavioural ones) to be homologous, but the inference 
is more complex. 
The assumption that we can use relatives of  the Colossal Squid to model 
its behaviour is based upon a two-step inference. Both steps are reliant on 
developmental entrenchment. In the comparatively recent past, the Colossal 
Squid and the Googly-Eyed-Glass Squid shared a common ancestor. They, 
with the other Glass Squids, form the clade Cranchiidae. If  it is the case that 
most traits are homeostatic, developmentally entrenched, then any 
behaviour exhibited by a member of  Cranchiidae was most likely present in 
the ancestor of  the clade. So the first part of  the inference is a retrodiction: 
traits held by a relative of  a target species were most likely also held by the 
common ancestor of  the target species and its relative. 
 
                                                      
17 This example is taken from Te Papa’s Colossal Squid display. Sadly, I have been unable 
to find any scientific papers which specifically mention this particular application of 
analogous inference. 





Figure ix Step 1: Retrodiction 
Google-Eyed Glass Squid (right) traits were most likely also traits of the 
most recent common ancestor of the Googly-Eyed Glass Squid and the 
Colossal Squid (left). 
Common 
Ancestor 
The second step is a prediction to the target lineage. If  it is the case that a 
recent ancestor of  the Colossal Squid exhibited a behaviour, then we would 
expect the Colossal Squid to also exhibit that behaviour. This again relies on 
the idea of  developmental entrenchment. So the epistemic warrant of  
hypothesizing that behaviours exhibited by the Googly-Eyed-Glass Squid 
will be exhibited by the Colossal relies on most traits remaining 
homeostatic, at least over short periods of  evolutionary time. A 
homologous inference gains epistemic warrant from developmental 
entrenchment. 
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Figure x Step 2: Prediction 
Traits present in the common ancestor are most likely preserved in the 
Colossal Squid  
Common 
Ancestor 
Developmental entrenchment does not require that phenotypes never 
change, but that they tend not to. In order for the ‘descent with 
modification’ clause in evolution to work genotype must, on the whole, be 
largely static. Too much modification, and there is no longer a target for 
natural selection to act upon; natural selection requires traits to be heritable. 
So developmental entrenchment is a reasonable process to postulate. The 
inference is probabilistic: it is most likely that any particular section of  
genotype (and corresponding phenotype) will be homeostatic between 
generations. 
In the example above I have assumed that the evolutionary relationship 
between the two squid is already set, but upon what basis do we postulate 
their phylogenies? How do we know, for instance, that the googly-eyed glass 
squid’s squid-like properties didn’t evolve independently the colossal 
squid’s? They could be homoplastic. As Sober 1988 shows a special 
similarity should guide these decisions. If  the two squids evolved their 
similarities separately, this would require many more ‘evolution events’ than 
if  they have a common ancestor. So the homologous hypothesis is more 
parsimonious.  
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 Parsimony’s epistemic power in homologous inferences is clearest in 
cladistic practice. Cladistics identifies the most likely arrangements of  
relatedness between lineages. The basic method involves “[i]dentifying 
improbable associations of  similarities in the overall space of  variation, and 
then comparing likely explanations for their congruence (Franz 2005) 
p499.” Relatedness is inferred using each trait congruence as a data point. 
For instance, one reason we think primates form a clade is their forward-
facing eyes – the group is united by this trait – but the real story comes 
from comparing this congruence with many others and then constructing 
possible trees of  relatedness (iterated congruence tests). Those trees with 
the least evolutionary events are the most parsimonious and are considered 
the most likely to be true.  
Evolutionary relationships are set by comparisons of  at least three 
lineages. The inference tells us which species has the most distant common 
ancestor of  three, which is the out-group. This method is what Sober calls 
‘cutting’. The other two species will be part of  (some) clade which does not 
include the out-group. This is set by a comparison of  character polarity – 
whether they are derived or ancestral (as termed by the transformational 
method). Generally a very large number of  character states are compared to 
set the relationships (in Schultze 1994, 216 are examined), but to exposit the 
basic structure of  a phylogenetic inference setting evolutionary 
relationships I will use a toy example. 
Compare our previous two species, the Googly-Eyed Glass Squid (A) 
and the Colossal Squid (B) with some other cephalopod, say some species 
of  octopus (C). There are three possible phylogenetic arrangements: the 
two squids may be the closest related, expressed as (AB)C, the octopus and 
the googly-eyed squid may be the closest (AC)B, or the googly-eyed squid 
might be the out-group A(BC). Which arrangement is the most likely is 
based on which, based on character polarity, postulates the least 
evolutionary events.  
Keeping the toy-like nature of  the example, I will consider just three 
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 character states provided by Boyle & Rodhouse: “The octopuses are clearly 
separated from the squids and cuttlefish on the basis of  the number of  
arms, the lack of  chitinous sucker rings and sucker stalks… (Boyle & 
Rodhouse 2005, pp 75). All three of  these character states are held 
ancestrally by A & B, but are not held in C. Based on these three characters 
we can see that both (AC)B and A(BC) involve two evolution events. C (the 
octopus) is the ancestral form, and the two squid lineages have 
independently evolved their common traits.  In (AB)C, however, there is 
only a single evolution event required – the squid form is ancestral and the 
octopus evolves as an out-group. This last hypothesis, with only a single 
evolution event, is the most parsimonious and so ought to be considered 
the most likely18. 
 
Figure xi: Cladograms 
Cladograms: Each arrangement is a potential arrangement of the 
evolutionary history of lineages. The lineages in parenthesis form the 
clade, the remainder is the outlier. Vertical lines represent evolution 
events. 
(AC)B A(BC) (AB)C 
 
Now imagine we have a character which is the same in both the  
Googly-eyed Squid and the octopus, but not in the Colossal Squid, say both 
                                                      
18 This is clearly very much a toy example – I am not suggesting that squid is actually the 
ancestral form, we would need to examine many more characters and lineages to make 
this claim. Sober 1988 contains a significantly more detailed and careful exposition of 
the inference. 
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 use ink. This does not effect (AC)B but it makes A(BC) contain an 
evolution event at every branch and adds an event to (AB)C. This 
arrangement can be demonstrated in a chart (as below) where the character 
polarity is demonstrated by ‘0’ (ancestral) and ‘1’ (derived).  
 Figure xii Character States 
 A B C 
8 Arms 0 0 1 
Sucker Rings 0 0 1 
Stalks 0 0 1 
Ink 1 0 1 
 
We can see from the chart that we have three ‘001’ arrangements and 
one ‘101’. Our two competing arrangements are (AC)B, where we would 
postulate that the evolution of  the first three traits are homoplastic and the 
ink character is homologous and (AB)C where the ink is homoplastic and 
the other are homologous. In this case we can see that because the (AB)C 
arrangement minimizes the homoplasy, it is still the preferred arrangement. 
But why should we consider the most parsimonious tree most likely? 
Sober (1988) applies the Principle of  Common Cause to justify the use 
of  parsimony in this case. As mentioned in the last chapter, the principle of  
common cause states that similarity (correlations) should be explained by 
postulating a common cause for that similarity. In my discussion of  
similarity in the last chapter, I downplayed ‘accident’ as an explanation in 
favour of  continuity of  history or of  process based upon this principle. If  
two phenomena are (improbably) similar, it is probably because they have 
similar histories either due continuity of  origin or process. But this does not 
get us any further for my purposes, as an analogy is as much a common 
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 cause as a homology19. 
However, if  we examine developmental entrenchment, we can see that if  
phenotype is usually preserved across generations, then there should be 
more synapomorphy than homoplasy. In my octopus versus squid example, 
we should take (AB)C to be the most likely because evolution events are 
uncommon compared to phylogenetic homeostasis. As stated above, 
developmental entrenchment is a necessary component of  evolutionary 
theory so it seems reasonable, based on the apparent success of  the theory, 
to take it as given. 
So, in my view, cladistic parsimony is reliant upon evolutionary theory. 
We need to know which evolutionary changes are more or less probable in 
order to conclude that an account which minimizes homoplasy (as opposed 
to one which simply takes the most overall similarity) is the right approach 
for phylogenetic reconstruction. The principle of  developmental 
entrenchment does this work. 
Homology is not immune to problems of  causal depth. If  species are 
very closely related the value of  parsimony is stretched, as we saw in 
Schultze’s discussion of  lungfish in the last chapter. Differentiating 
homology and homoplasy (analogy) based on character-states relies on 
there being enough difference in the characters to delineate them. The 
requirement is extremely fine-grained when considering closely related 
lineages and it is questionable whether cladistic parsimony provides it (that 
there are continuing arguments between systematists attests to this). This is 
an issue when deciding between a hypothesis of  parallelism or homology – 
because parsimony’s power is weakened in these cases we may be unable to 
judge between them. 
When attempting to discover the evolutionary relationships between 
                                                      
19 Sober goes on to develop a probabilistic framework to justify phylogenetic inference. For 
my purposes I just want to point towards the justification, as I have different fish to fry 
in discussing analogy. 
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 very disparate lineages there are also issues. Developmental entrenchment 
becomes less information-preserving as the distance between the lineages in 
question increases, as the signal has more chance of  being infected with 
noise from mutations. Very distant lineages are not just dissimilar in turns 
of  character-state, but in character. What dimensions ought to be used to 
compare a prokaryote to a platypus? Because of  this, claiming the relations 
between distant ancestors (say, whether Chromalveolates or Rhizaria are closer 
related to the rest of  the eukaryotes) is extraordinarily difficult (Dawkins 
2004pp 536-542).  
Additionally, if  the character states we are examining are particularly 
labile then developmental entrenchment and cladistic parsimony become 
less reliable. As Franz points out, “Character states with excessive rates of  
evolution, combined with deceptive biases in the abundance of  homoplasy 
and a paucity of  states – are unlikely to yield accurate phylogenies when 
parsimony is used. (Franz 2005 pp 501).” These issues will be returned to 
next chapter. Within the boundaries of  the very closely related and the very 
distantly related, and given a reasonably placid evolutionary rate and enough 
data, however, homology is in good shape.  
So, homologous inferences gain epistemic warrant from developmental 
entrenchment and parsimony. They are well founded themselves, and so we 
should be happy with inferences relying on them. The predicates of  
homologous inferences are (usually) projectible. 
In the next chapter, I will discuss the epistemic warrant of  analogous 
inferences and explain the problem of  causal depth in this case. 
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 4 .  T h e  P r o b l e m  o f  C a u s a l  D e p t h  i n  A n a l o g y  
This chapter argues that the epistemic warrant of  analogous inferences is 
reliant upon Natural Selection. It is necessary for Natural Selection to 
robustly fit phenotype to niche in order for analogous lineages to be used in 
comparative inferences. I will then argue that natural selection does not 
support analogous inference.  
4.1  The Epistemic Warrant of Analogy 
I will apply my account of  epistemic warrant to inferences relying on 
analogy. Usually analogies are used to provide evidence for some robust-
process in order to inform an actual sequence explanation. One reason to 
care about dolphin cognition, for instance, is that it could inform a general 
story about the evolution of  cognition. This story could then generate 
hypotheses about how cognition evolved in other lineages. Analogous 
inferences gain their epistemic warrant in virtue of  the process of  Natural 
Selection. As we shall see, if  Natural Selection fits form to function (if  
Adaptationism is true), then we should be confident of  analogous 
inferences. I will give an account of  Natural Selection and Adaptationism, 
and then show how it relates to analogy. 
4.1 .1   Natural Selection & Adaptationism 
This section will explain what I mean by Adaptationism, so it can be 
linked to analogy in the next. 
Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996) distinguishes between two explanatory 
approaches to biological form. An externalist approach explains phenotype 
evolution in relation to its environment. It is associated with Adaptationism. 
An internalist explains phenotype in relation to intrinsic properties. 
Evolutionary Developmental theory (Evo-Devo) is internalist. I distinguish 
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 between internalism and externalism as explanatory projects and causal 
theses. An explanatory project is a set of  questions, and an approach to 
answering them. A causal thesis is a claim the world; it is the fact of  the 
matter, not an explanatory approach. 
There are, then, two senses of  internalism and externalism. First, they 
are explanatory projects. Several philosophers have pushed explanatory 
pluralism between Evo-Devo and Adaptationism (Brigandt 2007, Sansom 
2003, Sterelny 2007, Amundson 2005). Their difference lies in the kinds of  
questions they seek to answer; there are particular phenomena they seek to 
understand and particular ways they seek to understand them. 
Adaptationism explains how traits become fixed in a population. Evo-Devo 
seeks to explain evolvability – the actual mechanisms of  phenotypic 
variation. If  we want an actual sequence about, say, how the hominid 
lineage became bipedal, the two approaches will give very different answers. 
An Adaptationist explanation will assume a particular pool of  possible 
variation and explain how some variants become more predominent in a 
population. An Evo-Devo explanation will tell us about the defvelopmental 
changes which caused the phenotype change.  
Internalism and externalism can secondly be understood as causal theses. 
By externalism, the most important causal factor in forming phenotype are 
extrinsic features: the relation between the phenotype and the environment. 
By internalism, the most important causal factors are intrinsic features of  
the developmental system itself. There is, to some extent, a normative 
connection between these two readings. If  externalism as a causal thesis is 
true, then we might be tempted to say that the best explanation of  
phenotype is Adaptationism. And if  internalism is the case, then Evo-Devo 
explanations ought to be preferred. This is much too simple: a full 
explanation of  how phenotypes evolve will incorporate both internal and 
external elements. But the point here is that given a certain question, an 
internalist or externalist approach might be more appropriate, depending 
which does the most causal work in that case.  
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 Note that the kinds of  explanations I am interested in here are ultimate, 
rather than proximate. I want to know whether the developmental process 
or selective process has more causal efficacy in shaping phenotype over 
evolutionary time, not the lifetime of  a particular organism. 
I will now focus my exposition on externalism: Natural Selection and 
Adaptationism. As a causal thesis, Adaptationists believe that the external 
process of  Natural Selection has the most causal force in determining 
phenotype. As an explanatory project they explain evolutionary change in 
terms of  the relationship between phenotype and selective environment. 
Natural Selection is a process whereby successive forms are fitted to, and 
modify, a selective environment. Some individuals in a population may have 
traits which give those individuals an advantage over their peers. If  this 
advantage increases the chance of  that individual's offspring surviving and 
themselves reproducing at a greater rate than other members of  the 
population, and if  that advantage can be inherited by those offspring, then 
over time the advantage will spread throughout the group. Those 
individuals who are less fit (who on average produce less or less successful 
progeny) are weeded out of  the population. 
 Generally, which traits increase fitness is context-dependant. A trait 
which increases success in one environment may not in another. For 
instance, increased running speed does not help a burrowing animal, nor is 
better eyesight. Having more efficient digging apparatus and a keener sense 
of  smell or touch, however, might well infer an advantage. Because of  this, 
animals in similar environments will tend to move in similar evolutionary 
directions - they will come upon the same solution to the same problem. 
If  Natural Selection does in fact shape phenotype, then identifying the 
relationship between trait and niche could form the basis of  an inferential 
conditional of  the form 'trait y evolves only if  environment x is present’. 
This inference can be both predictive and retrodictive. If  an animal lives in 
a certain environment, then we can predict that they have evolved, or will 
evolve, a particular suite of  traits. An animal living in a burrowing 
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 environment will evolve good hearing and touch, but eyesight will be 
neglected. We can also infer the environment a lineage lives in, or has lived 
in the past, based on their traits. The vestigal wing of  the kiwi shows that in 
the past their environment was the air, not the undergrowth. This is 'reverse 
engineering' (Griffiths 1996), and is an important aspect to an Adaptationist 
approach to evolution. 
Adaptationism, taken as a causal thesis, claims that selection shapes a 
lineage to a particular selective environment largely unaffected by the 
phylogeny of  that lineage. This is to say that there are particular solutions to 
adaptive problems to which Natural Selection will drive phenotype towards 
irrelevant of  the past history of  that lineage. The scope of  Adaptationism 
as an explanatory project is constrained by Natural Selection’s causal 
efficacy. If  it turns out that Natural Selection has minimal causal efficacy, 
then we may still ask Adapationist questions, but the answers we receive will 
lack explanatory potency. 
 I will rehearse an informal example in order to illustrate the explanatory 
project of  Adaptationism and set us up for the next section, where I will 
examine the relation between it and analogous inferences. 
 The males of  some species of  parasitic fig-wasps are both extremely 
violent and heavily armoured (see West at al 2001 for an academic 
treatment, Judson 2002 and Dawkins 1996 for popular accounts). After 
hatching they fight to the death, leaving a single survivor who monopolizes 
breeding opportunities. This behaviour is rare. Typically competition 
between males for breeding takes a non-violent, or at least non-lethal, form. 
The competing wasps are usually brothers, against our usual assumptions 
about kin-selection20. According to Hamilton’s Rule, for instance, 
individuals ought to show less aggression to their close relatives (See the 
discussion of  Hamilton’s Rule in West et al 2001). So the adaptive question 
is: how would violent and armoured traits spread throughout fig-wasp 
                                                      
20 Although not too much; siblicide is not uncommon, particularly in birds. 
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 populations? Given a better armoured or more violent variant, under what 
conditions would that variant be more successful? 
An externalist answer to this question will be in terms of  phenotype 
interacting with the selective environment: given a particular niche, violent 
behaviour and armour will be selected for. We need to cash out the costs 
and benefits of  the traits given the wasps’ lifestyle. Mate choice through 
duelling to the death is extremely risky, if  you loose a fight then you loose 
any mating opportunities you could have in the future. This is why most 
male-male competition is reticent. If  the mating opportunities are extremely 
limited, however, the nature of  the game changes. In a one-shot mating 
environment, then saving yourself  for a later ‘date’ is a waste of  effort. In 
these fig-wasp populations females leave the fig never to return after mating 
so males have a single mating opportunity. In this situation, males who are 
more violent, who are willing to take more risks in competition with others, 
will do better than their more cowardly foes. In such a situation, anything 
which gives a physical advantage in combat such as armour would also infer 
a selective advantage. Fig-wasp males are nasty because the one-shot nature 
of  their breeding environment favours nastiness.  
So Adaptationism as an explanatory project relates phenotype to niche. 
An adaptive question asks how a particular suite of  traits came to spread 
throughout a particular population. An adaptive solution explains that the 
lineage in question exhibits the traits because they maximise fitness given 
the niche the organism inhabits.  
The appropriateness of  this explanation depends upon the causal thesis 
of  externalism. Any particular adaptive (actual-sequence) hypothesis relies 
upon the robust-process of  Natural Selection being true for that case. It 
must correctly map onto the world; it must be that those traits are beneficial 
given the environment and true that those traits will be selected for and 
thus invade the population in question. It also depends on internal factors: 
even if  the adaptive model is right, it can only come into play if  there is the 
right supply of  variation. The more causal efficacy selection has in that case, 
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 the more epistemic warrant it grants the approach. 
In Adaptationist explanation, a selective relationship is identified 
between a particular environmental variable and a particular function. To be 
justified, the inference will pick some regularity between environment and 
phenotype which holds true across relevant counterfactual worlds – in 
short, a robust process. So an adaptive model is a modal claim about how 
design space is constrained by selection. An adaptive inference applies the 
model to particular case or class of  cases. 
So, an adaptive inference or explanation derives epistemic warrant from 
the causal thesis of  externalism. I can now relate this to analogous 
inferences. 
4.1 .2   Analogous Inferences 
The purpose of  this section is to connect what I have said about 
adaptive inferences generally to analogies in particular. An analogous 
inference is a special case of  an adaptive inference. As we shall see, if  
externalism about biological form is the case – if  the interaction between 
environment and phenotype do most of  the causal work in the shaping of  
phenotype, then epistemic warrant is granted to analogous inferences. 
An analogous inference takes information from one lineage to inform us 
about another. Sometimes when making inferences about the evolutionary 
history of  a particular lineage we will draw on information from other 
lineages which are not particularly closely related to our target. We generally 
do this in cases where the closest relatives will not be much use. It is not 
obvious how examining the land-based extant relatives of, say, a sea-going 
reptile such as a plesiosaur would shed any light on its behaviour. However, 
perhaps the behaviour of  species which now occupy the same niche as the 
plesiosaur would help. Although dolphins and sharks are not closely related, 
they do share morphological characters. Because their similarities are 
independently evolved (they are analogous), they could count as data-points 
for a robust-process about the conditions required for their evolution. If  
these similarities are due to the three lineages occupying the same selective 
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 niche, then maybe they can inform an inferential model which reconstructs 
the lifestyle of  the plesiosaur.  
Analogous inferences also inform adaptive models. An analogy consists 
of  similarities between both the traits of  two lineages and their selective 
environment. As adaptive explanation postulates a causal connection 
between phenotype and environment, analogies could be seen as ‘natural 
experiments’ which test adaptive models. 
So, one relation between analogous inferences and Adaptationism is that 
analogy can be used to test an adaptive inference (Workman & Reader 2004, 
Sterelny & Griffiths 1999). If  a particular actual-sequence relies on a robust 
process for justification, then we should expect that generalization to be 
true in other cases. So one way we can test an adaptive hypothesis is to 
examine other lineages which occupy the same niche. If  we can point to 
other examples which fit the model then it is corroborated. 
In the fig-wasp case, the model claimed that one-shot breeding 
environments will select for armour and violence in males. Judson (2002) 
cites two corroborating examples. “Annual” fishes that live in transient 
puddles fit the model. Because their life-span is dependant on the existence 
of  the puddle they were born in (only roe survive the long dry-season 
between rains) they only have one mating season. They exhibit extreme 
male-male aggression and sometimes fight to the death over females. 
Gladiator Frogs also meet the requirements of  the model. They live for a 
short time – only a single mating season – and so have limited opportunities 
to mate. Not only are males aggressive towards each other they have also 
evolved a sharp, retractable spine which is used only in male-male combat. 
These independent evolutions of  analogous traits corroborate the 
postulated regularity about one-shot breeding environments. Our 
confidence in the regularity will also infer confidence in the particular 
hypothesis about fig-wasps. 
Falsifying evidence is somewhat problematic in adaptive models. Judson 
does not consider any cases where a lineage in a one-shot breeding 
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 environment is not coupled with male-male aggression. Given the diversity 
of  animal phenotypes my hunch would be that such cases exist. Extremely 
short-lived insects such as mayflies, or in particular butterflies and moths 
such as the Emperor Gum-Moth, who have a very short breeding section in 
their life cycles, seem to have a one-shot breeding environment and (so far 
as I am aware) do not typically engage in male-male violence. There is a 
difference between having one breeding season and one breeding 
opportunity, of  course. The point is that sometimes (perhaps frequently), 
we will find counterexamples to adaptive models. If  we discover a 
disanalogy, then, what are we to make of  the hypothesis? If  we find a 
lineage with a one-shot breeding environment where males are meek, does 
this falsify Judson’s hypothesis? Not necessarily. A commitment to 
biological externalism does not entail a commitment to Natural Selection 
optimizing, and it does not entail a commitment to Natural Selection’s path 
being non-contingent. Just because it happens to be the case that a 
particular solution has not arisen in a lineage, this does not mean that this 
solution is not typically arrived at. However, the number of  ‘falsifying’ 
examples, and the level of  similarity between them and our target system, 
are important criterion for judging the level of  threat counterexamples pose 
to a theory. If  there are many examples, or if  those examples are 
particularly telling (they are importantly similar), then we should be 
concerned about the theory. 
As analogies can act as evidence for an externalist, adaptive model, so 
also can our confidence in externalism affect our confidence in analogous 
inference. If  we think that Natural Selection’s causal force reaches far and 
wide, we will be more ready to accept an analogous inference relying on that 
model. If  we retrodicted the male behaviour of  some extinct species of  fish 
which lived in transient pools we might claim that they were violent based 
on our observations of  Annual Fish (as well as Fig-wasps and Gladiator 
Frogs). This inference is only justified if  the causal thesis of  externalism is 
the case, if  it is a robust-process that is information preserving enough to 
warrant projection into the evolutionary past. 
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 So the epistemic warrant of  analogous inferences is gained via the 
robust-process of  Natural Selection. To judge the strength of  this warrant, 
then, we must examine whether the causal thesis of  externalism is true. It is 
here that the problem of  causal depth emerges. 
4.2  The Problem of Causal Depth   
The problem of  causal depth for analogy is due to noise from 
developmental processes interfering with the signal from Natural Selection. 
A problem of  causal depth occurs when the process which underlies a 
particular inference is information-destroying to the point that we lack 
epistemic warrant to choose between competing hypotheses. Natural 
selection is constrained by the process of  development. These constraints 
may make Natural Selection too information-destroying to ground 
analogous inferences. If  this is the case, then analogies between lineages are 
not projectible onto other lineages. We could not use them for inductive 
inferences.  If  we take the Developmentalist criticism of  Adaptationism 
seriously, then we should question whether analogous inferences have 
epistemic warrant. 
This section is a discussion of  constraints upon Natural Selection. Some 
constraints do not affect Natural Selection’s ‘signal’, its projectibility, but 
others do. In particular, I think that developmental constraints cause 
significant noise. I will discuss non-developmental constraints and suggest 
that are not sufficient to cause a problem of  causal depth. This will set me 
up to argue for the following two claims. First, the potentiality of  a 
developmental system can affect the signal from Natural Selection, causing 
a problem of  causal depth for an analogous inference. Second, it is typically 
the case that developmental systems erase this signal. 
The discussion of  constraints which follows is not intended to be 
exhaustive and aims only to identify the kind of  constraint which is most 
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 important for the problem of  causal depth21. A constraint upon Natural 
Selection is anything which relativizes the adaptive solutions it reaches. As 
Roger Sansom (2003) has pointed out, constraints upon selection are in fact 
necessary for its explanatory potency. What counts as optimal must at least 
be relative to the environment in question. I want to identify those 
constraints which erase the historical signal from selection and undermine 
inferences reliant upon analogy.  
Some constraints are fairly innocuous. For Darwin, Natural Selection did 
not reach global optima, but one localized in reference to the 
competitiveness of  other individuals in a population. “Natural Selection 
tends only to make each organic being as perfect as, or slightly more perfect 
than, the other inhabitants of  the same country with which it has to 
struggle for existence… Natural Selection will not produce absolute 
perfection (Darwin 2008 (1859) pp 235).”  ‘Perfection’ is relative to the 
fitness of  those other individuals competing in a population.  
This constraint is accepted (if  underemphasized) by modern 
Adaptationists (Dawkins 1996, Dennett 1995), as well as others. Because 
Natural Selection can only move traits towards increased fitness, if  a trait 
must decrease in fitness in order to reach some higher optima, then that 
optima cannot be reached. In other words, if  a ‘fitness valley’ exists between 
their current optima and a higher one, that higher one is inaccessible. 
Perhaps if  all fig-wasps became pacifists the overall fitness of  each 
individual fig-wasp would increase. But because any move towards pacifism 
on the part of  an individual wasp results in a decrease in fitness, general 
pacifism cannot be reached. Another constraint is trade-offs between 
various traits within an organism. An increase in fig-wasp size might result 
                                                      
21 There are various ways of dividing up constraints – Gould distinguishes between 
phylogenic contingencies (developmental history) and formal structural rules. He claims 
that what counts as a constraint is relative to the explanatory programme. Others may 
take a more objective approach. My discussion here is neutral to this debate, which is 
nicely arbitrated at the opening of Sansom 2003. 
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 in more success in combat, but could have negative factors as well. Perhaps 
they would be less efficient at mating, for instance. 
If  these constraints affect the signal from Natural Selection, they do so 
in a similar way as Sober’s ‘bowl’ example: they are due to the nature of  
Natural Selection itself.  I do not think they are particularly troubling here. 
It is a commitment to externalism, that Natural Selection is the most potent 
force in the evolution of  phenotype, which grants epistemic warrant to 
analogous inference. And externalism is not challenged by these examples. 
It is now time to make the first claim: Developmental processes can create a 
problem of  causal depth for analogies. 
A developmental constraint consists of  information about what a particular 
developmental system can and (more importantly) cannot do. It constrains 
selection by tying possible design space to the potentiality of  a particular 
developmental system. These constraints are, in Sansom’s terms “… 
abstractions from the causal processes of  development… (Sansom 2003 
pp504)” They constitute a separate robust-process from selection. 
Developmental constraints could affect the use of  analogy because when 
we claim that two species are analogous and use them to make comparative 
inferences, we do it against an assumption that the two lineages have the 
same potentiality. For instance, if  we wish to reconstruct the hunting 
behaviour of  an extinct hominid we may want to use an analogue. We could 
use a pack-hunter, say wolves (as suggested in Sayers & Lovejoy 2008). For 
the wolf  and our target species to be analogous, they must have developed 
the same adaptation in response to the same selective environment. For this 
to be the case, however, both lineages must have similar developmental 
options open to them: selection must have the stronger effect on phenotype 
than phylogenetic history. 
Let us go back to inferring male-male violence in an extinct species of  
fish. Because we had reason to believe that this fish lived in a one-shot 
breeding environment and because we have analogous examples of  male-
male violence given that environment (Annual fish, gladiator frogs, fig-
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 wasps) we inferred that this extinct fish exhibited male-male violence. But 
what if  the developmental system of  the fish had interfered with Natural 
Selection? Maybe male-male competition was simply not in the potentiality 
of  that system. Or alternatively some other evolutionary route was more 
likely given the developmental system. Perhaps the lineage evolved towards 
some different fitness peak because of  its developmental potential. If  this 
was the case then for this particular example we cannot project our selective 
model onto the target system. So, even if  we are correct in our adaptive 
explanations of  Annual fish, gladiator frogs and fig-wasps, because Natural 
Selection’s path is constrained by the developmental system of  the fish in 
question, we cannot then claim that our model holds true for it. 
So, it is possible for a developmental system to constrain Natural 
Selection in such a way that some analogous inferences lack epistemic 
warrant. In these cases Natural Selection lacks the causal depth to affect 
phenotype. This does not undermine the causal thesis of  externalism – 
externalism not holding true in particular cases is not enough to claim that 
it is false generally. The adaptive model can be right, but not applicable in 
this particular case. To do this we need to argue for the second claim of  this 
section: development’s constraint of  Natural Selection is typically the case. 
If  internalism is true, that developmental resources have a stronger 
causal role in the shaping of  phenotype than environmental pressures, then 
we have a generalized problem of  causal depth. We are unjustified in 
assuming that an externalist hypothesis in one lineage will hold true in 
another. As we shall see in the next few chapters, different evidence will be 
required to prop up these inferences. 
Paul Griffiths (particularly 1994) has argued against the use of  adaptive 
categories in taxonomy on the grounds that, generally speaking, 
phylogenetic history is a much stronger force in shaping phenotype than 
Natural Selection. His argument could be summarized as a claim that the 
causal thesis of  internalism is true, and so functional categories (part of  the 
explanatory project of  externalism) are inappropriate for taxonomy. I take it 
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 that the purpose of  taxonomy (at least in cladistics) is to represent the real 
evolutionary relationships between lineages. A ‘taxonomy’ which uses 
functional (adaptive) categories allows for cross-species generalizations. But 
these generalizations, Griffiths claims, are not robust. A cladistic taxonomy 
has more explanatory potency than a functional one. Natural Selection’s 
causal efficacy is shallow. 
Griffiths’ argument that phylogenetic history is a much stronger force on 
phenotype than selection is made largely by exemplar. “It is a truism in 
comparative biology that similarities due to analogy (shared adaptive 
function) are ‘shallow’. The deeper you dig the more things diverge. Bat 
wings and bird wings have similar aerodynamic properties but their 
structure diverges radically, despite their deep homology as tetrapod limbs 
(Griffiths 2007b, pg 216).”  
Another striking example he uses (Griffiths 1994) is to compare two 
(relatively?) closely related species who occupy the same niche. If  
externalism is true, and selection is largely unaffected by phylogenetic 
history, then we should expect lineages in the same niche to share similar 
phenotypes. There are two exemplars he gives for the niche ‘Top-Rank 
Fresh-Water Predator.’ One is the crocodile, the other the anaconda. It is 
difficult to find resemblance-relations between these two lineages which are 
best explained in terms of  adaptation. Their reptilian features are 
homologies, not analogies. According to Griffiths, we will find these 
discrepancies more often than not. This kind of  example suggest that 
Natural Selection is importantly constrained by development, and moreover 
that that phylogenetic history has more influence over phenotype than 
selection. It shows that we cannot simply assume that Natural Selection will 
reach predictable optima. 
These examples are telling, but inconclusive. I can see no way of  
claiming that, in principle, Natural Selection is shallow (this point is 
expanded below). However, as we examine these examples a case builds: 
typically, phylogenetic history tells us much more about a particular lineage 
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 than niche. Developmental processes (most likely) do constrain the options 
open to Natural Selection enough to undermine its explanatory potency for 
questions of  biological form. The causal thesis of  externalism is (mostly) 
false. 
I have focused on a broad question: what explains phenotypic form 
overall. As we have seen, adaptive hypotheses are usually about the function 
of  a particular trait or suite of  traits. So even if  adaptation is a bad 
explanation for overall form, it does not follow that it is a bad explanation 
for a particular trait. So these considerations do not overly affect adaptive 
hypotheses (although they reduce the scope of  externalism as an 
explanatory project). They do, however, affect analogous inferences. If  
Natural Selection’s causal efficacy is shallow, then we cannot assume that 
what is true about the relationship between one lineage and its selective 
environment will be true of  another. I am unwarranted in projecting from 
the behaviour of  a fig-wasp to an extinct fish based on the analogous 
similarities between them. If  this line of  thought is right, when contrasting 
two competing hypotheses about the behaviour of  the fish, analogies have a 
minimal role in corroboration. Much of  the remainder of  this thesis aims to 
show the conditions required to overcome this. 
So the problem of  Causal Depth can be expressed. We cannot readily 
grant epistemic warrant to inferences reliant on analogy because Natural 
Selection is too information-destroying a process. The influence of  
phylogenetic history overrides that of  selective history. Before moving on 
to the next chapter, there is a last point I want to make about the problem 
of  causal depth 
The problem of  causal depth is an empirical problem, not a conceptual 
one. We might think that analogies are shallow by their very nature. The 
similarly between analogues is functional, and therefore (we might think) 
more abstract than the similarities between homologues. If  there is some 
trade-off  between abstractness and specificity (presumably due to 
functionality or abstractness maps onto ‘generality’ in some sense), then 
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 analogues have a grain problem due to their functional nature.  
I think this kind of  approach is wrong-headed. At the end of  the second 
chapter I discussed the nature of  the functional similarity between 
analogues. There I committed to Lycan’s account of  continuity between 
function and physicality. As we saw, functional and physical description 
could be either homologous or analogous. If  this is the case, then analogies 
cannot have a grain problem due to their functionality (or, at least, that 
functional homologies have the same problem).  
Another way of  putting this point, I think, is to reemphasize that 
parallelisms can be as similar as homologies. If  this is the case, then our 
explanatory inference that a particular resemblance-relation is homologous, 
leads us to cast the similarity in terms of  physical (phylogenetic) continuity. 
If  we infer an analogy, then we cast the similarity in terms of  selective 
function. But that analogies are shallow is a fact of  the matter; there is 
nothing necessary about analogies which leads to the problem of  causal 
depth. So the problem of  causal depth lies not with analogies themselves, 
but with the fact of  their shallowness. 
As such, one method to refute Griffiths, Gould and others would be to 
find examples of  analogies where Natural Selection’s effect is deep. This is 
not my approach. The question I aim to answer in the next three chapters 
is: given that analogous similarities are shallow, that there is a problem of  
causal depth, under what conditions can analogies remain useful to us? 
Before turning to possible solutions, I want to bring into focus a 
particular case where I think the use of  analogies would be most helpful: 
outlier lineages. This is the topic of  the next chapter. 
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 5 .  O u t l i e r  L i n e a g e s   
This chapter sets the task for chapters 6 and 7. It describes an area where 
analogous inferences have obvious application: Outlier lineages.  
In the last chapter I showed that the causal-thesis of  Adaptation ought 
to be considered generally false (although it is true in some particular cases). 
As Adaptationism is necessary to grant epistemic warrant for analogous 
inferences, this undermines the use of  convergences to construct adaptive 
models. I am unable (it seems) to project an adaptive explanation from one 
lineage to a target lineage. 
In the first part of  this chapter I will outline an explanatory target that 
analogies would be very helpful for. These are outlier lineages, lineages which 
are phenotypically isolated from their homologues. The use of  homology is 
impoverished in the explanation of  outliers, and I shall spend some time 
explaining this. I will then sketch a framework for the explanation of  outlier 
lineages, which I will call an evolutionary narrative. An evolutionary narrative is 
an externalist, actual sequence explanation which hypothesizes the adaptive 
history of  a particular trait or suite of  traits belonging to an outlier lineage.  
Before analysing the purported solutions to the problem of  causal 
depth, I want to bring into focus the kind of  questions analogies can help 
answer. 
There is a kind of  evolutionary question which analogies can help 
answer. These are explanations about the evolution of  outlier lineages. An 
outlier lineage is phenotypically isolated, which limits our ability to use 
homology to reconstruct its evolution. I will use these limits on homology 
to set a particular role for that class of  information in the retrodiction of  
outlier lineages. 
With this in hand I will outline a framework for retrodicting the 
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 evolutionary histories of  outlier lineages – we need to construct an 
evolutionary narrative. There are two pieces of  information required, one 
phylogenetic and the other adaptive. We need to know the initial conditions 
of  the lineage, what state they evolved from. We then need to refer to an 
adaptive model which links the initial state to the final state.  
I will ultimately argue that homology and analogy have very different 
inferential uses. Homology can inform the initial conditions and analogy the 
adaptive model. This division of  labour is central to my solution to the 
problem of  causal depth. 
5.1  What is  an outlier lineage?  
In this section I will explain what I mean by outlier lineages and go over 
some inferential issues they pose. This will allow me to explain the uses of  
homology and analogy in such cases. 
An outlier lineage has phenotypically departed from its relatives. Some 
of  the planet’s most successful lineages have not shifted from their basic 
design for millions of  years. By contrast, some lineages have shot down 
unexpected routes through design space, becoming markedly different from 
their conservative cousins.  
To count as an outlier lineage, a lineage must be phenotypically isolated. 
If  a lineage has outlier traits, which are traits which are present in the target, 
but not in any close relatives, then it is an outlier lineage.  
Pressure can be put on the distinction between an outlier lineage, and a 
mere variant. For instance, a particular species of  Finch which happens to 
have a longer beak others does not count as an outlier. In such cases our 
inferential approach to explaining the difference is not the same as in more 
phenotypically isolated cases. For the Finch, analogies are not needed to 
explain the evolutionary difference. We instead rely on a ‘longitudinal study’ 
of  the lineage and its relatives. For instance, if  beak-size variation was 
modelled by studying beak-length versus various dimensions of  possible 
selected effect (available food, population and so on), then we could 
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 extrapolate any regularities discovered onto our target. This longitudinal 
approach gives a micro-evolutionary explanation (see Grant & Grant 2006 
for a ‘longitudinal’ study Darwin’s Finches beaks). To count as an outlier, an 
explanation of  the outlier traits must not be amenable to these real-time 
studies. The phenotypic isolation must be deep and complex. 
There are several ways a lineage could become an outlier. If  a lineage’s 
relatives have died off  it may be left with unique traits. This is an orphaned 
outlier22. The Nautilus clade consists of  six species across two genera. 
Fossils suggest their basic form has remained unchanged for 500 million 
years. They are the only cephalopod to have a coiled shell, or any hard 
external casing at all. The Ammonite relatives of  the Nautilus, which shared 
this similarity, went extinct at the K-T extinction event (Dawkins 2004, pg 
394). The Nautilus Clade, then, is an outlier in virtue of  the ammonite 
extinction. 
 
                                                      
22 A related idea is David Jablonki’s concept of a Dead Clade Walking (2002). There is a 
tendency for certain clades, having survived mass extinction events, to become extinct 
in the aftermath. Survivors from such clades may become orphaned outliers, or if the 
temporal distance is long enough, lonely outliers (such as the tuatara). An interesting 
question is why, if Dead Clades are fairly robust phenomena, some groups occasionally 
manage to survive given the extinction of the remainder of their clade. What, for 
instance, explains the survival of the tuatara?  
















Figure xiii Orphaned Outlier 





If  a lineage has travelled a distinctive phylogenetic path for long enough, 
it sometimes evolves traits that are divergent from its relatives. This is a 
lonely outlier. The two species of  Tuatara, for instance, have followed a 
separate evolutionary path from any other reptile for at least 200 million 
years. Over time, differences have accrued between them and their relatives. 
Their parietal eye, for instance, has either been lost in the main reptile 
group or evolved independently in the clade after the split.  So the tuatara is 
an outlier lineage in virtue of  the temporal distance between itself  and its 
cousins. The platypus and echidna, as well, are outliers in virtue of  the deep 
phylogenetic distance between them and other extant mammals. 
 
















Figure xiv Lonely Outlier 





Sometimes the difference between lonely or orphaned outliers is 
indistinct. If  an outlier lineage has undergone minor phenotypic change in 
its life history, and is unique due to the extinction of  cousins, then it is 
lonely. If  is has undergone significant phenotypic drift, then could be a 
lonely orphan. 
Mere temporal distance or phylogenetic isolation alone is not enough to 
count as an outlier. The clades represented by the two genera of  Nautilus 
have a common ancestor in the deep past, so they have plenty of  temporal 
distance between them. But, in the context of  the Nautilus clade, they are 
not outliers because the lineages have not diverged enough. A lineage is an 
outlier due to phenotypic distance, not temporal. For the Nautilus clade, the 
phenotypic distance between it and its closest relatives is explained by 
temporal distance and the extinction of  the clade’s relatives. 
Finally, a group may become an outlier because of  runaway selection, 
typically due to entering a new niche. These are runaway outliers. The 
cetacean lineage (whales, dolphins and porpoises) is nestled within the 
artiodactyls (even-toed ungulates). Their closest extant relative is the 
Hippopotamus (the ‘whippo’ hypothesis: Dawkins 2004 pp 202-210, 
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 Marino et al 2007)! The obvious contender for explaining the enormous 
difference between a dolphin and a hippopotamus is adaptation to a salt-
water niche. Examining the hippopotamus cannot tell us how the cetaceans 
evolved from land-living hoofed mammals to sea predators; it is unclear 
whether we should consider the most recent ancestor of  the two lineages 














Figure xv Runaway Outlier 





So, a lineage may become an outlier due to the extinction of  homologues 
(becoming orphaned), or temporal distance (becoming lonely), or due to 
rapid phenotypic change (running away). All result in phenotypic isolation, 
which, as we shall see, massively limits the use of  homology. Before 
discussing these limits, I want to discuss the hominid lineage as an outlier, 
as I will be using our ancestry as a case study throughout this chapter and 
the next two. 
Homo-sapiens is an outlier lineage. Not only are we phylogenetically 
isolated but we have many apparently unique, ubiquitous traits. These range 
from physical adaptations such as bipedalism (Sayers & Lovejoy 2008) to 
psychological and cultural adaptations like language and abstract thought. 
We are, then outliers on two counts. Our lineage is characterized by rapid 
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 evolutionary change leading to a suite of  traits not present in our 
homologues. Also, all other members of  the hominid clade have become 
extinct. In short, we are runaway orphans. 
Some research programmes (most notably Evolutionary Psychology) 
seek to explain such unique traits in Adaptationist terms (Workman & 
Reader 2004, Pinker 1997, Barkow et al 1992). An adaptive explanation is 
appropriate for these traits - their high cost and specific design suggest are 
diagnostic of  adaptations. However, their novelty impoverishes the 
application of  comparisons with homologues. 
Jonathon Kaplan (2002) has argued that due to the phenotypic isolation 
of  hominid traits, our evolutionary history is out of  inferential reach for 
comparisons with other lineages. In order for a lineage to give good 
evidence about the evolutionary history of  a trait, we must be able to 
calculate the fitness consequences of  that trait. With Finches, repeated 
‘longitudinal’ observations allowed us to find the fitness consequence for 
beak-length. If  there are no available homologues to make such a 
calculation, then the information (through this route at least) is inaccessible.  
Kaplan appears to either ignore analogy or conflate it with homology. As 
we shall see in the next section, given the nature of  outlier lineages, it is 
trivial to point out that homology cannot provide evidence for fitness 
consequences. He doesn’t consider non-homologous similarities between 
humans and other lineages. Independently evolved resemblance-relations, if  
they exist, would constitute better evidence for adaptive hypotheses about 
hominid evolution than homologous similarities (see below). So we should 
search for analogies as well. This is not to suggest that all of  our traits have 
available analogues. Language, for instance, might be a truly unique trait. If  
there are no analogues or homologues for a trait, then comparative data 
cannot shed light on adaptive models. 
So far we have learnt what it is to be an outlier lineage. A lineage counts 
as an outlier just in case it is phenotypically isolated and that isolation is 
deep (not amenable to longitudinal study). The hominid lineage is an 
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 example of  this. With the focus is firmly on our own lineage, I want to 
make some points about the use and limitations of  homology before going 
on to exposit the explanatory structure which ought to be applied to outlier 
lineages. 
5.2   Jolly’s  Paradox and the Limits of Homology 
When our explanatory target is the emergence of  novel features in an 
outlier lineage, the use of  homology is especially limited. This is in part due 
to the nature of  outlier lineages - the target trait will not be present in 
homologues. But we also must be careful to demarcate the vital but 
different roles that analogues and homologues play. A discussion of  ‘Jolly’s 
Paradox’ will lead me into the next section where I will argue for a division 
of  labour between them. 
Some properties of  outlier lineages weaken the use of  homology. To see 
why, we need to consider the epistemic basis for homologous inferences I 
discussed in chapter 3. 
Homology has varied uses in evolutionary biology. It can be a data point 
for the reconstruction of  ancestral phenotypes; to help calibrate a molecular 
clock; to test adaptive hypotheses; to set the phyletic relationships between 
lineages. My interest is in the use of  homology to project traits from one 
lineage to another, thus telling us about the phenotypes of  their ancestors, 
the phenotypes of  extant relatives and helping to construct and test 
adaptive hypotheses. 
I have previously argued that homologous inferences (in the cases I am 
interested in) gain warrant from developmental entrenchment and cladistic 
parsimony. There are three reasons that homologous inferences are typically 
weakened in outlier lineages. First, although outlier lineages are not 
characterized by temporal distance they are frequently phylogenetically (as 
well as phenotypically) isolated. Second, if  some traits have undergone rapid 
evolutionary change, this suggests that the trait is evolutionary labile. And 
temporal distance and trait labiality weaken developmental entrenchment. 
Third, an outlier lineage will usually lack data points for clade construction. 
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 This weakens cladistic parsimony. I will take each point in turn. 
If  there is temporal distance between a lineage and its homologues, this 
can weaken homologous inferences. In chapter 3 I discussed the use of  the 
Googly-eyed Glass Squid to model the Colossal Squid. Our basis for 
assuming they shared behaviour was the minimal phylogenetic space 
between them. Because phenotype is typically preserved across generations, 
traits can be projected from a homologue to a target across small 
phylogenetic distances. Imagine now that the temporal distance between the 
two species was extended. The longer they have diverged – the lonelier the 
lineages - the higher the chance that any particular trait would have changed 
(unless there is very strong stabilising selection acting on them). So if  the 
two squid lineages had diverged enough, we would have little basis to claim 
any particular similarity between them. Outlier lineages, particularly lonely 
and orphaned ones, are typically temporally distant from their homologues, 
and so developmental entrenchment might not provide epistemic warrant 
for homologous inferences. 
If  a trait has evolved rapidly in a lineage then this trait is probably labile 
in the clade in question. In primates kin-structures appear to be particularly 
labile. Across the group there are many different arrangements, and close 
relationship is not a good guide for what particular structure a lineage will 
have. This suggests that it is ‘easy’ for a primate to change its social 
structure, at least over evolutionary time. A runaway outlier has recently 
undergone a set of  deep, complex evolutionary changes. If  an outlier is a 
runaway, then, there is a good chance that their outlier traits will be labile. If  
this is the case, then developmental entrenchment cannot guide inferences 
about the traits these lineages held in the past (kin-structure in primates is 
discussed in more detail next chapter). 
An outlier sometimes lacks data points for cladistic analysis. Compare an 
impoverished clade to those which systematists prefer. Hominidae, the clade 
which consists of  the Great Apes and Humans, has perhaps eleven species 
spread over roughly thirteen millions years (Kaplan 2002). Compare this to 
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 the Cichlid fishes in Lake Victoria, who evolved roughly 450 species in 
100,000 years (Dawkins 2004); or with the lungfish discussed in Schultze’s 
work (see chapter 2), which have many species spread across three 
continents (Schultze 1994). The difference in sheer bulk is striking. If  our 
data only consists of  a few species then the probability of  the most 
parsimonious arrangement being correct will decrease.  
So the epistemic warrant of  homologous inference is weakened in 
outlier cases. I will now turn to a different point about homology which I 
will make in the context of  using homologues to inform human evolution. 
If  we are asking an adaptive question about an outlier trait homology has a 
particular role to play. It is very important that this role is clearly delineated.  
There is much debate about use of  the Pan clade, Chimpanzees and 
Bonobos, to model hominid evolution. Some emphasize the similarities 
between us and Pan, claiming that our outlier traits are phylogenetically 
continuous. For instance, Frans De Waal (amongst many others) has 
claimed that human morality is rooted in Pan cooperative behaviour (De 
Waal 2006, see also Katz 2000); Bernard Chapais and others have claimed 
that human kinship structures can be traced from those of  Pan (Chapais 
2008, Rodseth & Shannon 2006); and Darwin believed that an 
understanding of  primates would revolutionise our understanding of  
human nature, which he demonstrated using homologues between human 
and chimp emotional expression (Sterelny & Griffiths 1999). What these 
theories have in common is the denial of  a discontinuity between human 
and chimp. We do not need to look at any information from outside the 
Pan-Homo clade, or maybe outside of  Hominidae, for answers to questions 
about human adaptations. Like the long-beaked finch from the previous 
section, we can simply extrapolate the adaptive model for our evolutionary 
story from observations of  homologues. 
For some traits this is the case (emotional expression is homologous 
between hominids and other primates) but there is reason for worry which 
is interestingly (but perhaps misleadingly) expressed in ‘Jolly’s Paradox’. My 
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 aim is to use a discussion of  the ‘paradox’ to illustrate the role which 
homology has to play, and to lead into a general story about the retrodiction 
of  outlier lineages. 
Sayers & Lovejoy (2008) argue forcefully against the use of  Pan as a 
model for hominid evolution. They rightly take issue with the use of  
chimpanzees and bonobos as analogues. In some cases they argue that traits 
which are taken as analogous between primates and hominids are not 
actually analogous. For example they think (and argue in exhaustive detail) 
that the regular taking of  an upright posture in primates is not an analogue 
of  bipedality as the physiological criteria for bipedality is significantly 
divergent from typical primate physiology. They also argue that there is a 
double standard between primatology and animal behavioural studies. A 
primatologist, they claim, is much quicker to assert that a particular 
behaviour is cultural or learned than a scientist working on the behaviour of  
other animals.  
Their most interesting argument is the claim that an increase in similarity 
between chimp and human makes the job of  explaining unique hominid 
traits harder. This is ‘Jolly’s Paradox’. Discussing tool-use Sayers & Lovejoy 
have this to say: “… the more chimpanzees are shown to be skilled in 
making tools, the less effective their tool-making becomes as a criterion for 
the earliest human behaviour. (pp89).” Why justifies this claim? If  they are 
right, then it seems to follow that the more similar an ancestor is to our 
target the harder our explanatory task. I will examine their position in more 
detail in reference to bipedality. 
Clifford Jolly has used Baboons taking an upright stance to construct a 
model of  the evolution of  bipedality (Jolly 1970). Baboons typically adopt 
an upright stance in order to collect and eat seeds. Jolly suggested that 
selection for uprightness as an adaptation for seed-eating could have led to 
bipedality in the hominid lineage. It is not clear whether he means this to be 
a homologous inference, where our common ancestor with Baboons took 
an upright stance for this purpose, or an analogous inference where our 
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 ancestors evolved an upright stance in parallel with Baboons. Either way, his 
idea can be expressed as a hypothesis (H1) which takes an adaptation from 
the ancestral state and supposes that selection for that adaptation led to the 
explanatory target.  
 
Figure xvi Hypothesis One (H1) 
Selection for a Pre-existing trait leads to the evolution of the target trait. 
Final State: Bipedal 
Initial State: Upright 




Sayers & Lovejoy argue that if  the upright stance is used for a purpose 
successfully in primates, then it doesn’t make sense for selection to favour 
selection for bipedality for that purpose. That baboons regularly take an 
upright stance when eating seeds, they claim, shows that bipedality is not an 
adaptation for seed-eating. Baboons are well adapted for seed-eating. Why 
would selection favour an evolutionary change to a body design which 
seems to come at such cost, when the current arrangement is sufficient? 
Bipedal hominids loose arboreal access and quadrapedal speed. “The more 
it can be demonstrated that primates can effectively practice it [upright-
stance], the less probable it becomes as an explanation for the singularity of 
compulsory hominid bipedality (Sayers & Lovejoy 2008).”  
So for Sayers & Lovejoy H1 is not a good hypothesis for the evolution 
of bipedality. They think a theory which postulates a different selection 
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 pressure is necessary. So, even if hominids did take an upright stance in the 
evolutionary past, our explanation needs to postulate a change in the 
selective environment. Uprightness is, at best, an exaptation. 
 
Figure xvii Hypothesis Two (H2) 
Bipedality evolves due to the adoption of an upright posture as a 
exaptation and selection for a different function. 
Final State: Bipedal 
Initial State: Upright 
Posture as adaptation for 
Selection pressure 
for some other 
purpose 
 
Their case is overstated. First, it is not clear that Jolly actually means that 
uprightness is anything other than an exaptation. This is clearly the most 
reasonable way of reading his hypothesis. Second, it is not necessarily true 
that selection for bipedality requires selection pressure for a different 
purpose. If there is some trade-off between the fitness inferred from seed-
eating and the fitness inferred from a quadrupedal gate, then the mitigation 
of that trade-off could allow selection to favour bipedality. Perhaps, for 
instance, the shift from forests to plains removed selective pressure on 
arboreal adaptations. It could just be the case that selection for seed-eating 
(assuming that bipedality is a more efficient means of doing so) was 
stronger in the hominid lineage than in baboons.  
Having said this, they are on to something important. It is not that 
increased similarity leads to more difficult explanations. The important 
point is that if we are to explain why hominids are different to other 
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 primates, we need to draw on differences between the past selective 
environments of hominids and other primates. If both hominids and 
Baboons lived in the same selective environment, then why is it that 
hominids evolved bipedality and Baboons did not? 
So Sayers & Lovejoy’s point about Jolly’s Paradox is best understood as 
emphasizing the need for a difference-maker in adaptive explanations. Possible 
difference-makers are divergences between a lineage and its homologues. 
What is the trait, developmental resource, or environmental variable which 
drove the lineages down divergent paths?  The explanatory target for outlier 
lineages are the divergences between the lineage and its homologues. By 
using the same lineages as both homologues and as analogues, therefore, 
the difference maker is easily obscured. 
For the retrodiction of some outliers, the difference-maker will be less 
important. If a lineage is an outlier due to temporal distance, then it may 
not be the case that its outlier traits can be explained solely, or even at all, in 
reference to external explanation. If a lineage has evolved due to drift or 
some other non-selective process, the differences in environment are not 
sufficient to explain the phenotype. It is in adaptive, external explanations 
that we want to identify difference makers. So for lonely outliers, and some 
orphans, the difference-maker is less important because an externalist 
explanation is less appropriate. But when we are considering cases where 
lineages have becomes outliers due to homologue extinction or rapid 
evolutionary change this is less likely.  
So, to focus my aim here. I am concerned with the proper strategy for 
retrodicting outlier lineages of the type which Homo-sapiens exemplify. These 
lineages are runaways, phenotypically isolated because in the relatively 
recent past there has been rapid evolutionary change. We have evolved 
unique traits (presumably adaptations) due to a particular set of selective 
environments. Also, these lineages are orphaned; they lack close 
homologues. Because all other hominids are extinct, we cannot (directly) 
observe them. 
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 One method of finding a difference maker is to examine contrastive 
information between the outlier and its homologues. Any comparative 
(homologous) information does not warrant an adaptive explanation for the 
emergence of that trait (naturally, we may want a selective explanation for 
its maintenance). All of Hominidae, including humans, are warm blooded. So 
what? Our explanatory target for the emergence of warm-bloodedness is in 
the distant past, long before primates evolved. But, contrasts between 
Homo-sapiens and its homologues do possibly require adaptive explanation. 
We are uniquely adapted to compulsory upright walking. The bipedal 
question asks what was different about past Hominid selective 
environments which meant we evolved an upright posture when Pan did 
not. The explanatory target is this divergence in trait. The difference-maker 
will be some quality (most likely in the selective environment) which 
Hominids were exposed to, and Pan were not. 
Sayers & Lovejoy miss the vital role which homology does play. 
Homologous inferences are the best means we have of setting the initial 
conditions. Even with a strong fossil record, cladistic methods are still 
required to set the evolutionary relationships between the extinct lineages. 
For instance, that many primates habitually take an upright stance suggests 
that our non-bipedal ancestors also habitually took an upright stance. This 
does not tell us that this habit is an exaptation for obligatory bipedalism (in 
fact its apparent ubiquity suggests otherwise), but nonetheless our initial 
conditions will include this trait. Getting a good picture of the original state 
is absolutely necessary.  
I am now in a position to outline the use of homology for outlier 
lineages. Comparative information can inform the initial state – the ancestor 
who evolved into our target system. Contrastive information hypothesizes 
difference-makers for our adaptive explanation. Jolly’s Paradox is a 
pessimistic take on the relationship between homologue and target. The 
higher the similarity between the target system and the homologues, the 
more in common the initial conditions are to the final conditions – and the 
more difficult the task of identifying difference makers. If Chimps are tool-
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 using, upright-stance taking, cultural-learning, hunting primates, why on 
earth did they not evolve into a species as apparently successful and varied 
as Homo-sapiens? In a sense Sayers & Lovejoy are right: the higher the 
similarity between the initial conditions and the final state, the more 
confounding the adaptive problem is.  
With the role of homology exposited, I will explain the inferential 
structure applicable to runaway orphan outlier lineages. 
5.3  Evolutionary Narratives 
This section gives an account of  the structure of  an adaptive explanation 
for an outlier lineage. The model might be generalizable to all adaptive 
explanations but whether this is the case is not my concern here. It will set a 
clear division of  labour for homologous and analogous information. 
Homologues set the initial state, analogues inform the adaptive model. I am 
interested in what I will call evolutionary narratives and will contrast this to 
Brett Calcott’s notion of  a lineage explanation (Calcott 2009). 
What do we want from an explanation of  an outlier lineage? If  we want 
to know, say, why elephants have such prominent proboscises, what 
information are we asking for? We want an evolutionary narrative. A story 
which tells us how something which wasn’t an elephant, evolved into 
something which is. We require an actual-sequence explanation – there is a 
fact of  the matter about how some proto-elephant (‘protophant’) which 
lacked a trunk, evolved into an elephant. This narrative is our explanatory 
target.  
What does an evolutionary narrative consist of, then? The narrative is a 
set of  ordered changes in the lineage – the changes will either be in phenotype 
or environment. To keep with the fanciful elephant theme, let’s say the story 
goes as follows. First, the protophant environment shifted from forested to 
grassland. Second, the protophant phenotype evolved a more efficient 
olfactory system. Third, the environment shifted due to an increased 
number of  grazing animals. Finally, the protophants evolved proper 
elephant trunks. An evolutionary narrative is not just a temporal sequence, 
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 however. This misses an important element. I still need to explain why the 
protophants evolved trunks. 
To answer our question, the narrative must explain the relation between 
these four events in terms of  adaptation. Perhaps the increase in grassland 
(event 1) caused a selective environment which favoured long-distance 
methods of  finding food. The protophants evolved more efficient noses 
(event 2) for this purpose. As other animals moved into the grasslands 
(event 3) competition for food increased. This environment favoured ways 
of  exploiting new food sources, which the evolution of  the trunk (event 4) 
enabled the protophant to do. So in this toy example selection for efficient 
olfactory traits provided an exaptation for the evolution of  trunks.  
The relations between the events refer to some kind of  robust-process 
(which could be expressed as an adaptive model). The claim that a shift into 
grasslands creates a selective environment which favours the evolution of  
an efficient sense of  smell is based in a more general statement. Generally, a 
grassland environment (due to the greater distances, perhaps) selects for a 
more efficient sense of  smell23. As we shall see, these informal models 
ought to be informed by analogies.  
So an evolutionary narrative consists of  a set of  shifts in phenotype or 
environment, and the adaptive relations between them. There are two tasks 
for the ‘evolutionary storyteller.’ We need to know about the events 
themselves – this is the actual-sequence explanation. And we need to know 
about the selective processes acting upon the lineage – this requires a 
robust-process explanation.  
To clarify the notion of  an evolutionary narrative, I want to contrast it 
with Calcott’s lineage explanations (Calcott 2009). One question we might be 
interested in when considering evolutionary change is how it is, 
mechanistically, that traits change over time. In the evolution of  eyes, for 
                                                      
23 I am not suggesting here that any of these claims are actually the case, if anything 
grassland would select for better eyesight. It is meant only as an example. 
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 instance, we want to know how it is that a light-sensitive spot could evolve, 
in a step-by-step fashion, into a lens eye. What sequence of  small shifts 
could make the idea that eyes have evolved plausible? This is a lineage 
explanation. 
For Calcott, lineage explanations have two main requirements. They have 
a continuity requirement. Each successive stage must be only slightly altered. 
The shifts between stages cannot be large leaps – the evolution from a light-
sensitive spot to a lens is a gradual process. They also have a production 
requirement. There are functional criteria the trait must meet at each stage 
of  evolution. For instance, each successive stage of  eye evolution must 
grant better eyesight (acuity or focus). 
A lineage explanation of  trunk evolution, then, would be an ordered 
sequence of  mechanistic changes in nose design which shows how a normal 
mammalian nose might gradually evolve into a trunk. The main difference 
between this explanation and an evolutionary narrative is that an 
evolutionary narrative is (ideally anyway) firmly externalist. We identify the 
relations between shifts in environment and adaptations which lead to the 
evolution of  trunks. Not the internal changes (given particular adaptive 
functions) which mechanistically explain the trait’s evolution.  
So while a lineage explanation is a quasi-internalist (insofar as the 
selective information is one directional in the production requirement), 
robust process explanation (it tells us about how trunks could evolve 
generally, not necessarily how they did evolve in protophants), an 
evolutionary narrative is firmly externalist and actual sequence. We want to 
know, in the actual case of  elephant evolution, what shifts in environment 
and phenotype explain the selection of  trunks. 
An evolutionary narrative has something akin to Calcott’s two 
requirements. The continuity requirement is nowhere near as stringent (as 
we do not need to explain evolutionary shifts mechanistically), but it is 
required that the differences in phenotype at each stage be causally linked to 
differences in selective environment. The production requirement is altered 
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 as well. In a lineage explanation, the optimal production remains static (in 
the case of  eye evolution, it is an increase in focus). In an evolutionary 
narrative, the production is two-directional. Successive phenotypes change 
the selective environment, just as differences in the selective environment 
drives changes in phenotype.  
 
The actual sequence of events are indirectly reconstructed by 
comparing the initial state to the adaptive model and projecting to the 
final state 
Adaptive Model 
Initial State Final State 
Actual Sequence 
of Events
Figure xviii Evolutionary Narrative 
 
The three central parts of  an evolutionary narrative (at least in a 
simplified sense) are the initial state, the final state and an adaptive model. 
Before explaining the roles of  homology and analogy here, I need to say 
something about what constitutes the states, the model and how they relate. 
My account is simplified as it ignores the role of  non-selective processes in 
evolution. Drift and developmental constraints can be an essential part of  
an evolutionary narrative. For the purpose of  clarity I will ignore these to 
focus on an externalist model. Ideally, non-adaptive processes which have a 
role in the forming of  phenotype would be incorporated into the adaptive 
model or initial state. 
The original and final states (and any necessary states in between) consist 
of  a set of  variables. In the protophant example, for instance, the original 
state included variables such a forested environment and a small, inefficient 
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 nose phenotype. The final state included a grassland environment and a 
trunk phenotype.  
An adaptive model also consists of  variables, but these will be a set of  
conditions for the evolution of  a trait. These variables can be categorized 
into selective and developmental. So perhaps the evolution of  trunks 
requires a highly competitive grassland environment (a selective variable) 
and a large, efficient olfactory system (a developmental variable). Given the 
right combination of  selective and developmental factors, the trait will 
evolve.  
Contrastive information between the initial state and the adaptive model 
sets difference-making variables. In my toy example, the initial state and the 
adaptive model share the developmental requirement of  an efficient nose. 
They diverge on the selective requirement of  higher food competition. So 
we would conclude that the difference making variable which drove 
protophant evolution towards trunks is the increase in population which 
caused an increase in competition for food. 
With this in place, I can now state the division of  labour between 
homology and analogy. Homology is useful in setting the original state, but 
is unhelpful for the adaptive model24. Analogy may have a small but 
contentious role for the original state, but can be both inspirational and 
corroborative for the adaptive model. 
What information could inform the original state? There are two sets of  
variables required, environmental information and phenotypic information. 
Many historical sciences can inform the initial state, paleobotany, 
paleoclimatology, and a host of  other ‘paleos’, but I want to focus on 
homology. Any fossil remains, be it plant matter, fecal or animal, rely upon 
cladistical analysis to set the relationships to the target lineage. Although it a 
matter of  great contention to claim any particular fossil lineage is actually 
                                                      
24 This is focusing on extant homologues. In the hominid case extinct homologues have 
proven a very important stream of evidence in constructing the evolutionary narrative. 
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 an ancestor of  a target lineage (Sober 1988), homologous studies can give 
us good evidence of  cousinship to the target in the same fashion as it does 
for living species. If  there are no fossil remains, then homology can provide 
a picture of  the initial conditions if  there are enough homologues of  the 
right relationship to grant warrant. For instance, in the hominid case extant 
relatives can inform us about our ancestors at the Pan-Homo split, 
approximately 6 million years ago, and further back – but not any closer to 
the present (see Suddendorf  2003 for an overview of  homologous uses 
looking specifically at the Great Ape-Hominid case). 
Analogues are limited in informing the initial state. As we saw in the last 
chapter, ‘Reverse Engineering’ is an Adaptationist method for inferring past 
adaptive environments from current adaptations (Griffiths 1996). 
Information about previous environments are part of  the initial conditions. 
Perhaps an analogue could corroborate an adaptive hypothesis which claims 
that a particular selective environment causes a particular adaptation. But 
this is the kind of  claim we rejected in the last chapter. Because adaptive 
forces are affected by historical stochasticity, we should be suspicious of  
historical inferences made on an adaptive basis. As we shall see in chapter 7, 
given enough corroborating evidence this kind of  inference may be 
acceptable. But for now let the scepticism stand: analogues are little help in 
setting initial conditions. 
Analogues can give us empirical traction on adaptive models. We have 
already seen how tenuous adaptive hypotheses are. The ‘natural 
experiments’ provided by other lineages independently evolving the same 
adaptations are the best method of  corroboration that we have (although 
see the Coda for an attempt to extend what we mean by ‘analogue’). 
Homology should not be used in the adaptive model (although see 
chapter 6). We seek to explain the traits which are not present in the 
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 homologues. So homologies have no part in modelling25 the conditions 
required for the trait in question to evolve (although insofar as they have 
informed the initial conditions, they are necessary for discovering 
difference-makers). 
To close off  this section, I want to provide a series of  idealized steps 
involved in an evolutionary narrative 
1. Setting the Initial Conditions: The previous phenotype and 
environment is inferred using a suite of  historical inferences 
(importantly homology) 
2. Setting the Final State: The final position is described, in complex 
situations there may be transitional states. 
3. Setting the Adaptive Model: the variables required for the evolution of  
the trait in question are hypothesized. (analogues are very 
important for this, how they can be used in this context is the topic 
of  the next to chapters) 
4. Hypothesizing the Difference-Maker: contrastive information between 
the initial conditions and the adaptive model provides possible 
difference-making variables. 
5. Retrodiction of  the Evolutionary Narrative: hypothesize when, how and 
why the difference-maker/s arose in the lineage in question (to be 
corroborated by historical sciences) 
These steps are idealized. History can be a very messy process and it 
would be awfully surprising if  any evolutionary narrative fit this idealization. 
For complex, phylogenetically isolated traits there will frequently be several 
                                                      
25 As an aside, some philosophers in science have discussed, and in fact defined, models in 
terms of a-priori construction (Odenbaugh forthcoming, Weisberg 2007, Godfrey-
Smith 2006). For these philosophers, something is only a model if it is constructed 
indirectly without reference to actual-world systems. If they are right, then we should not 
think of what I am discussing as a ‘model’, as it is primarily empirical in its 
construction.  
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 ‘initial’ conditions, each with their own difference-makers and adaptive 
models. Even my protophant toy example involved extra steps than those 
given here. Nonetheless, this gives us an idea of  the approach required for 
these retrodictions and will be central to my arguments for the remainder 
of  the piece. 
The next two chapters will consider two solutions to the problem of  
Causal Depth. The first emerges from what has been named the ‘Historical 
Turn’ (Griffiths 1996). Here we tie adaptive inferences to developmental 
processes. In the context of  analogy we must constrain our possible 
catchment area of  analogues to closely related species (something like this 
move is endorsed in Gould 2002, Sansom 2003, Powell 2007 as well as in 
Griffiths’ work). I will resist this solution and suggest instead that we do not 
need to constrain our catchment area as stringently as defenders of  the 
Historical Turn prescribe.  
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 6 .  P a r a l l e l  M o d e l l i n g  
In this chapter, I discuss a possible to the problem of  causal depth: 
‘Parallel Modelling.’ We constrain our catchment area by developmental 
criteria. This way, only ‘parallel’ analogues count as data points. This gains 
epistemic warrant by ‘piggybacking’ the warrant granted to underlying 
developmental homologies.  
A parallel model constructs an evolutionary narrative by providing an 
adaptive model which is constrained to a particular clade. The model will 
specify the relationship between phenotype and environment given a 
particular developmental tool-kit. So it might tell us what selective 
environment is required for the evolution of  bipedality in great apes.  
I do not disagree with the approach – in the appropriate circumstances. 
My argument next chapter is that we need not necessarily constrain our 
catchment area in the way prescribed by parallel modelling. 
6.1  The Parallel  Solution 
The ‘Parallel Solution’ to the problem of  causal depth claims that 
epistemic warrant can only be granted when projecting traits from an 
analogue to a target outlier lineage if  those analogies are parallel. When we 
wish to use analogies in evolutionary narratives, therefore, we should restrict 
our catchment area to those lineages which are closely related to our target. 
In his 1996 paper The Historical Turn in the study of  adaptation, Paul 
Griffiths argued that adaptive hypotheses ought to incorporate phylogenetic 
history. Because history, as expressed in developmental resources, plays a 
large role in shaping phenotype (the causal-thesis of  internalism is strong), 
an important part of  an adaptation’s explanation is its phylogenetic history.  
When using comparative data to test adaptive hypotheses, it is important 
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 that we do no over-count confirmations. As Griffiths notes, it is the 
independent evolution events which count as data-points for the 
connection between environment and trait. If  the data is homologous, it 
cannot explain the emergence of  the trait. 
Griffiths’ position is not a rejection of  the explanatory project of  
externalism. It is a modification of  it. The claim should be read as 
emphasizing the role of  developmental resources in the initial conditions. 
By contrasting adaptive models which incorporate historical factors we will 
create more robust theories.  
From the Historical turn, a solution to the problem of  causal depth 
arises. If  we constrain our catchment area to groups united by a set of  
developmental resources, we can gain epistemic warrant for analogous 
inferences which take a relationship between environment and phenotype in 
one lineage and project the relationship onto a target outlier. Effectively, the 
noise created by phylogenetic history is removed. So, if  we restrict our 
search to parallelisms as opposed to isolated convergences, our inferences 
will be warranted on both externalist and internalist grounds. To get a 
picture of  the parallel solution, we need to look closer at what a parallelism 
is. 
What is it to be parallel? I leaned heavily on this distinction in chapters 1 
and 2, at the time giving a rough definition which I will stick with for now 
before questioning in the next chapter. Two traits are parallel just in case 
they are analogous (independently evolved), but utilize the same 
developmental resources. Gould (2002) gives an example of  this. 
The leg formation of  crustacea is controlled by a group of  Hox genes 
which are developmental homologies across the clade. A common 
crustacean trait is Maxillipedalism, the transformation of  limbs originally 
for walking into eating apparatus. This has independently evolved numerous 
times, but “...always under control of  the same developmental rule, 
presumably a pleisomorphic [synapomorphic] trait of  the clade (Ibid, pp 
1134).” So these are not merely cases of  convergent evolution, but of  
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 parallel evolution. 
The developmental process which leads to Maxillipedalism gives a firm 
basis for analogous inferences. As Gould puts it, “… the value of  
parallelism becomes greatly increased by the operational basis thus granted 
to firm and testable explanations – by moving away from Adaptationist 
scenarios in the largely speculative mode, and towards morphogenetic rules 
with specifiable, even predictable, variations (Ibid pp 1132).” So, because we 
can predict and explain what is going on at a developmental level, and on 
homologous grounds are justified in extrapolating this information across 
all lineages with that developmental system, these analogies gain epistemic 
warrant. 
Parallel analogies, then, ‘piggy-back’ epistemic warrant from underlying 
homologies. If  the lineages in question have relevantly similar 
developmental tool-kits, then their contrasts will be caused by 
environmental factors. In effect, we ‘control’ our external explanation for 
internal noise. Our explanation incorporates both homologous and 
analogous information, and both count towards epistemic warrant. 
Recall that the aim of  analogous inference is to inform an adaptive 
model which can then be contrasted with the initial conditions. When using 
parallel analogies there is a particular structure to the model which I will 
sketch using two examples from work on hominid evolution. First, Chapais 
(2008), focuses on an underlying developmental cause to construct a kind 
of  ‘design-space’ for primate kin-structures. Second, the relation between 
Teste size and sexual dimorphism in primates provides a similar example 
which focuses on selective information. 
6.1 .1   ‘Parallel modelling’ in pr imate kin-str ucture 
This section will examine Bernard Chapais’ (2008) hypothesis about the 
evolution of  hominid kin-structures to illustrate parallel modelling. I will 
demonstrate some features of  models. We shall see the use of  an 
underlying, developmental homology to ground the hypothesis; the 
construction of  a ‘design space’ which incorporates both the conditions for 
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 and not for the evolution of  the trait; the use of  homologues to construct 
the adaptive model; the apparent limitations of  the approach. Chapais’ 
theory also fits an evolutionary narrative, so it shows how a parallel model 
fits into my explanatory structure. First, the explanatory target: kin-
structures in the hominid lineage. 
The kin structure of  Homo-sapiens is an outlier trait. Although primates 
show great variability in kin structure between lineages, particular species 
themselves tend to be fairly invariable. The Pan clade (Chimpanzees and 
Bonobos), for instance, is largely promiscuous and patrilocal, whereas 
Gorillas pair-bond (in harems) and are largely matrilocal. In contrast, 
human social systems run the gamut from promiscuity to monogamy, from 
strict patri- or matri-locality to liberal ‘multilocality’. This spread is itself  
part of  the outlier trait which requires explanation (Rodseth & Shannon 
2006). At some stage in our past, we were largely invariable in kin-structure, 
now we are hugely variable. What has changed? How can we identify the 
difference-maker? 
There are no analogues to human social systems available in primates. 
The identification of  extended kin-systems (to say nothing of  national or 
cultural identification) is unique. However, the variability does, in a sense, 
have an analogue. Although no other single species of  primate is multilocal 
(in a sense both patrilocal and matrilocal), the primates when taken as a 
group include the whole spread.  
Although this in itself  is not an analogue, it does suggest labiality in the 
trait. If  we can identify the factors which determine kin-structure across 
primates generally, this could allow us to identify contrasts between Homo 
and the rest of  the clade. It may be we are unique in occupying a unique 
location in kin-structure design space – but not unique due to being outside 
of  that space. 
The phenomena we are interested in here is human kin-structure as 
measured by two dimensions. Dispersal Patterns describe how different 
lineages mix between different groups. Most primates are matrilocal – the 
   
 
113
 males tend to leave their original group. Pan is noticeable due to its 
patrilocality. Breeding Patterns describe connections between mating partners. 
Pan are promiscuous, Gorilla have stable breeding bonds in harems and 
Gibbons have stable pair-bonds. As I have said, Homo-sapiens is noteworthy 
due to exhibiting, in different cultures, almost every point along these 
continua. 
Bernard Chapais (2008) constructed a kind of  ‘primate kin-structure 
design-space’ and used this to generate a hypothesis about how our own 
lineage evolved its variability. The design-space is used by Chapais as an 
adaptive model. It can be used to determine which external factors 
determine kin-structure in primates.  
His project is in three parts. He uses comparative studies of  primates to 
construct a ‘design space’; lessons from this are then extrapolated to explain 
the evolutionary narrative; the final state is set based on anthropological 
work.  
There is legitimate concern about whether he has properly set the initial 
conditions or defined the outlier trait correctly. He argues that the most 
recent common ancestor of  ourselves and Pan had the same kin-structure as 
Chimpanzees and Bonobos. This is largely on cladistic grounds, and given 
the impoverished data set available, as well as the apparent lability of  the 
trait, it is a very shaky position (especially considering possible falsifying 
evidence: the apparent dimorphism in Australopithecine). He bases his 
definition of  human kin-structures on Levi Strauss’ concept of  ‘reciprocal 
exogamy’, a view which is certainly not without criticisms from 
anthropology (Wilson Forthcoming). I am not primarily interested in these 
issues with his account; however, I am interested in how he goes about 
constructing the adaptive model. I am simplifying his story, focusing on just 
a few aspects of  his theory. 
Although Chapais’ explanatory target is a group-level phenomena, he ties 
his model to an organismic trait. The group-level phenomena (human kin 
structures) are a result of  a developmental trait which has homologues in 
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 other primates. By examining other primates, therefore, Chapais can 
construct a ‘design-space’ which matches the individual-level developmental 
cause to a (in this case) group-level selective cause.  
The developmental trait Chapais relies on is the ‘Westermarck Effect’. 
The Westermarck Effect is a theory about how kin are recognised in primate 
groups. There is a developmental window in the development of  young 
whereby those in close proximity are ‘recognised’ as kin. This does not 
require any literal concept of  kin-relationships. It is just that those who you 
spent a lot of  time with as a child are treated ‘as if ’ they are family. They are 
treated more cooperatively and are avoided in mating situations. It is 
important for Chapais’ account that individuals are also able to recognise 
‘2nd-order’ family based on who their recognised kin recognise as kin. So if  I 
recognise my mother, and she treats her brother (my maternal uncle) as kin, 
I will also recognise him in an attenuated sense. 
The Westermarck effect provides a mechanism which explains primate 
kin-structures. If  the Westermarck effect holds, then kin recognition is only 
viable if  the relatives are in close proximity from an early age. So a parent is 
only recognisable if  they are involved in upbringing, and a sibling is only 
recognisable if  they are close enough in birth-order to be nearby at the right 
times. First I will examine the relationship between breeding patterns and 
the Westermarck effect. 
 There is a striking difference between which relatives can be recognised 
between a promiscuous group and a group with stable-bonds. If  there are 
stable-bonds, particularly in a pair-bonding situation, the individual will 
spend formative time (be able to recognise) both their mother and father. 
By extension, then, they would be able to recognise the extended family of  
both sides. A promiscuous group is comparatively impoverished. The 
individual can only recognise their immediate caregiver (typically the 
mother), their siblings, and the extended family of  that caregiver. Assuming 
that cooperation is based on these kin-groupings, then the opportunities for 
cooperation in a promiscuous group is severely limited as compared to a 
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 stable group. Now we can turn to dispersal patterns. 
Again, different dispersal patterns cause different kin-recognition. 
Whichever sex has dispersed find themselves in a community where they 
recognise no kin. In a patrilocal society, for instance, mother-daughter dyads 
are cut short when the daughter disperses. Only their offspring (who do not 
themselves disperse) are recognised. The sex which remains can recognise 
its kin, but half  of  its offspring will disperse.  
We can now present what kin can be recognised in various groups 
though the Westermark Effect against breeding and dispersal patterns. The 
table shows post-dispersal relationships.  
 Figure xix: Recognisable Kin Based upon Breeding & Dispersal Strategy 
 Patrilocal Matrilocal 
males 








Maternal & Paternal 
line, male offspring, 
male siblings 
Female offspring, 
female siblings Stable 
Bonds 
females Male offspring 
Maternal & Paternal 
line, female offspring 
 
If  there is a relationship between kin recognition and cooperation, then 
we can envision this table as a kind of  ‘design-space’. Under certain 
conditions selection for cooperation will lead towards stable bonds, or 
alternatively a shift to stable breeding could open up cooperative 
opportunities. For Chapais, Promiscuous males will not shift into a stable 
bonding strategy unless there is some kind of  dampener on male-male 
conflict. This could be a decrease in available food (meaning that there is 
pressure to spend less energy on conflicts) or some new variable which 
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 stabilizes male-male conflict (tool-use, for example).  
Notice that no arrangement in the chart are the same as our lineage, who 
recognise everybody.  
Hominids also have extra-group bonds. In other primate societies, there 
is no lasting bonding between groups. Human social arrangements include 
many such links. Chapais believes that this difference can be explained 
through reciprocal exogamy: the exchange of  individuals between groups. If  
the groups overlap and bonds are maintained between those individuals 
who have left and those who have remained, then they can act as ‘bridges’ 
for cooperation between the groups. Chapais believes that it is male 
cooperation which is essential for the selective benefit which would drive 
the evolutionary trajectory. 
Chapais takes his initial conditions as being the same as Pan. They are 
Patrilocal and promiscuous. As mentioned above there is legitimate concern 
about this, but for the sake of  the example I will accept it. We now have the 
first two pieces of  an evolutionary narrative. 
1. Setting the initial conditions: Our ancestors were Patrilocal and 
promiscuous with minimal relations between groups 
2. Setting the final conditions: Humans have mixed philopatry and 
breeding strategies with many intra-group relations (according to 
Chapais this is due to reciprocal exogamy). 
We have, then, three options for the difference maker. Chapais’ 
hypothesis relies on a shift to stable breeding bonds. If  a group is partilocal 
and has stable breeding bonds, then there will be kin-recognition between 
dispersed females and their father. If  those relationships are maintained, 
then bonds between groups can be formed. 
3. Hypothesizing the Difference-Maker: The shift to stable breeding 
bonds opened up our ancestors’ cooperative avenues.  
4. Setting the Adaptive Model: (see table above) selection for 
increased cooperation, coupled with a stabilizing effect to dampen 
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 male-male competition, would cause a shift towards stable bonds. 
If  a Pan-like group began exhibiting stable bonds, and the groups 
overlapped, then dispersed females could act as ‘bridges’ between 
them. 
5. Constructing the evolutionary narrative: 
 
(vast) Simplification of Chapais’ (2008) evolutionary narrative. Hominids 
evolve from a Pan-like state (initial conditions) to a hominid state 
(reciprocal exogamy) via the forming of stable breeding bonds. 























Figure xx Evolutionary Narrative of Hominid Social Grouping 
 
This is a simplified version of  Chapais’ account. I have picked out the 
details necessary for my point. I certainly do not wish to commit to the 
viability of  the project, but mean it as illustration of  how, using the parallel 
solution, an evolutionary narrative can be constructed. There are a few 
features of  this kind of  explanation I want to point out. 
In the last section I claimed that homologues were unhelpful for setting 
the adaptive model, but in this case we see the homologues are used in its 
construction. The two closest homologues of  our lineage, Pan, play a 
central role in not only setting the initial conditions, but also the design-
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 space which Chapais uses. How do they avoid Jolly’s Paradox? 
Parallel models avoid Jolly’s Paradox by incorporating both contrastive 
and comparative information. A typical adaptive model consists of  a series 
of  conditions for the evolution of  a particular character or character-state, 
whereas a parallel model will give a series of  conditions for the evolution of  
a suite of  character-states. A  parallel model of  Maxillipedalism in crustacea, 
for instance, our model would include both the conditions for it to evolve, 
and for it not to evolve.  
In a sense a parallel model is not an adaptive model, but simply a 
‘design-space’ out of  which adaptive hypotheses (evolutionary narratives) 
can be extracted.  
Another point to notice in Chapais’ account is the amount of  
extrapolation required in his evolutionary narrative. Human kin-structures 
are not just an outlier from the perspective of  our homologues, but from all 
primates (and all of  the animal kingdom, so far as I am aware). This means 
that the solid ground provided by the parallel model can only take Chapais 
so far before he needs to fall back onto speculation26. I believe this will be 
typical of  parallel models – although they certainly give us a solution to 
causal depth, they can be very limited. I will return to this point later. 
It is important to see where the epistemic warrant for Chapais’ theory 
lies. At least in part, the warrant is derived from the Westermarck Effect as 
an underlying, homologous, developmental process which is causally related 
to the target trait. Our belief  in the design-space he constructs is due, at 
least in part, to the close relatedness of  the group in his catchment area. If, 
for instance, it was constructed from animals picked randomly from 
throughout the animal kingdom (say, the kin structures of  the octopus, lion 
and giraffe) we would wonder on what basis the claims were made. By 
constraining to the great apes (or maybe old-world Primates – Baboons 
                                                      
26 Not to say that speculation is in itself negative, only that the epistemic warrant of such 
speculation is not longer provided by the parallel model. 
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 could be a good data-point if  the Westermarck mechanism is present) 
Chapais has principled grounds for selecting comparisons. The parallel 
nature of  his data gives it credence. 
I have kept the selective details of  Chapais’ account vague, largely 
because he does and, when they are provided they are very speculative. I 
now want to look at a different case-study which, in contrast with Chapais, 
focuses on the selective pressure rather than developmental homologue. 
6.1 .2   ‘Parallel modelling’ in pr imate mating strategy 
This section will explain how parallel analogues have informed models 
of  primate mating strategies. We will again encounter the limitations of  the 
approach, but also how ‘boot-strapping’ can occur as we test and construct 
the model across various analogues.  
The use of  both sexual dimorphism and testicular size to predict mating 
strategy in primates is an example of  parallel modelling (Workman & 
Reader 2004). The explanatory target in this case is not the current state of  
human mating affairs, but the state of  affairs we evolved in. We are hunting 
for the initial conditions of  hominid mating strategy27, which then evolved 
into the variable phenomenon we see today. I think the strategy is right in 
principle under favourable conditions can be executed in practice.  
Sexual dimorphism appears to correlate with competition for females in 
primates. Dimorphic organisms tend to live in harems. Gorillas are the 
prime example, the males being almost twice the size of  females. 
Silverbacks who have monopolized breeding opportunities in a harem must 
fight off  other males, so there is selection pressure for larger size. Those 
with very little dimorphism tend to pair-bond or be promiscuous. Male and 
female Gibbons are almost indistinguishable in terms of  size and they pair-
bond. 
                                                      
27 Which is not to say that the target of much of the work undertaken in this area is not 
aimed at discovering facts about us now.  
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 Examination of  dimorphism allows retrodictions to be made about 
hominid mating strategies in the past. Today human males are roughly 
twenty percent larger than females. This is closest to Pan (although humans 
show more dimorphism) and suggests a promiscuous or pair-bonding 
scenario existed in our past (Chapais uses this as evidence towards his 
conclusion that our ancestors were Pan-like). 
Testicular size is taken as a measure of  sperm competition (Harcourt 
1995). The thought runs that in a promiscuous environment where females 
mate with more than one male, there will be a selective advantage in having 
more sperm. The more ejaculate, the higher the probability of  breeding 
success. In an environment where females tend to mate with a single 
partner, then there is no need to spend extra resources on sperm. If  this is 
right, then we can predict the promiscuity of  a species based on its 
testicular size. A polyandrous (promiscuous) lineage should have greater 
relative testicular size than monandrous (bonding) relatives. 
In baboons, for example, the relationship between testicular size and 
mating strategy has been demonstrated (Jolly & Phillips-Conroy 2006). 
Baboons which live in harems (‘one male units’), such as the Hamadryas 
and Yellow, have significantly smaller testes than those that live in multimale 
groups such as the Olive and Guinea Baboons. 
Using testicular size and dimorphism, then, we can predict the mating 
strategies of  primates. A primate with larger testes will be promiscuous; one 
with small testes will bond. A dimorphic species will bond in harems, a less 
dimorphic species will either pair-bond or be promiscuous. These can be 
plotted in a design-space similar to the one I employed in the last section. 





Figure xxi Primate Breeding Strategy Identified by Dimorphism and teste size 
 Larger Testes Smaller Testes 









This design space can be used to compare competing hypotheses. In the 
last section Chapais’ theory of  the evolution of  kin-selection in the hominid 
lineage relied upon our ancestors being pan-like. They occupied the bottom 
left quadrant. Another theory (see Chapais 2008 pp 152-156) claims that 
our ancestors were similar to Gorilla, occupying the upper right quadrant. 
One piece of  evidence we could consider when comparing these theories is 
the dimorphism of  our ancestors. There is some reason to believe (although 
Chapais for one disputes it) that Australopithecine was dimorphic – males 
were significantly larger than females. Assuming our testes size is roughly 
the same as it is now (thus avoiding drifting into the troublesome upper-
right quadrant) then this is evidence that the Gorilla hypothesis is more 
likely28. 
So, by examining the primate clade to create a parallel model we are able 
to set a quantified inferential structure which can be applied across that 
clade. Again, part of  the epistemic warrant of  the approach lies in the 
relatedness of  the lineages examined. There is an implicit assumption that 
homologous developmental processes are producing the phenomena that is 
                                                      
28 To be fair, Chapais wrangles a good series of arguments to dispute the Gorilla 
Hypothesis (for one thing, this arrangement is less parsimonious in cladistic terms), and 
dimorphism in Australopithecine is not firmly established. Again, this is just meant as 
an example of the application of the model – not a firm argument either way. 




A worry we might have is whether this is truly an analogous inference, or 
just the corroboration of  an adaptive model. In the first instance, we take a 
selective-environment/phenotype pair and project it onto a target lineage. 
In the second, we test our adaptive model by examining possible analogous 
instantiations of  it. I think either construal applies to what I have to say 
about analogies. In a standard analogous inference, the relationship is 
projected directly onto the target. In the modelling case we project from the 
analogue onto the general model. I think relevantly similar inferential 
concerns exist for both versions. 
An interesting question which arises from this examination is whether 
any primates fit into the top-left quadrant. If  they do, whatever breeding 
strategy they employ, it will present a problem. The model predicts that we 
will not find a dimorphic primate with large testes. However, on discovery 
of  an apparently falsifying case, the model need-not be thrown out. It could 
be that there are some exceptional circumstances which explain away the 
exception. Better still, this new information could be incorporated into the 
model – it could be bootstrapped. 
An example of  how a parallel-model can be boot-strapped is in Jolly & 
Phillips-Conroy’s (2006) work. In their study, Yellow Baboons did not have 
testes of  the size predicted by the model. They seemed too small. In 
response they re-examined the dimensions they were using in the model. 
The predictions were based on comparisons of  body-mass and testicular 
size. Because Yellow Baboons have long, heavy arms extra weight skewed 
the result. “It is evidently the relatively long (and thus proportionately 
heavy) limbs of  yellow baboons that make them appear to have smaller 
testes, when total body mass is used as the standard (Ibid pp 267, italics in 
original).” By looking at trunk volume (which left out limb mass) they 
showed that Yellow Baboons did, in fact, meet the model.  
Again we see how limited parallel models can be. Just physiologically 
speaking (let alone behaviourally), Humans are outliers in terms of  sexual 
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 adaptation from the perspective of  the primate clade. For instance, the 
concealed ovulation in human females significantly changes the sexual 
gameplan by barring males from following their fertility cycles (Workman & 
Reader 2004). As with Chapais’ theory, the parallel model can take us only 
so far, but after that point any further explanation becomes increasingly 
speculative. Because we are inferring from the model to the initial 
conditions of  the evolutionary narrative, we need other streams of  evidence 
to take us further along the story. 
The last two case studies have shown the general form taken by the 
‘parallel solution’. The adaptive model is constructed through a survey of  a 
clade, then further refined as more examples are added. The model covers 
‘design space’ for the possible character states of  the trait in question. The 
epistemic warrant for this practice is in part derived from a presumed 
underlying developmental homology (any analogous information is parallel). 
The approach certainly allows for very careful, quantified retrodictions but 
is limited in scope. If  the general model is confirmed, we are able to apply it 
to unique cases so long as they fit within the design-space the model is 
concerned with. As we have seen, if  a trait lacks any true analogues in the 
catchment area, then our adaptive explanation becomes more speculative as 
we move beyond the model’s purview.  
In the next chapter I will argue that the Parallel Solution is a suitable 
solution in the appropriate context, but it is not necessary for our 
catchment area to be constrained in the way it prescribes. An important part 
of  this discussion involves getting a clearer handle on what it means to be 
parallel, which will occupy me for the remainder of  this chapter. 
6.2  What is  it  to be Parallel?  
I have defined parallel as follows: an analogy is parallel if  the same 
developmental information is utilized in both analogues. There is a major 
issue here. As we shall see, by this definition all analogies are parallel.  
They are all parallel by this definition because at a fundamental level life 
shares a common origin. Some genetic markers have origins in the deep 
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 past (such as Pax6, discussed below) as they are held in common across vast 
tracts of  life. If  those resources are used to produce the phenotype we are 
interested in, then they would count as ‘parallel’. More problematic, a 
fundamental homologous similarity held across all life is the organic 
structure of  genes themselves. All life (discovered so far) uses the same 
paired four-base genetic structure built from the same chemical 
compounds. This constitutes our main evidence that life on earth has 
evolved from a single event (Dawkins 2004). As genes themselves are 
developmental information, which are utilized in phenotype expression all 
analogies must be parallel.  
But we have already agreed in chapter 4 that analogies typically lack 
epistemic warrant. To claim that they are warranted simply in virtue of  
underlying genetic information is not sufficient. Imagine using the analogy 
between the mammalian and cephalopod eye (analogous instances of  a lens 
eye) to construct an evolutionary narrative about the evolution of  lens-eyes. 
We would object to this because of  the problem of  causal depth. Analogies 
are not projectible: even if  we are correct in our modelling of  cephalopod 
and mammal eye evolution, we do not have grounds to then infer that the 
same evolutionary model applies in some other case. A response to this 
objection could go as follows. Both squid and humans hold their genetic 
structure as developmental homologues, therefore they are parallel. We 
agreed in the last section that the use of  parallelism does gain epistemic 
warrant. This response is unsatisfactory. Why? Just having genes is not 
enough to create a lens eye. All kinds of  eyes in the animal kingdom are 
built using genes, so the genetic structure itself  cannot explain the 
particularity of  lens eyes. We must reject our current definition of  
parallelism, then, as it leads to this absurd conclusion. 
Genes themselves do not have the correct causal relationship with 
phenotype to give epistemic warrant. As we need some kind of  mechanism 
for the development of  phenotype, we could say they are an enabling condition 
for the evolution of  eyes, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient. A 
genetic set-up based on a different chemical substrate could (perhaps) still 
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 produce the same phenomena; if  it was sufficient, then all lineages would 
develop lens eyes. Genes are part of  the causal story but they do not have 
enough influence over phenotype to form the basis of  a comparative 
prediction. 
To avoid analogies being parallel as a matter of  course, then, we need to 
find some account of  parallel which includes those cases where 
developmental homologues infer warrant and excludes those which do not. 
So the pressing question is: what does a developmental homologue need in 
order to give warrant to an analogy?  
We have seen that the correct causal relationship is important, so this will 
guide enquiry. Stephen J Gould presented this issue in a colourful metaphor 
which may be helpful to introduce at this stage. 
For Gould, developmental information can be more or less constraining 
on phenotype depending on whether it is a ‘Pharaonic Brick’ or a 
‘Corinthian Column’ (Gould 2002 pp 1132 – onwards; Powell 2007). If  
phenotype is strongly constrained by developmental information, then that 
information is a Corinthian Column. If  phenotype is weakly constrained by 
developmental information, then it is a Pharaonic Brick. I will explain each in 
turn. 
A Column built in the Corinthian architectural style must follow very 
specific design specifications in order to be successful. Too much variance 
will cause the column to collapse. Due to these constraints, if  I know a 
column is Corinthian, I can make fine-grained predictions about its form. I 
can project many of  the observations I make of  a few Corinthian columns 
onto all Corinthian Columns. 
Developmental information can constrain phenotype in a similar 
fashion. Recall my discussion on Maxillipedalism, the evolution of  eating 
apparatus from limbs in crustacea. The trait has evolved numerous times in 
the clade, always using the same genetic information. We are able to give a 
mechanistic explanation of  how Maxillipedalism occurs. If  I know a lineage 
has that group of  genes, I can then predict Maxillipedalism given the right 
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 external inputs. The holding of  the particular Hox genes involved with the 
phenomena is constraining enough to derive warrant for analogous 
inferences across the clade. So, if  I wish to retrodict whether (say) an 
extinct crustacean used its fore-limbs for locomotion or eating, and lack 
physical evidence, then our observations of  maxillipedalism in extant 
crustacea may be projected onto our target. If  we have evidence that the 
target lineage occupied a relevantly similar selective environment then this, 
given the analogies, is reasonable grounds to hypothesize maxillipedalism in 
that lineage. 
In Exodus, Pharaoh has the Israelites make bricks which are used in the 
construction of  many of  the buildings in his city. As any particular brick 
could be used in the construction of  many different buildings, it doesn’t 
look like many interesting predictions could be made based on them. We 
can exclude some uses, of  course: the bricks were probably not used for 
boat building or hot-air balloons, but using a brick to build doesn’t 
constrain the process of  building enough for us to tell much about the 
structures they might be used for.  
Pax-6, or ‘eyeless’ is a genetic example of  a ‘Pharaonic Brick’ (see Gould 
2002 and Powell 2007 for discussion in the context of  developmental 
constraints; Callearts et al 1997 for a review of  scientific work). Versions of  
the gene have been identified across extensive sections of  the animal 
kingdom and there is reason to believe that its function is preserved across 
these phyla. It is a homeobox gene which acts as a ‘master-control’ for eye 
development. Removal of  the gene causes the failure of  eye development; 
duplication of  it causes extra eyes to develop. Crucially, it does not control 
eye type. Splicing a human Pax-6 gene into a fruit fly will not result in the 
fly developing a human eye, but rather an extra fly eye. So, can we rely on 
Pax-6 as a developmental homologue to give warrant to the use of  
analogies?  If  I want to retrodict the kind of  eye some extinct species held, 
can I rely on its presumed holding of  Pax-6 in its developmental apparatus 
to grant epistemic warrant to the utilization of  analogies to support 
hypotheses? 
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 Because Pax-6 is passive in regards to the kind of  eye which develops, it 
does not constrain phenotype enough to grant epistemic warrant for 
models of  eye evolution. Pax-6 cannot show regularities in phenotype 
expression. Both cephalopods and mammals do hold Pax-6 as a 
developmental homologue (Tomarev et al 1996), but its ubiquity in non-
analogous eyes shows that it does not constrain the process enough. 
Because, for example, Pax-6 does the same job in the development of  lens 
eyes and compound eyes it cannot shed light on why a lineage might have 
compound rather than lens eyes. It is an enabling condition for both, but a 
good explanation for neither. So, like the genetic structure itself, Pax-6 is a 
Pharaonic Brick – it does not grant epistemic warrant to the use of  analogy 
because it does not hold the right causal relationship with phenotype. 
A developmental constraint’s being a pharoanic brick or Corinthian 
column is relative to the particular question we are asking. For instance, 
Pax-6 does not constrain phenotype enough to warrant hypothesizing 
regularities about the kind of  eyes which evolve. But, it may constrain 
phenotype enough to predict that a lineage will evolve visual sensory 
apparatus (as opposed to some other method of  garnering information 
about the environment). 
Gould, then, divides convergence into two types. When the 
developmental homologue has too weak an influence on phenotype to 
grant warrant it is a Pharoanic Brick. It is an enabling condition, but is inert 
in terms of  the regularities we are hunting for. A Corinthian Column, on 
the other hand, does grant warrant. It has a strong enough influence on 
phenotype to count as a sufficient condition for a trait’s evolution (given the 
right selective conditions). Presumably Gould means for these cases to be 
ends of  a continuum – some developmental processes have more or less 
effect on phenotype, and thus grant more or less warrant to analogies that 
utilize them.  
So we want our account of  parallel to include Corinthian Columns, but 
exclude Pharaonic Bricks. For the Parallel Solution to work, the 
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 developmental resources need to have the right level of  what Woodward 
calls causal specificity (Woodward, forthcoming). Causal specificity measures 
the level that a particular cause affects the phenomenon of  interest. In 
particular a more specific cause will help with counterfactual claims. For 
instance, if  we want to understand why phenotypic expression of  
developmental resources varies, we are better served by examining the 
DNA differences in variants than (say) the RNA constants. Woodward uses a 
broad interventionalist account of  causality. So a highly specific cause will 
have clear, predicted results upon intervention. A specific cause will be a 
difference-maker. 
Unsurprisingly, the more a developmental system constrains phenotype, 
the more warrant it grants to an inference relying on parallel evolution. The 
more phenotypic expression is constrained, the more causal specificity is 
attached to the environment. In extreme cases, we could view the 
environmental input as a ‘switch’, determining phenotype expression. The 
two figures below plot phenotypic possibility against relevant environmental 
factors for both pharaonic bricks and Corinthian columns. In the highly 
constrained case, increases in environmental input will quickly constrain 
possible phenotype. We can confidently see the relationship between the 
initial conditions and the external factors. If  we see this arrangement in an 
analogue, then, the relationship between initial conditions and 
environmental ‘switch’ can be confidently projected onto a target lineage.  
As Gould puts it, something counts as parallel “… if  the underlying 
homology prescribes a highly distinctive, detailed and strongly 
determinative channel of  constraint (Gould 2002 pp 1135).”  
 















Figure xxii Pharonaic Brick 
The addition of external inputs to a minimally developmentally 
constrained trait (Pharonaic Brick) will not decrease the range of 
phenotypic plasticity: the predicates are not projectible 
 
 











Figure xxiii Corinthian Column 
The addition of external inputs to a developmentally constrained trait 
(Corinthian Column) decreases the range of phenotypic plasticity. When 
enough external factors have been identified, we can model the 
environment/phenotype relationship
 
Now that we know what we are looking for in a definition of  analogy, I 
will discuss the kind of  answer we want. We should avoid drawing a line in 
the sand when defining parallel evolution, as its continuous will not be 
captured by a strict boundary.  There seem to be two approaches for 
defining parallel in the literature. Traditionally an analogy is defined as 
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 parallel if  the analogues are closely related. Another approach is to claim 
that we must identify the developmental homologue in order to claim 
parallelism. I will argue that we needn’t choose between these definitions. 




take these methods as strict definitions. Can either of  
the
ider the traditional account. The question is whether 
the
alogues to model the emergence of  a trait. We 
du
raphyletic groups (Griffiths 1994). If  we restrict examination to members 
of  a particular clade (where that clade is ‘small’), then the probability of  any 
cases of  homoplasy being due to common developmental resources 
increases. We assume a developmental homologue causes the similarity. 
A stricter method would be to demand that the developme
mologues are actually identified (Gould 2002, Powell 2007). Here a 
research programme in developmental genetics, identifying the actual 
mechanism involved with development, would be required before we can 
claim parallelism.  
I will for now 
se accounts adequately draw a boundary between what counts as parallel, 
and what does not? 
First, I will cons
re is some rule which can, in a principled manner, distinguish between a 
Pharaonic Brick and a Corinthian Column in terms of  the size of  the 
paraphyletic group and the number of  required events within that group. If  
parallelisms are clumped within clades, then to differentiate parallelisms 
from convergence, we need to discover 1) the number of  events necessary 
and 2) the size of  the required catchment area. As Diogo (2005) asks - 
“How many homoplastic events of  a certain character should we have… in 
order to hypothesise that the homoplastic development of  this character 
was due to parallelism and not to convergence? (Ibid pp 714)” If  we cannot 
find a way of  drawing the boundaries between parallel and convergence, 
then the definition fails. 
Imagine we using an
tifully restrict our catchment area to within a clade. However, what if  
there are striking analogues of  just outside of  the catchment area? Should 
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 we then increase it? Any two lineages can be seen as part of  a clade – we 
just need to trace their relationship back far enough. Because different 
developmental resources will restrict phenotype expression to different 
levels, one rule based on clade-size or event numbers cannot capture these 
differences. Without a principled way of  judging when our catchment area 
is the right size, the traditional approach is unsatisfactory as a definition of  
parallel. 
Russell Powell (2007) argues that we should restrict our definition of  
pa
tyi
the point to 
cri
                                                      
rallel to those cases where the underlying developmental information is a 
direct cause of  the trait in question. The developmental cause must be 
proximate, which is to say that it cannot be masked by any other cause. 
Although Pax-6 is clearly a cause of  eye development, other downstream 
developmental information determine the particular phenomena we are 
interested in (eye-kind phenotype), Pax-6’s causal efficacy, then, is masked29. 
Powell’s approach avoids the criticisms of  the traditional account by 
ng parallelism to developmental information rather than paraphyletic 
groups. We do not need a rule about the number of  events or the temporal 
size of  a clade we are examining if  our definition relies on developmental 
information. But we do not require such a strong prescription. 
Recall my case studies of  parallel modelling. It is besides 
ticize these on the basis of  not identifying the developmental 
mechanisms in question. The actual mechanisms involved in the 
Westermarck Effect and the development of  dimorphism or testicular size 
do not need to be understood in order to justify inferences based upon 
them. We have reasonable grounds for assuming there is some uniting 
29 I have intentionally avoided the technical definitions here, as I don’t think they are 
necessary for the account. Powell utilises Brandon’s technique for determining proximate 
causes: cause P screens ancient cause D for homoplastic trait T if the probability of T given 
P & D is the same as T given P but different from P given T. 
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 developmental process which underlies these closely related lineages 
because of  the success of  the model across the clade. Therefore, it is 
unreasonable to expect us to put a halt on any inferences based upon them 
until a reductive, mechanistic explanation of  the developmental 
homologues themselves is provided. And so giving a definition of  parallel 
tied to the identification of  the developmental homologues is 
unsatisfactory. 
 Based on these considerations we should conclude that parallelism and 
co
agnostic of  parallelism. If  there is a 
rea
llel in the evolution of  
len
ntrast, should be thought of  
as 
nvergence are continuous. Parallel analogies are such because they have 
enough developmental constrain to control for developmental noise. What 
is going to count as ‘enough’ depends upon the nature of  both our 
question, the causal strength of  the external influences and the 
developmental resources themselves. Being parallel is a matter of  degree. 
Because of  this, I think the right approach is to avoid giving any kind of  
definition, and instead I will briefly point to several methods of  diagnosing 
parallel evolution 
Both approaches should be seen as di
sonably closely related paraphyletic group with enough independently 
evolved examples of  the trait, this seems fine. If  the developmental 
mechanism is actually identified, so much the better. 
In the Pax-6 case, one reason to resist it being para
s-eyes (at least when discussing the evolution of  a kind of  eye, rather 
than eye evolution versus, say, ear evolution) is because the paraphyletic 
distance between us and cephalopods is too great. Additionally, the 
developmental mechanism itself  simply does not have the causal force to 
ground the inference. It is a Pharonaic Brick. 
The Westermarck effect in primates, by co
parallel. The paraphyletic group in which it is present (which, for our 
purposes, is simply the primate clade) is reasonably constrained. The 
developmental resources themselves control phenotype expression enough 
to ground prjoections. It is a Corinthian Column. 
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 So an analogy is parallel when there are reasonable grounds for believing 
tha
g is an 
ap
There is a suitable number of  lineages available (the clade in 
2.  comparative and contrastive 
3. e analogies are parallel 
4. hat developmental resources 
4 is e ed a case of  parallel evolution as when 
de
e next chapter. Here I 
wi
t the trait in question is caused by a developmental resource which is 
homologous in the analogues and constraining enough of  the phenotype. 
Reasonable grounds can be either close relations and a well corroborated 
approach (as in testicular size and sexual dimorphism) or actual 
identification of  the developmental process (as in Maxillipedalism). 
Before moving on, I want to make clear when parallel modellin
propriate approach. These are not intended to be hard and fast rules, but 
rather a guide. They are variables which would determine the level of  
epistemic warrant we might give to a hypothesis reliant upon a parallel 
model.  
1. 
question is not too impoverished) 
There is a suitable number of
exemplars available to  construct the model 
There is a plausible case to be made that th
(the trait clusters within closely related groups, the developmental 
homologue has been identified, or there is good reason to believe 
there is a developmental homologue) 
There is a plausible case to be made t
(as opposed to selective forces) carry the bulk of  the causal burden 
for phenotype explanation 
ntailed by 3 as I have defin
velopmental information does most of  the constraining (is a ‘Corinthian 
Column’ in Gould’s terms). If  3 is the case, then 4 will also be the case. I 
felt it necessary to split them in order to emphasize the rationale behind 
parallel modelling. Epistemic Warrant is granted on the basis of  underlying 
developmental homologies, not the analogues alone. 
With this account in hand, I can now move to th
ll argue that although parallel solution is legitimate, it is not the only use 
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 of  analogies for the kinds of  questions I am interested in. I will then 
describe these uses. 
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 7 .  A  V i n d i c a t i o n  o f  N o n - p a r a l l e l  M o d e l l i n g  
This chapter argues that non-parallel modelling has a role to play in the 
retrodiction of  outlier lineages.  
Parallel modelling is not the only solution to the problem of  causal 
depth. To show that a solution to a problem is not necessary, all that is 
required is to show a different, valid solution. So my argument uses 
exemplars of  non-parallel analogues and shows how they avoid the problem 
of  causal depth.  
In the first half  I will give an abstract argument for the validity of  non-
parallel modelling, which will be fleshed out in more detailed case studies in 
the second half. I will conclude with a set of  conditions for when non-
parallel modelling is appropriate. 
7.1  The Parallel  Solution Is Not Necessary 
In the last chapter I gave an account of  parallelisms and I will use this to 
sketch two situations where analogies have epistemic warrant for fine-
grained explanation, but are not parallel30. The first is when selection is a 
strong enough force to give a basis for inferences. This can be show by 
examining a group of  analogues. The second will be the use of  other 
historical sciences to provide the grain. If  non-parallel modelling is 
sometimes a valid use of  analogies, then parallel modelling is not the only 
option, and therefore not necessary. Whether or not there are many viable 
or even plausible applications of  non-parallel modelling will be discussed 
                                                      
30 I should point out that in the literature those who put forward parallel modelling do not 
typically claim it is the only route, but it is at least implied in some pieces and other 
options are not usually explored. 
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 later in the chapter. 
Consider two situations, A and B, in which we find similarities between 
lineages. In situation A, there is a striking (analogous) resemblance relation 
between a group of  lineages and there is reason to believe these 
resemblances are parallel (for example Maxillipedalism). In situation B, there 
is again a striking (analogous) resemblance relation between a group of  
lineages, but here there is no reason to see them as parallel. What kind of  
explanation do we want to give for these resemblance relations? 
In the first chapter I sketched a general account of  similarity. I suggested 
there were three possible explanations for resemblance relations. One was 
continuity of  history, which in a biological context relates to homology. 
One was continuity of  process, which would relate to analogy. The last was 
accident, which could relate to homoplastic resemblance relations which are 
due to different selective pressures. I claimed that an explanation could 
consist of  any combination of  these factors. What explanation would we 
consider most likely in situations A and B? 
In A continuity of  history plays an important part in the explanation, as 
they are parallel. The closer the relations and the more corroborated the 
hypothesis, the more we would expect this to be the case. The identification 
of  the developmental resources themselves would further confirm our 
claim. I will not go into further detail about A, as this situation has already 
been explored through my case studies in the last chapter. 
In situation B, continuity of  process forms the larger part of  the 
explanation. There may be underlying developmental resources utilized, but 
the distance between the lineages examined would undermine a diagnosis 
of  parallelism. Accident may also play an important role, and how much 
credence we give it is based on several factors. The more striking the 
similarity, the more independent evolution events we have and, recalling the 
discussion in chapter 1 about complexity and functional ambiguity, the 
more complex the trait, the less likely that the similarity is due to accident. 
So, if  situation B is the case, and the trait is complex enough, and the 
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 similarity is striking and well corroborated, then we would declare the 
explanation of  the similarity to be due to similar selective pressures. If  we 
were to then construct a hypothesis based on this, would it be justified? 
As I have previously argued, the problem of  causal depth is an empirical 
problem about the nature of  analogous similarities, not a conceptual claim. 
It is not the case that analogous similarities must be shallow by their very 
nature, but because Natural Selection doesn’t connect form to function we 
should expect analogous similarities to be shallow and be suspicious of  
inferences made based on them. But this suspicion can be allayed. 
I want to give a quick example of  what I believe is a legitimate case of  
Situation B in order to flesh out how our scepticism might be dampened. 
There is a surprising, striking similarity between us and (of  all things) 
Koalas which Henneberg et al have examined (1997). Both lineages have 
fingerprints. What is more, the fingerprints are so similar that an electron 
microscope is unable to tell whether a sample is from an adult Koala or a 
human. So the similarity is striking, but what of  it? It seems very unlikely 
that Koala and Humans have identical fingerprints because of  continuity of  
niche. Although they are homoplasious, on what grounds should we 
consider them an analogy? 
Henneberg et al do think of  fingerprints as analogies, and their basis for 
thinking this is revealing. Their conclusion, that “… dermal ridge patterns 
[fingerprints] are heritable structures occurring on the skin of  those 
mammalian extremities that are prehensile irrespective of  the taxonomic 
affiliation of  an animal… (Ibid pp 2)”, is a claim which is general across all 
mammals. It is a robust-process explanation of  fingerprints in Mamalia. 
Although this is in a sense developmentally constrained, the shear size of  
the clade implies that being a member of  mammalia is merely an enabling 
condition for fingerprints, they are not parallelisms. On this basis, we could 
conclude that the similarity is accidental. To counteract this, Henneberg and 
associates must convince us of  selective force acting upon the trait.  
The selective force which Henneberg et al call upon is adaptation for 
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 grasping in arboreal environments. They cite three pieces of  evidence for 
this. First, the closest relative of  the Koala is the clade including the 
burrowing Hairy Nose Wombat (see Phillips & Pratt 2008 for cladistic 
analysis) which is neither arboreal, nor grasping, which lacks 
dermatoglyphes (fingerprints). Second, the Short-tailed Spotted Cuscus 
(Phalanger Maculatus) which is more distantly related (the suborder 
Phalangeriformes, as opposed to Vombatiformes) but is arboreal and 
grasps, does have dermal ridge patterns and lives in an arboreal 
environment31. Third, the adaptation is not for just living in arboreal 
environments, but specifically for grasping, because tree kangaroos (another 
relative), which are arboreal but do not grasp, do not have dermatoglyphes. 
This evidence corroborates the adaptive hypothesis by either showing 
contrastive information (the first and third) or comparative information (the 
second) which is compatible with the hypothesis. 
This is the right kind of  evidence to suggest that the homoplasy between 
Koalas and Humans is due to continuity of  niche. If  the trait is due to 
similar selective pressures, we should expect lineages in similar niches to 
exhibit the trait (such as the Cuscus does). That closely related species do 
not exhibit it ties the trait to an arboreal environment. Further 
corroboration would come from examining other arboreal mammals. The 
more cases of  independent finger-print evolution coupled with a branch-
grasping environment, and more cases of  fingerprintlessness coupled with a 
non-branch-grasping environment, the more plausible our case. Does this 
get past the problem of  causal depth, however? Just because we can agree 
that an explanation of  Hominid or Koala resemblance in dermatoglyphes is 
due to them being analogies, how does the robust process (that mammals 
                                                      
31 It is not stated whether or not this represents an independent evolution event between 
Koala and Cascus or not. If they are independent, than this would be an (presumably 
parallel) extra analogy. If the similarity is homologous, however, it is not so clear 
whether it would count as evidence. Additionally, given the bushiness of the Cascus 
lineage, it is reasonable to enquire as to whether all cascus have fingerprints, or just the 
examples cited. 
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 grasping in trees evolve fingerprints) gain epistemic warrant? Can we 
project our analogies of  fingerprints n hominids, koalas and cuscus onto 
other lineages 
Epistemic warrant is granted here through bootstrapping. Both primate 
and marsupial dermatoglyphes act as corroborating evidence for the robust 
process that the model expresses. The problem of  causal depth shows that 
we cannot assume optimization. In situations where evidence is carefully 
collated and confirmed across wide taxa, then there is no reason why 
warrant cannot be granted.  
But is this explanation really satisfying? It is still in the nature of  
analogous similarities: it is in a sense shallow. Our original explanatory target 
was the amazing similarity between the fingerprints of  Homo-sapiens and 
Phascolarctos-cinereus. The explanation is that they have fingerprints as 
adaptations for grasping due to living in an arboreal environment. This 
explains why Humans and Koalas have fingerprints – but fails to explain 
why their fingerprints should be so similar. A reasonable conclusion might 
be that the particular similarity here is accidental. So it may be the case that 
these analogues allow us to construct a projectible model which can tell us 
about other tree-grasping mammals. But it does not allow us to project the 
level of  specificity apparent in the close similarity between us and Koalas. 
Here is a good time to bring in my second point. 
The discussion of  the use of  homology and analogy in this work so far 
(and in the literature generally) has been importantly unrealistic. It has only 
attended to comparative information between lineages as a way of  
informing historical inferences, as if  when we construct such hypotheses 
this information is looked at alone. Nothing could be (or at least should be) 
further from the truth.  
History is, if  not intractably messy, than at least extremely complex. The 
best historical hypotheses will draw upon as many inferential streams as 
possible. Comparative information, then, may form an important part of  a 
hypothesis. We look to the hypothesis as a whole for epistemic warrant, not 
   
 
140
 its parts in isolation.  
For instance, John Horner’s (1983) theory that some species of  dinosaur 
were altricial (nestbound and requiring parental care during youth) relies 
upon both comparative and fossil evidence. He and Robert Makela’s 
discovery of  fossilized Maiasaura nests in 1979 provided physical evidence 
that young were cared for. This evidence makes no sense unless examined 
against comparative information from bird nesting practices (Horner 1994). 
Basically, because Maiasaur nests look like birds nests, Horner concluded 
that Maiasaur babies had a similar upbringing to extant birds. 
What does this have to do with the problem of  causal depth? Just 
because analogous resemblances might themselves be shallow, it does not 
follow that an explanation which involves them is. The required depth could 
be acquired from, or in combination with, other streams of  evidence. 
Horner’s hypothesis can glean fairly fine-grained information about 
Maiasaur behaviour (to a reasonable degree of  certainty or warrant) based 
on a combination of  fossil data and comparative data from extant altricial 
species.  
In the case of  the Koala fingerprints, an examination of  the process by 
which fingerprints develop may enable a finer grain of  explanation. If  there 
are similarities between how fingerprints develop between the Hominid and 
Koala lineages, these continuities could be part of  our explanation (or, for 
that matter, part of  the explanatory target itself !). Here the developmental 
similarities could themselves be either homologous or analogous; in either 
case they can help us construct a fine-grained explanation of  fingerprint 
development in both lineages. The adaptive explanation will get us part of  
the way: explaining why they have fingerprints in the first place. The 
mechanistic explanation would get us the rest of  the way by explaining why 
Koala and Hominid lineages are so similar. A satisfactory (fine enough 
grained) explanation of  the homoplasy between us and Koalas requires both 
streams of  evidence. 
And so there are two reasons why parallel modelling is not the only way 
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 to successfully use analogues. First, in situations where there is a non-
parallel similarity between lineages, and that similarity has been confirmed 
across several independent examples (situation B), it is reasonable to 
conclude that Natural Selection does play an important role in that case. 
Such cases will probably be developmentally constrained in some sense, but 
these constraints will be broad and explanatorily vacuous (they are merely 
enabling conditions). Second, the finer grain required for epistemic warrant 
need not come from the analogies alone, but can be granted on the basis of  
other information streams. Analogies can be part of  an integrated explanation. 
In the next section, I will take up my sketch of  situation B and clothe it 
in terms of  my explanatory structure for outlier lineages from chapter 5 and 
a few case studies. 
7.2  Non-Parallel  Analogous Modelling 
This section will show that in appropriate situations we can use non-
parallel analogues to model outlier lineages. There are two approaches that I 
will explore. The first relies on using other streams of  evidence to form our 
hypothesis. The second uses bootstrapping across several analogues to 
refine the model and gain epistemic warrant. 
First I will examine the use of  analogies to support the claim that Homo-
floriensis is a phyletic dwarf  due to selection for smaller size in an island 
environment. This will show how analogues can gain necessary causal depth 
when taken in combination with other information-streams. 
Second I will follow the construction of  a hypothesis about the 
evolution of  teaching behaviour in the hominid lineage using Meerkats as 
an analogue. This discussion will demonstrate how the incorporation of  
several analogues into model construction can grant warrant. 
The case studies will set me up for a more abstract discussion of  the 
kinds of  roles I see non-parallel analogues as taking in hypothesis 
construction and confirmation.   
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 7.2 .1  Case Study: Dwarfism in Homo-floresiensis  
The first case study I will examine is the use of  non-parallel analogous 
information to inform the hypothesis that Homo-floresiensis were of  Erectine 
stock. My aim is to show the use of  analogies as part of  the evidence for a 
hypothesis. The problem of  causal depth is avoided because the proper 
grain is provided in combination with other information streams. 
Homo-floresiensis are a recent (and surprising) addition to the hominid 
lineage. Confirmed finds have been limited to the Indonesian island of  
Flores where they seem to have lived up until around thirteen thousand 
years ago. Their most striking characteristic is their diminutive size. The 
adults are thought to average around 1 meter tall (Brown et al 2004), which 
has earned them the nickname ‘hobbit’.  
The hobbits are enigmatic: some of  their traits point to a phylogeny 
which undermines current orthodoxy in hominid dispersal. It is generally 
held that two hominid lineages spread from Africa into Asia: Homo-erectus 
and Homo-sapiens. However, if  Floresiensis evolved from an earlier branch 
of  the hominid tree, this would show that there was an earlier radiation into 
Asia. Perhaps Homo-habilus, or an earlier lineage. As such, there are two 
competing hypotheses about hobbit evolution. Roughly, one claims they are 
dwarf  erectines (thus preserving orthodoxy), the other that they are 
habiline.  
What evidence can count for either side? Remarkably, cladistic analysis 
provides two equally parsimonious trees. One sides with the habiline 
hypothesis: they emerged between 1.86 and 1.66 million years ago (a little 
before Homo-habilus). The other has Floresiensis evolving as part of  the 
Erectine line (Argue et al 2009). So examining the character states 
themselves cannot resolve the issue.  
We need to work out which of  the following scenarios is more likely. 
Either a wholly undiscovered lineage of  hominids left Africa sometime after 
1.86 million years ago and spread across Asia. Or a group of  Erectus 
evolved island dwarfism with remarkably habiline features. So, is it more 
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 probable that there is a (until now) surprise lineage which left Africa and 
was successful enough to radiate to Flores – without leaving any other 
traces. Or is it more probable that island dwarfism in erectus lead to the 
suite of  traits which the hobbits possessed? 
An undiscovered lineage in the hominid tree would not be as remarkable 
as we might suppose. The fossil record for hominids is disappointingly 
sparse, although new finds are continually made. Considering the small 
probability of  fossilization, and the small probability of  an actual find, it is 
perfectly within the realms of  plausibility that an undiscovered radiation 
exists. Having said this, the only reason we have to postulate this extra 
radiation is the Flores finds. There is no corroborating information 
whatsoever, no hint provided by fossil or archaeological finds. So, in a 
sense, our preferred hypothesis is erectine dwarfism as this requires less 
changes in surrounding theories (it is more parsimonious). 
In a series of  papers (the latest 2009) Jungers et al have challenged the 
dwarfism hypothesis by examining physiological traits of  the Flores finds. 
Hobbits have several characteristics which are not merely small from the 
perspective of  Erectus, but also primitive. Most notably, they seem more 
adapted for arboreal life (less perfectly bipedal) than Erectus and their 
brains are surprisingly small.   Is island dwarfism enough to explain not just 
the diminution of  size but also the apparent regression? I will focus on 
encephalization (brain size compared against body size) as it is here that 
interesting use of  analogy has been made. 
Based on developmental assumptions, the brains of  Floresiensis are 
much smaller than we would expect. During ontogeny in larger mammals 
brain growth typically completes earlier than the rest of  the body. So, if  a 
lineage is a dwarf  due to a shorter growth period, we should expect brain 
size to be correspondingly larger. So, all things being equal, as body size 
decreases we should expect encephalization to increase. Based on models 
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 using these kinds of  assumptions, as well as research on modern Pygmies32, 
the body weight predicted based upon Floresiensis brain size is half that 
estimated of  the specimens found (Martin et al 2006)33. In short, their 
brains are half  the size they ought to be. And so it is much more likely that 
the Hobbits are habiline (or even Australopithecine), as their brain size 
disqualifies island dwarfism from the explanation. 
So the claim is that Floresiensis cannot be phyletic dwarves because of  
the nature of  the robust process of  island dwarfism. As such, the strength 
of  the objection is reliant on our confidence in the model of  island 
dwarfism. This model takes information from existent human populations 
(see note 3 for disquiet about this) as well as from both domesticated and 
wild mammals. Its primary justification, however, is based on assumptions 
about mammal ontogeny, the developmental process by which island 
dwarfism occurs. There are two assumptions here. One is that dwarfism 
occurs by retarding later stages of  growth. That dwarfism will affect brain 
size less than gross body size is reliant upon this. Second, brain size and 
gross body size must be coupled34. If  the developmental process which 
effects body size necessarily also affects brain size, then selection for 
smaller body will also select for smaller brain to the encephalitic 
correspondence predicted by the model. If, however, the two can be 
                                                      
32 I am very suspicious of the worth of evidence provided by Pygmy populations. Although 
they certainly exhibit smaller size, presumably due to selection, they certainly do not 
constitute a separate species to the rest of the human lineage. As such, the difference 
between the kind of task facing us here (predicting encephalization change based on 
dwarfism as part of speciation) is astronomically different than that provided by intra-
species examples.  
33 Martin et al (2006) believe the most likely explanation for this is that the specimens 
found are not a separate species, but rather modern humans with microcephaly. I am 
ignoring this hypothesis largely because I think it is clearly false. If we examine the suite 
of traits which Floresiensis exhibits, rather than simply brain-size, it defies credulity to 
imagine that this was caused by some kind of disease. 
34 Just to be clear, by ‘coupled’ here I do not mean that any change to body size will have 
an equal size change in brain size. I mean that any change in body size necessarily changes 
encephalization as predicted by the model. 
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 affected independently, then we are unwarranted in assuming that a smaller 
body will correspond with a particular encephalitic range.  
Weston & Lister (2009) challenge the model used to predict 
encephalization in island dwarfism by examining analogous data. They use 
two lineages of  extinct pygmy hippopotamus and an extinct lineage of  
pygmy elephant against an extinct lineage of  large hippopotamus, as well as 
extant variants. This data does not fit the model which Martin et al and 
Jungers et al use. The brain size reduction seen in Floriensis does fit with 
the analogous data Weston & Lister collate. This shows that at the very least 
it is possible that dwarfism could explain this level of  reduction in brain 
size. “Whatever the explanation for the tiny brain of  H. floresiensis relative to 
body size, the evidence presented here suggests that the phenomenon of  
insular dwarfism could have played a part in its evolution (Ibid pp 87).”  
In this example analogies are used to counter an objection to the 
hypothesis they support. The original claim was that the brain size decrease 
in hobbits could not be put down to dwarfism as the traits they exhibit did 
not lie in the realm of  possibility laid out by the robust-process of  island 
dwarfism. What Weston & Lister’s work shows is that the original model of  
island dwarfism that backed up the objection is faulty.  
The evidence challenges both assumptions required for the ‘late-
ontogenetic model’ (as Weston & Lister call it). Their data shows that 
dwarfism does not always occur via the retardation of  later ontogenetic 
processes. There must be processes which allow brain growth to be 
decreased more than body growth. And this possibility undermines the 
second assumption. Brain and body growth can be decoupled. Selection, 
then, could favour decreased body size without a corresponding increase in 
encephalization. For instance, if  dwarfism is due to impoverished resources, 
then it could be adaptive to reduce expensive brain tissue more than gross 
body-size. 
If  the entire debate about Floresiensis’ origins centred on which model 
of  island dwarfism was the most appropriate then we would have reason for 
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 disquiet. Dwarfism in primates is rare: parallel information, therefore, is thin 
on the ground. If  Floresiensis is a dwarf  primate, then, its dwarfism is an 
outlier trait. Bronham & Cardillo (2007) examine island dwarfism in 
primates, but this largely serves to demonstrate that generalizations made 
across mammalian taxa about dwarfism include the primate clade. Their 
data shows that the developmental pre-conditions for island dwarfism are 
present in primates. Given the lack of  parallel information, then, on what 
basis would we grant epistemic warrant to a hypothesis about hominids 
whose only basis was comparative data from Elephants and Hippopotamus? 
On what basis can we project from these large ungulates to a hominid? 
This question considers the claim in isolation of  the wider debate. We 
need not draw only on analogous data to support the hypothesis that 
Floresiensis are phyletic dwarves. This hypothesis is also supported by 
current orthodoxy in hominid dispersal patterns. Our confidence in current 
orthodoxy (and corroborating evidence for that confidence) actually counts 
as evidence for the Erectine hypothesis35. We know, for instance, that late 
Erectus inhabited nearby regions (Java) – which gives credibility to the 
theory on biogeographical grounds. Additionally, further examination of  
the developmental mechanics behind island dwarfism  or the decoupling of  
body and brain growth in ontogeny, could count as extra evidence. If  we 
had a clearer idea of  how selective pressure for dwarfism effects ontogeny 
(if  the robust process of  dwarfism was better understood developmentally) 
then this, assuming it corroborates the Erectine theory, could be bought to 
bear.  
It is too early to tell whether or not the Erectine or Habiline theory will 
become accepted. This depends on further work into the selective and 
developmental processes at work in island dwarfism and the robustness of  
                                                      
35 This is not to say that orthodox solutions are always correct (I do not mean to sound 
overly conservative here), but just that evidence for a particular theory will count as 
evidence for any corollary theory which that evidence is consistent with.  
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 current orthodoxy about hominid dispersal. My point is that the use of  
analogues to justify the Erectine hypothesis do not gain epistemic warrant 
based on the analogues in isolation. They gain their warrant in the context 
of  the wider debate. In isolation, the claim is suspect due to the problem of  
causal depth. But we should examine it in combination with the rest of  the 
evidence for the hypothesis it purports to support. 
In this example, analogous information has been a side-line to other 
streams. Fossil data (or lack thereof), for instance, has been the main driving 
source of  hypotheses. I want to turn now to a case where analogy is the 
driving force behind the theory and show how epistemic warrant can be 
granted in this kind of  situation.  
7.2 .2  Case Study: Teaching in Meerkats 
This section examines the use of  analogous data to inform hypotheses 
about the evolution of  teaching in the hominid lineage. It will demonstrate 
an evolutionary narrative in a non-parallel context and show how epistemic 
warrant can be granted for analogous data by bootstrapping across 
analogues. 
The teaching hypothesis discussed is meek. It takes a functional 
definition of  ‘teaching’. An individual is teaching just in case they modify 
their behaviour in some way which does not benefit their carrying out of  
the skill in question, but increases the chance of  uptake by an observer36. 
This behaviour requires no fancy cognitive equipment; there is no need for 
intentionality, decoupled representations or a theory of  mind. The 
behaviour can be completely automated. As such, hypotheses based upon it 
                                                      
36 This is a simplification of the definition given by Caro and Hauser (quoted in Hoppitt et 
al 2008 pp 1) “An individual actor A [the tutor] can be said to teach if it modifies its 
behaviour only in the presence of a naive observer, B [the pupil], at some cost or at least 
without obtaining an immediate benefit for itself. A’s behaviour thereby encourages or 
punishes B’s behaviour, or provides B with experience, or sets an example for B. As a 
result, B acquires knowledge, or learns a skill earlier in life or more rapidly or efficiently 
than it might otherwise do so, or would not learn at all.” 
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 cannot provide a full explanation of  teaching in humans. I am also taking it 
as an assumption that teaching is in fact an adaptation, which meerkats in 
fact possess. 
Our explanatory target is a shift from what Sterelny calls by-product 
engineering (the environment is inadvertently organized to facilitate learning 
based on adult lifeways) and protected trail and error learning, to true teaching. 
Teaching adults do not merely protect their offspring, but “… actively 
intervene in the process [of  learning]. They make certain aspects of  the task 
salient. They ease the task by providing especially simple exemplars or by 
partially solving it. They give repeated opportunities to practice it (Sterelny 
2003 pp 158).” None of  these activities require intentional teaching but they 
may be part of  the behavioural and cognitive toolkit which acts as an 
exaptation for more demanding cognitive faculties. So by ‘teaching’ here I 
am referring to a minimal functional definition. 
Teaching is an outlier trait in Hominids. It is not present in our close 
relatives. The great apes, Pan in particular, are champion learners. Many 
chimp groups are dependant upon socially transmitted skills such as nut 
cracking or termite ‘fishing’. These skills, however, are not taught but 
learned via inadvertent social learning (a term which combines by-product 
engineering and protected trial and error learning). A chimp mother will not 
modify her behaviour when she is termite fishing and her offspring is near. 
The offspring will pick up the skill through trial and error guided by their 
interest in actions taken by the parent..  
There is, then, an adaptive question begged by teaching. Assuming that 
our ancestors were non-teaching inadvertent social learners, in virtue of  
what did we evolve into teachers? I take it that the shift from inadvertent 
social learning to (minimal) teaching was a fairly early step in hominid 
evolution, as opposed to something which only emerged once full-blown 
intentionality and imitation (or even language) evolved. I am not sure, and 
will not examine here, whether we should be happy with placing the 
emergence of  teaching this far back. For the sake of  the example, I will take 
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 it as a given. 
Let us take our ancestors to be Pan-like in terms of  learning and 
teaching. So our initial conditions are modelled on Chimpanzees and 
Bonobos. These include inadvertent social learning and a selective 
advantage for skill uptake. In a Chimpanzee band which gets a significant 
amount of  nutrition through termite fishing, then there is a selective 
advantage to parents if  offspring learn that skill. To discover the difference-
making variable, we want to find contrasting information between this 
initial state and an adaptive model. 
Recall that I outlined a particular structure for non-parallel analogue 
models. In such cases we expect developmental information to be an 
enabling condition for the emergence of  the trait, so the hypothesis will 
include (at least tacitly) a developmental requirement. This will interact with 
selective requirements which in combination are sufficient conditions for 
the trait in question’s evolution. In this case Meerkats are used as aan 
analogue to construct the adaptive model. 
Thornton & McAuliffe (2006) report observations and experiments with 
wild Meerkat populations which provide clear evidence of  teaching. 
Meerkat adults frequently hunt and kill scorpions, which considering their 
non-immunity to scorpion venom is not a simple prospect. Meerkat pups 
have to learn how to hunt scorpions, and this is facilitated by adults in their 
troop. In response to begging calls from pups adults will provide partially 
disabled scorpions. This happens in three stages. Youngest pups are 
provided dead scorpions. Intermediates are given live scorpions with 
disabled stings. Finally a live, fully functioning scorpion is provided. This is 
a case of  teaching: there is no direct benefit for the adult in this behaviour, 
and it improves the chances of  the pup learning the skill37.  
                                                      
37 Thornton & McAuliffe’s experimental work focused on the behaviour of the adults 
given particular cries from pups. They do not show that this behaviour actually 
improves uptake of the skill. However, it is very plausible that it does. 
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 Hoppitt et al (2008) use Thornton & McAuliffe’s data to construct an 
adaptive model of  teaching behaviour evolution. The enabling 
developmental variable they point to is inadvertent social learning. In order 
for teaching to be effective, young must have the cognitive nuance to learn 
through trial and error. They also provide two selective variables. First, there 
must be a selective advantage for the tutor if  the pupil picking up the skill. 
If  skill uptake does not in some way increase the fitness of  the tutor, then 
the behaviour will not be visible to selection. Second, inadvertent social 
learning must be inadequate (or at least less efficient) for passing on the 
skill. There must be selection pressure for a skill which mere trial and error 
learning does not easily pass on.  
The model fits Meerkats well. Meerkats (like most mammals) do exhibit 
inadvertent social learning, particularly during pre-adulthood, so they have 
the developmental precondition. As we may suppose, a scorpion-hunting 
meerkat is generally fitter than a non-scorpion hunting meerkat38, and as 
they are obligate cooperative breeders, it is reasonable to claim that it is in 
the interest of  any conspecific for a pup to pick up the behaviour, whatever 
the specific familial relationship between them. A plausible case could be 
made that group-level selection plays an important role here. But also, given 
cooperative breeding, it is in the interests of  all adults if  the young become 
self-sufficient earlier as they can then concentrate on foraging for 
themselves – so a group-level story is not necessary. At any rate, the first 
selective requirement is met. Scorpion hunting is not a skill which lends 
itself  to trial-and-error learning. So the second selective requirement is 
reasonable. 
Teaching behaviour in Homo-sapiens (the final condition) also meet the 
model. Humans can learn by trial and error. It is (presumably) in the 
                                                      
38 The statistics on scorpions as a food source seem less than promising. Thornton & 
McAullife report that 4.5% of meerkat prey biomass is made up of the scorpions they 
studied. Having said this, I have no idea of what constitutes a significant or insignificant 
amount. 
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 interests of  parents for their offspring to learn the various skills and 
behaviours necessary for navigating our social world. The skills we learn are 
complex and not easily picked up through trial and error. 
So, recalling my framework for adaptive explanation of  outlier traits, we 
now want to compare and contrast our initial state with the adaptive model. 
As we can see in the table below, chimps and bonobos both exhibit 
inadvertent social learning (in spades) and it is reasonable to suppose that 
there is a selective advantage to the tutor. However, the kinds of  skills 
passed on in chimp groups are well suited to trial and error learning. 
 Figure xxiv Initial State vs Adaptive Model  
 















The discrepancy between the adaptive model an initial conditions, then, 
is in the kind of  skills passed on. Pan skills such as termite fishing and nut 
cracking are well suited for trial and error learning. They are repetitive, safe, 
and typically carried out in an environment where young can interact with 
adults. Scorpion hunting by contrast is fast, dangerous, and typically done 
away from home. So the difference making property Hoppitt et al propose 
is a shift in the kind of  skills required for success in the hominid lineage. 
“Unlike other apes, in humans, teaching could have been favoured by the 
requirement to transmit complicated skills and technology that are not 
easily acquired through inadvertent social learning (Hoppitt et al 2008).” 
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 Perhaps a shift towards obligate hunting, or some kind of  tool use, could 
have provided the impetuous? 
There is an issue with the hypothesis as stated in terms of  causal 
direction. Is it the case that the evolution of  teaching opened up avenues 
which allowed for the evolution of  hunting or tool use? Or is it that the 
evolution of  these complex skills led to the evolution of  teaching? My 
hunch is that each would scaffold the other. If  passing on these skills 
requires a modicum of  teaching, and teaching requires the impetus of  these 
skills to get going, then it seems reasonable to suppose that a slight shift 
towards proto-hunting, or proto-complex tool use (or whatever), could 
drive teaching behaviour which in turn would allow better skills, and so on. 
Now that we know the bare bones of  the hypothesis, there are two 
questions. How do we test it? How then do we fill in the details? I will take 
each in turn. As stated the hypothesis is possible, but is it plausible? Its only 
evidential basis is a single mammal. And not a closely related one at that: 
Meerkats are Carnivora, sharing an ancestor with our lineage around 85 
million years ago (Dawkins 2004). What basis could we have for thinking 
that an observation of  a distantly related animal with a dramatically 
different lifestyle could be projected onto our lineage? 
 My previous solution is less applicable in this case. If  other streams of  
information to provide the required grain, those streams must exist and be 
transparent enough to grant warrant. Behavioural information is 
notoriously difficult to discover from the indirect evidence provided by 
paleoanthropology or archaeology (Andrews 2009). However, see Tehrani 
& Riede 2008 for a discussion of  the relationship between material culture 
and teaching. I think it fair to claim the hypothesis is, in a sense, an 
integrated explanation. It incorporates other streams of  information to set 
up the initial conditions, and it may be that specificity of  information here 
could carry over to the adaptive model. However, in this case I am 
concerned with increasing the epistemic warrant of  the adaptive teaching 
model itself.  
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 The hypothesis can be corroborated through application to other 
analogues. If  there are numerous, disparate and independent evolution 
events of  teaching, then it is reasonable to infer that Natural Selection plays 
an important role in its evolution. Developmental information will be a 
Pharoanic Brick’. The more examples of  teaching analogues we discover, 
the more likely it is that continuity of  niche is the right explanation for the 
similarity. The more these analogues fit our model, the likely that it picks 
out a robust process. If  we are certain of  the robust process, then it grants 
warrant to any actual-sequence explanation which relies upon it.  
So what other cases of  teaching in animals are there? Before Caro & 
Hauser (1992) suggested their functional criteria, it was generally believed 
that teaching was a unique hominid trait. Once the application was applied 
numerous possibilities were idenfitied. Hoppitt et al cite possible teaching in 
eusocial insects (ants and bees), non-human primates (Callitrichid 
Monkeys), Carnivora (Cheetah, Meerkats, domestic cats) and birds (Pied 
Babblers and domestic fowl). Teaching has also been proposed in cetacea 
(Marino et al 2007). Even allowing for common descent in each group 
(which is unlikely in some cases), if  these were empirically confirmed we 
would have five analogues available39.  
Work which is not being carried out is testing for falsifying cases. Most 
importantly, are there lineages which meet the three criteria and yet do not 
teach? Given the strong relationship between teaching and highly complex 
skills in the model, if  we find negative data of  this type it would certainly be 
                                                      
39 I am uneasy about the inclusion of insects into these lists of corroborating analogues. 
The main issue I think is scepticism about the developmental criteria being met. I 
would not be surprised if some species of ants and bees do engage in inadvertent social 
learning in some form, so perhaps something can be learned from them. There are 
other cases that I do not think much inferential weight can be granted. Simon Conway-
Morris (2003)’s assertion that the symbiotic relationship between leafcutter ants and a 
fungus is an analogue of agriculture in Homo-sapiens is, I think, unfounded. This is 
because he cannot point to a common developmental requirement which could act as 
an enabling condition.   
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 an issue. 
Having said this, the number of  possible teaching analogues suggests 
that we do have a legitimate case of  Natural Selection being strong enough 
to warrant cross-taxa modelling. I think a research programme which aims 
to confirm teaching behaviour in these lineages, and then uses this to 
inform and corroborate the analogue model, is promising.  
Clarke (forthcoming), for instance, examines how feeding calls in White-
tailed ptarmigan (a species of  alpine grouse) influences diet-choice in their 
chicks. “White-tailed ptarmigan hens display a multimodal signal composed 
of  food calling (a distinctive guttural clucking) and tid-bitting (dropping bits 
of  a food item with active head bobbing) only in the presence of  their 
precocial chicks… Invariably, the chick then pecks at and consumes morsels 
of  the specific food item indicated by the hen (Ibid pp2).” Clarke makes a 
fairly good case for teaching. The hen points out food items which are 
protein rich (and thus important for survival) and difficult to identify. In an 
alpine environment food is scarce so a reliance on trial and error learning 
could lead to starvation. It appears that chicks retain eating preferences into 
adulthood, and so on. Clarke resists fully committing to a teaching 
hypothesis but points towards new research which could confirm it. This 
study and others like it can serve to increase our certainty that Natural 
Selection does in fact shape lineages towards teaching given the kind of  
scenario Hoppitt et al discuss. 
So I have answered the first question: the hypothesis may be tested by 
examining its predictions across other analogues. If  it is corroborated by 
several (and not clearly falsified by too many) then we should be confident 
of  it. Answering this question, however, does not appear to counter the 
problem of  causal depth. Both our model and hypothesis it has generated is 
still vague. The theory is coarse-grained: the ‘mechanism’ is the relationship 
between any particular skill and inadvertent social learning. A finer-grained 
model might tell us whether, say, hunting or tool-use are more likely 
candidates in the hominid case. No matter how confident we are that 
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 teaching will evolve given inadvertent social learning, a selective advantage 
for the tutor and skills which are hard to learn, how are we to work out 
which skill drove the adaptation in the hominid lineage? Both hunting and 
tool use fit the model. Like the two hypotheses about dinosaur extinction in 
the second chapter, the process lacks the causal depth to let us choose 
between them. So the more difficult question, then, relates to the details of  
the hypothesis: how do we fill them in? 
It may be the case that we cannot. Not all historical information is 
recoverable. The vague answer given for teaching may be the best we can do 
in some situations. Having said this, it is a better answer than could have 
been provided without reference to analogues. There may be some things 
which could extend the inference, however. 
I have (largely for the sake of  the example) ignored the use of  indirect 
evidence from paleontology and the like, but there is another stream of  
information which could help refine our model. Maybe some analogous 
information is more pertinent to our explanatory target than others. For 
instance, Meerkats and Grouse teach very different kinds of  information. 
Meerkats teach a particular skill whereas Grouse make particular aspects of  
the environment more salient. It may be that different variables are more or 
less important given these differences. There could be differences between 
how these different kinds of  teaching evolve. These differences could be 
more or less applicable to the hominid lineage. This kind of  information 
will refine the model. 
So the problem of  causal depth can be (at least partially) combated by 
corroborating the model across analogues. Extra detail could be gained 
through bootstrapping be examining the particulars of  the lineages in 
question. The groundwork for a more ambitious solution will be given 
tentatively in the coda. 
7.3  The Role of Non-Parallel  Analogy 
I will now draw out some general points about the role of  non-parallel 
analogies.  
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 In his criticism of  Simon Conway-Morris’ use of  convergent evolution 
to support the claim that there are massive constraints on evolutionary 
paths due to Natural Selection, Kim Sterelny (2005) suggested that we think 
of  regularities in evolution as ‘conditional inevitabilities’. This is to say that 
although we cannot make claims about life in general, we might be able to 
discover regularities in how evolution unfolds given certain historical 
conditions or constraints. 
In my discussion of  parallel modelling, I effectively claimed that 
parallelisms can give us grounds for postulating conditional inevitabilities. 
In A situations (when there are striking similarities across parallel 
analogues) we conclude that developmental information constrains the 
process enough to postulate inevitability if  that developmental constraint is 
present and if  the correct selective pressure is present. My case for the use 
of  non-parallel analogues is quite similar. 
Situation B consisted of  a striking similarity between two non-parallel 
analogues. The tempting conclusion is that the resemblance relation is due 
primarily to Natural Selection. Selection has enough causal force that its 
signal is not obscured by noise from phylogenetic history in this case. 
Again, if the developmental information is present as an enabling condition 
and if  the correct selective pressures are present, then the trait will evolve. 
Here we must be cautious of  the potential role of  accident in explanation: 
drift and other non-selective factors could play an important role in shaping 
the resemblances. 
The issue is here is twofold. First, how do we tell that situation B is in 
fact the case? How are we to tell that a striking resemblance between two 
lineages is due to those lineages occupying the same niche, rather than the 
similarity being accidental? There is a danger of  ‘cherry-picking’ our 
examples to fit our hypothesis. How, then, do we establish that these 
similarities are of  real significance. In Griffiths’ terms, how do we take a 
group of  striking examples and construct a “… robust ecological theory 
(Griffiths 1996)”?  
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 Second, even if  we have established that non-parallel analogues can 
constitute a conditional inevitability, given the problem of  causal depth, 
what possible use could they have? The kinds of  explanations generated by 
these cases seem abstract, shallow and unsatisfactory.  
My response to the first issue is as follows. Imagine that situation B 
exists across several examples. There are striking, non-parallel similarities 
between a group of  lineages. Take the meerkat example from the last 
section. We projected a selective story from meerkats onto our own lineage. 
Given the range of  choices for projection on offer, it would be reasonable 
to worry that the examples are cherry-picked. How can we assure ourselves 
that the similarities are not merely accidental? 
There are three factors, which I have already mentioned, which should 
undermine scepticism about cherry-picking. I don’t think a particular rule is 
necessary (as epistemic warrant is itself  a matter of  degree) but our 
certainty of  picking out a true case of  situation B depends upon the 
number of  data-points, the complexity of  the trait, and the degree of  
similarity. 
If, for instance, we were able to point to more lineages, not closely 
related to either meerkats or hominids, which also fit the hypothesis this 
would give the sceptic pause. The model/hypothesis makes predictions not 
just about our target lineage, but any lineage which meets the conditions 
specified. There is a relationship between the number of  non-parallel 
analogues and our scepticism about cherry-picking. As the model is 
corroborated, it becomes more likely that we are identifying a robust 
process – that we have found a true B situation. 
Similarly, the complexity of  the trait should increase our certainty. 
Teaching behaviour is a striking trait and (assuming it is an adaptation) its 
functional purpose is relatively limited. Some examples are more obvious – 
both bats and birds and pterosaurs (who we have never seen fly) have 
analogous wings. We know this because the complexity of  wings and the 
specificity of  the requirements of  occupying an airborne niche allow us to 
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 infer their function. So, if  a trait is complex (and the complexity is borne 
out in analogues), it is likely that Natural Selection played a central causal 
role in its evolution. 
Finally, the level of  similarity also goes towards dispelling scepticism. I 
have previously mentioned the principle of  common cause: we should 
prefer a single explanation for similar phenomena. Our preference for the 
principle is related to how close a similarity is. Unlike homology, the 
similarities in analogy are both in terms of  trait and environment. We might 
give credence to the theory that humans and Koalas evolved fingerprints 
due to a grasping arboreal environment because both the similarity in the 
trait and the similarity in the evolutionary niche are close. If  we think the 
resemblance-relations weak, we would be less inclined to accept it. 
I have responded to the second issue in various ways. The most effective 
response is to emphasize the role of  analogy as a part of  an explanation. 
When analogous models are integrated with other streams of  evidence they 
can play an important, sometimes essential part. We saw this in the use of  
hippopotamus and elephant to support the erectine-dwarfism theory for 
hobbits. Here epistemic warrant is granted to the hypothesis as a whole. 
Maybe each stream when taken alone is insufficient to establish warrant, but 
in combination they can ground an explanation. 
Recall my structure for evolutionary narratives. Here there were three 
sets of  variables. They were the initial conditions, the final conditions and 
the adaptive model. In the fifth chapter, I argued that analogies can inform 
the adaptive model. If  we have fine-grained information for the initial and 
final conditions provided by homology, field studies, palaeontology and so 
on, it may be the case that the analogies gain warrant as part of  an 
integrated explanation.  
The process of  bootstrapping an analogous model across several 
examples can also provide depth. Variables which are central in some 
analogues may be less important in others. Examining a large group can 
help us pick out the important variables, and tell us under what conditions 
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 those variables are sufficient. Aspects of  the trait in question, or the 
evolutionary narrative that leads to it, might vary in important respects 
based on historical factors. Examining a large group could bring these out. 
And so the role of  analogies is in informing the adaptive model. 
Epistemic warrant is granted in non-parallel cases by a combination of  finer 
grain through bootstrapping across several exemplars and in reference to 
the explanation that they form a part of.  
I am now at a stage where I can articulate the conditions for non-parallel 
modelling to gain epistemic warrant. 
1. There must be enough analogues to give grounds that Natural 
Selection does shape phenotype in the way proposed by the model (that 
it does enough of  the causal work) 
2. There must be reasonable grounds for assuming an enabling 
developmental condition is held across the analogues 
EITHER, 
3. The analogy is part of  an integrated solution. There are other streams of  
data which corroborate the hypothesis, gaining the causal depth required 
for warrant 
OR, 
4. There must be enough information across the analogues to allow us to 
increase specificity by bootstrapping. 
So if  these conditions are met we have solid grounds for using non-
parallel analogues to construct robust evolutionary models. The problem of  
causal depth is avoided through bootstrapping or independent 
corroboration. 
Before finally concluding, I want to examine the use of  non-biological 
analogues in modelling outlier lineages. This will be the topic of  the Coda. 
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 C o d a  
 
Whenever a science is declared ‘complete’, a common example is cited to 
dissuade such hubris; the attitudes of  some physicists at the turn of  the 20th 
century. In a lecture in 1894, for instance, the physicist Albert Michelson 
made the following claim: “… it seems probable that most of  the grand 
underlying principles have been firmly established and that further advances 
are to be sought chiefly in the rigorous application of  these principles to all 
phenomena… the future truths of  Physical Science are to be looked for in 
the sixth place of  decimals (Michelson, quoted in Horgan 1996 pp19).”  
Such statements were made directly before the revolutionary changes in 
physics which characterized the 20th century: relativity and quantum theory.  
My project so far has been about the limits using animals in the 
reconstruction of  evolutionary narratives, and I think this project runs 
similar risks to the claims of  these physicists. They, and perhaps I, have 
underestimated two things: the ingenuity of  scientific thought and the 
strangeness of  the natural world. With this worry in mind, then, I want to 
try extending the meaning of  analogy into non-biological domains. 
The application of  concepts from the biological sciences to other 
domains is not uncommon. ‘Universal Darwinism’ attempts to apply 
Natural Selection to the social sciences (particular in memetics and 
economics), Cosmology, History, and so on… (Dennett 1996). My 
approach is to suggest that some of  the principles I have discussed in a 
biological context might also hold true in non-biological contexts and, 
crucially, this can help us understand biological phenomena. 
In chapter seven, I argued for a principled basis to ground the use of  
disparate analogues to model outlier lineages. I claimed that epistemic 
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 warrant could be granted provided enough corroborating analogues were 
available or if  the analogue was used as part of  an integrated explanation. 
An important constraint on this discussion was the availability of  analogues. 
If  none exist, then we are forced to repeat Kaplan’s (2002) conclusion in 
regards to the use of  the comparative method in the hominid lineage: 
analogues cannot shed light on our explanatory target. 
Sometimes the application of  non-biological analogies can inform a 
biological explanation. There can be epistemic and inferential continuity 
between biological analogues and both man made artefacts and ‘true’ 
models (in Weisberg’s sense). If  I am right that such continuity exists, then 
my discussion of  non-parallel analogues will also apply to modelling, both 
physical and conceptual. If  this is the case, then we needn’t despair at a lack 
of  comparative data: we may construct our own. 
Not all models or artefacts are analogies. Some are merely attempted 
representations for the purpose of  education – the models of  extinct fauna 
from the crystal palace, for instance (Secord 2004). Other physical models 
can be important to scientific theorizing, as Watson & Crick’s model of  the 
double helix famously demonstrates (De Chadarevian 2004). I claim that 
some models meet the requirements to be analogies of  biological systems. In 
this capacity they can both inform us about the functional import of  
adaptations, and inform robust processes which can generate adaptive 
hypotheses. 
In virtue of  what are two traits analogous? They must be similar in some 
striking sense. They also must be adaptations: traits that have evolved in 
response to some selective process. The traits must have evolved 
independently. And they must hold the trait due to the same selective process 
(otherwise the similarity is accidental – I will cover what it means for a 
designed object to ‘evolve’ below). In the context of  my general account of  
similarity-explanation, their similarity must be due to continuity of  process. 
My claim here is simple. If  an artefact or a model ‘evolves’ a relevantly 
similar ‘trait’ to some biological one, through what approximates the same 
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 process, then it can count as an analogy. It will pick out aspects of  some 
robust process which could ground a retrodiction.  
There is an objection I want to discuss. In the last chapter, I argued that 
there must be some developmental resources common to the analogues. 
These act as an ‘enabling condition’. This requirement ensures that we are 
picking out the correct phenomena in our analogies. Just because both ants 
and bees meet the functional definition of  ‘teaching’, does not mean ants 
and bees inform a model of  how teaching evolved in the hominid lineage. 
For it is unclear that eusocial insects evolved teaching via inadvertent social 
learning, and it is almost certain that we did.  
If  analogues must share a developmental condition there appears to be a 
problem with the idea of  non-biological analogues. A physical model, or a 
conceptual one, does not appear to have developmental resources. They are 
not biological, and do not have genetic information. They cannot be 
genuine analogues. 
This objection is, I think, easily met. The reason for pointing to the 
developmental requirement is to constrain our inference. We want to make 
sure that the analogues we are pointing to evolve by similar trajectories. In 
non-biological cases these constraints can be approximated. Because 
modellers have control over the variables of  the model, they can set these in 
a way that mirrors their target system. So the developmental requirement 
can be met insofar as the modeller must approximately, and appropriately, 
represent the developmental constraints on the target system. 
In the first chapter I argued that our justification for predicating some 
selective-function to a trait is independent of  evolutionary theory. We do 
not identify something as a ‘wing’ in virtue of  it being selected for flight. 
Rather, there are certain engineering facts which (give the right physical 
conditions) so constrain possible wings that we are able to confidently 
diagnose function from form. We recognise them as similar in terms of  use-
function, not selective-function. This discussion is as true of  man-made 
artefacts as it is of  biological morphology. The same set of  engineering 
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 facts enable us to recognise both the wings of  an aeroplane and those of  a 
bird. 
Technology and biology frequently solve a problem in similar ways. 
Sometimes we take our inspiration from biology, but sometimes science and 
nature ‘evolve’ the same solution independently. An arresting example is the 
discovery of  echolocation or ‘bio-sonar’. Echolocation is, broadly speaking, 
a method of  garnering spatial information from the environment via the 
emitting of  a wave (be it radio waves as in radar or sound waves in sonar). 
As the wave hits objects in space they will ‘echo’ back to the emitter. This 
information can be used to calculate the position, size and velocity of  
objects in space similarly to a visual system. Donald Griffin and Robert 
Galambos established the use of  sonar in bats in 1938 and in 1952 Kellogg 
and Kohler discovered it in cetaceans. This came as something of  a surprise 
to physicists who, during the Second World War, put considerable effort 
into the development of  both sonar and radar. In fact, Griffin’s theory was 
met with considerable resistance – it seemed very unlikely that a technology 
only just being discovered by modern science could have been present in 
biology. The evidence was incontrovertible, however (see Jones 2005 for an 
overview of  echolocation and Dawkins 1986 pp 23 – 36 for a discussion on 
the parallel discoveries of  sonar and echolocation).  
This is the same design response to the same problem in very different 
milieus. Both aircraft and bats share a problem: how do you navigate in a 
lightless environment? The solution is the same - instead of  relying on 
photons interacting with objects, rely on sound (or radar) waves.  I do not 
think it plausible that sonar literally evolved by Natural Selection (there is 
no clear replicating, heritable unit for selection to act upon). However, I 
think it is reasonable to say they ‘evolved’ insofar as both are functional 
responses to the same design problem. This is a case of  analogous 
evolution – the traits are similar; they are both ‘adaptations’; they were 
arrived at independently; and arrived at in response to a relevantly similar 
selective process. There is an important difference to the processes here, of  
course. One is literally selected by a guiding intelligence - it is artificial 




There are pertinent differences between artificial and natural selection. I 
will first discuss these in a biological context before moving to artefacts. 
Traits under artificial selection, due to the guidance provided, can have 
selection costs mitigated in a way not open to natural selection. In an 
important sense, the suite of  traits exhibited by modern domesticated sheep 
were probably not open to their ancestors. The overproduction of  wool 
presumably uses resources which, in a natural environment, could be better 
utilized in other areas. This is not to say a plump, woolly merino would be 
necessarily outperformed by a scraggily wild sheep40. Or that extra 
wooliness was not a possible pathway based on the developmental resources 
available (this is obviously not the case). The claim is that a move towards 
increase wooliness infers no obvious advantage, and almost certainly 
involves some cost. Due to this, wild sheep populations (if  under strong 
enough selective pressure to avoid drift) will not evolve woollier coats. It is 
only through the actions of  their domesticators, who have preferentially 
bred for wooliness and mitigated whatever costs there are through the 
provision of  food, care and protection, that something like a Merino can 
evolve.  
Domesticity could also be understood as Natural Selection in an unusual 
selective environment. The point is that this case of  ‘artificial’ selection is a 
middle ground between paradigm cases of  Natural Selection and design. 
For artefacts, literally designed objects further costs are mitigated. The 
process by which sonar technology ‘evolved’ is different to how bat 
echolocation (or wooliness in domesticated sheep) evolved. Sheep and bats 
are restricted by their biology. Without very advanced genetic engineering, 
changes must by largely gradual and haphazard. Modern engineering, by 
contrast, can evolve in leaps due to imagination, experiment and a 
                                                      
40 The general outperfomance and replacement of indigenous wild species with feral 
lineages is testament to the selective prowess of some domesticated animals. 
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 theoretical understanding of  the mechanisms involved. Echolocation 
almost certainly evolved over a much longer timescale than sonar. 
So artificial selection (both biological and technological) differs from 
natural selection in one important respect. Artificial selection removes 
constraints. In the sheep case selective constraints are removed, and in the 
sonar case ‘developmental’ limitations are further limited. Design is 
constrained by technological competence and resource availability – but 
nothing as stringent as a biological developmental system. As such, the 
availability of  a particular design to artificial selection does not mean that 
that design is open to Natural Selection. All forms which are available to 
natural selection are included in the set available to artificial selection, but 
some forms which may be artificially selected are not included in the set 
open to natural selection. 
The lesson here, then, is that examining artificially selected objects, 
particularly engineering and design (as opposed to domesticity41), can tell us 
about the limits of  physical possibility. They can inform a robust-process 
which both explains why a particular design works, and more importantly 
why a particular design is, or is not, physically possible. So a morphospace 
may tell us what the logical limits of  a form is, and an ‘empirical 
morphospace’ (McGhee 1999) can tell us which areas of  those possible 
                                                      
41 One way of viewing domesticity is as a fairly large-scale experiment on developmental 
plasticity. Some animals have been bred for functional purposes (horses have become 
larger and stronger, cows more placid and milk-rich and so on), but others purely for 
novelty. These ‘experiments’ can tell us something about the range of developmental 
potentiality open to different developmental systems. For instance, it has long been 
noted that the domesticated dog seems to have a much wider morphological potential 
than other domesticated animals, cats for instance. Cats have been bred for novelty as 
much as dogs, and yet dogs have demonstrated enormous flexibility. It is clear that a 
Maine Coon and a Sphynx are both cats. It would be less clear upon seeing a Great 
Dane and a Chihuahua that they would be the same species (see West-Eberhard 2003 
pp 298-299). Why? 
Also, of course, one of the main lines of evidence for Darwin’s theory of Natural Selection 
came from observations of artificially selected domesticated animals. 
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 forms are actualized, but the examination of  artificial analogues, and the 
engineering and design regularities they discover, can set physical limitations 
to morphospace. They can tell us why some areas are unoccupied, and 
suggest why some areas are.  
I will put the point in terms of  a traditional morphospace. Examining 
the mathematical properties of  shells can tell us about the logical space of  
shell design. Actual shells can then be plotted against the morphospace. 
Contrasting the morphospace with the ‘empirical’ morphospace sets a 
question: why are some realms of  possibility crowded, and others empty? If  
we can discover physically possible ‘shell-space’ this will help by disqualifying 
some areas of  logical morphospace. Physical possibility of  shell design can 
only be determined in reference to a set of  regularities (robust-processes) 
about the physical properties of  shells.  
I will illustrate these two uses, human artefacts as making design aspects 
salient, and informing a robust-process, using examples from J.E Gordon’s 
popular book on engineering Structures (1978). 
Examining human design can make aspects of  animal adaptations more 
salient: we can learn why the design was successful. One example, again 
using bats, is the similarity between their wing design and that of  sails in 
Chinese Junks (see Gordon 1978 pp 125-128). 
Bat wings and Junk sails both exemplify a very efficient response to 
balancing structural and aerodynamic factors for wind-based locomotion. A 
design which emphasizes structural strength may undermine aerodynamism 
and vice-versa. As Gordon points out, an increase in wind velocity will 
increase the pressure exerted upon the sail. If  the structure in question is 
too weak, then tensile stresses may result in damage, but a very rigid 
structure might limit aerodynamism. A sail which is too taunt or heavy will 
not transfer much of  the wind’s energy into push.  
One solution is to design a sail which is attached to the mast at regular 
intervals, as in the Chinese Junk. We could “… arrange for the sail to bulge 
between its supports so that, as the wind pressure increases, the radius of  
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 the curvature diminishes and so the tension force in the canvas remains 
roughly constant however hard the winds may blow (Ibid, pp 125-126).” We 
see the same approach in hang gliders: as the wind blows, the ‘sails’ billow 
between the struts. This design allows the hang glider to maximise 
aerodynamacy without risking breakage in high winds.  
Bat’s wings follow the same engineering principles as Junks and hang-
gliders. Their finger bones have evolved into long, thin ‘struts’ which form a 
framework over which a thin membrane of  skin is stretched. As the bat 
flaps its wings, the tension forces are distributed in the same way as wind 
across a Junk’s sail. The ingenuity of  the design, and the principles upon 
which it rests, are made salient by reference to man-made objects 
engineered in response to similar design problems42. Bat’s wings and Junk’s 
sails are analogous. 
Principles derived from engineering can play a role in understanding the 
physical (as opposed to logical) limits of  morphospace. An entertaining 
example, again provided by Gordon (pp 107-109), is the limits on available 
body size set by the qualities of  bone. The idea is that by applying what we 
know of  material strength to bone, we can pick out regularities across all 
lineages which utilize that material structurally. Biological and artificial 
analogues play a role by informing and corroborating the engineering 
model.  
One measurement we can make of  a material is its brittleness. In simple 
terms (which, in honesty, is the only level at which I can interact with these 
principles), the brittleness of  a material is its tendency to break – for a 
fracture to develop and cause the structure to split apart. Almost every 
material will fracture, but these fractures need to be a certain size to actually 
undermine structure. This length is the ‘Griffith-crack’ and, very 
importantly for our discussion of  bones, for any given material the Griffith-
                                                      
42 Interestingly, Gordon also points out that Pterodactyl wings, which rested on a single 
‘strut’, could be understood in terms of the sails of modern yachts.   
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 crack length is absolute, not relative. So a wooden wall which is 10cm thick 
will have the same Griffith-crack length as a wooden wall which is 1m thick. 
Once a fracture reaches that length, structural integrity will be undermined 
as the fracture spreads and the wall splits. 
We can use brittleness to understand some of  the structural limitations 
bones impart on terrestrial vertebrates. Because the Griffith-crack length is 
absolute, the larger an animal becomes and the thicker and longer its bones, 
the smaller the relative crack required to cause a break. In other words, to 
break a mouse’s bones you might need a fracture half  the length of  the 
mouse. To break an elephant’s bones, you only need a fracture of  the same 
length. But an elephant’s bones typically will meet much greater pressures 
than those of  a mouse, simply due to increased weight. So if  you drop a 
mouse its bones will more than likely survive intact. A dropped elephant 
will crack. This is why, as Gordon puts it, “… elephants need to be very 
careful; one seldom sees them gambolling or jumping over fences like lambs 
and dogs (pp108).” 
And so the brittleness of  bones sets a limit to the size which a terrestrial 
vertebrate may reach. And this limit may be quantified and tested. Gordon 
figures that the size of  a lion or a man is at about the upper limit of  safe 
size for running and jumping. One way this is supported is through 
biological analogy: he cites domesticated horses who, through artificial 
selection, have been breed for dramatically increased size43. Horses break 
bones frequently, especially compared to smaller Shetlands and donkeys. 
Horses have been artificially selected for a size which, due to the brittleness 
of  bone, would not be selected naturally. Horses are too sprightly for their 
                                                      
43 I am not completely sure whether we ought to see this as an analogy or a homology. It is 
homologous insofar as it relates to bones, which are held in horses and other 
vertebrates due to descent. It is analogous insofar as we are looking at independent 
evolution events of size increase. It may perhaps be best understood in terms of 
‘parallel modelling’ – due to the homologous constraint of bones, we find similar 
analogues. 
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 size. Another way of  testing this is by taking bone, or synthesizing a 
relevantly similar material, or simulating bone in a computerized 
environment, and observing its reaction to different levels of  pressure. 
Amazingly, these considerations of  the tensile strength of  bone can give 
us great inferential reach – even into some aspects of  the behaviour of  
extinct lineages. Larger terrestrial animals would not be sprightly. Like an 
elephant, they may be able to charge at a fair clip, but they will not be very 
manoeuvrable. The agile Tyrannosaurus Rex from Jurassic Park may be 
beyond the limits of  physical possibility. Apatosaurs, like white men, can’t 
jump. 
Analogues are important evidentially for modelling these regularities. 
They aid in the construction of  the model and are crucial to testing it. In 
the same manner that meerkats and alpine grouse were used to inform the 
teaching model in the last chapter, machines and technology, given the right 
circumstances, can also inform adaptive models. 
I have illustrated two uses of  non-biological analogues. First, they can 
make nuanced aspects of  design more salient, as an examination of  the sails 
of  Junks did for bat wings. Second, they can inform models of  robust 
regularities which can ground inferences, as we saw in terms of  bones and 
body-size. Impressively, the application of  these regularities to simulations 
can provide remarkable fine-grained hypotheses about some aspects of  the 
behaviour of  extinct lineages44. To finish my argument for inferential 
                                                      
 
44 Another way by which our understanding of physical structures can be used to model 
the past is in the construction of physical models. By ‘physical model’, I mean the actual 
construction or simulation of the actual construction of the animal (see Odenbaugh 
forthcoming for discussion). An arresting example is the interaction between 
palaeontologists and CGI artists in modern documentaries which attempt to recreate the 
past, for instance the BBC’s Walking With Dinosaurs. Here, simulations of the animals were 
constructed from the skeletal system up, with the proper constraints built in. The task was 
then to work out how these animals actually moved. These computer simulations actually 
served to advance scientific knowledge, particularly in regards to the flight of larger 
pterosaurs (see Francoeur & Segal 2004 for a discussion of the use of computer modelling).  
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 continuity, I will now briefly apply the conditions I set for non-parallel 
analogies to these artificial cases. 
There must be enough analogues to give grounds that Natural Selection does shape 
phenotype in the way proposed by the model (that it does enough of  the causal work) 
Non-biological analogies could be very important for this requirement. 
Compared to biological analogies, where we are restricted by the availability 
of  analogues, in the artificial case we are only limited by our technology and 
our imagination. So different perturbations can be constructed or simulated 
and examined – allowing for the careful construction and testing of  models. 
There must be reasonable grounds for assuming an enabling developmental condition 
is held across the analogues 
As already stated, the developmental condition clause stands in order to 
ensure that the analogues have the same (or relevantly similar) potentialities 
or constraints. These can be approximated by the addition of  variables and 
constraints in the model itself. In the case of  computer simulations, for 
example, the computer world can be programmed with a particular physics 
and agents can be modified according to the limitations of  their real-world 
targets (see note 5). 
EITHER, 
There must be other streams of  data which can corroborate the hypothesis for the 
explanatory target, gaining the causal depth required for warrant 
I see this clause working in exactly the same fashion for both biological 
and artificial analogues. Both can be part of  an integrated solution. 
OR, 
There must be enough information across the analogues to allow us to increase 
specificity by bootstrapping. 
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 This statement could almost be taken as a description of  the modelling 
process. A solution is arrived at by examining different perturbations of  the 
model, and adjusting the variables towards the required target given those 
results. 
And so, when we are judging the epistemic warrant of  an artificial 
system which is fulfilling an analogous role, we should make this judgement 
based upon these criteria. We should ensure that we have examined enough 
perturbations of  the model. We should ensure that it picks out the right 
dimensions of  variability and initial condition which reflect the potentiality 
or constraint of  the target system. We can see the model as part of  an 
integrated solution. If  it stands alone, there must be enough perturbations 
examined to provide the necessary variability. 
In conclusion, I have shown that the concept of  ‘analogy’ as described in 
the first seven chapters, and the criteria I have given for judging its 
epistemic warrant, is applicable in other realms. The use of  analogies from 
material sciences like engineering, and abstract models and computer 
simulations, can fulfil the same role as biological analogies. The sceptical 
problems they face are not different in kind from those faced by cases of  
convergent evolution. So although I have focused on the limits of  these 
inferences, the application of  both ingenuity and a further understanding of  
the natural world can expand these limits. 
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 C o n c l u s i o n  
Upon sighting the platypus, Shaw suspected that a duck’s bill and 
webbed feet had been sewn onto a mammal pelt. Given the clear categories 
provided by Aristotelian theory, a mammal having avian features is a 
surprise. In an evolutionary light, however, there should be no surprise. 
Given the effect of  Natural Selection on phenotype, and given the 
similarities between niches occupied by disparate lineages, we should expect 
to find animals which have evolved similar adaptations.  
Given evolutionary theory, we should also expect closely related lineages 
to have similar traits. They have inherited a similar developmental system 
from a common ancestor. This is what makes outlier lineages surprising. 
For example, the platypus has two startling outlier traits. Males have a 
venomous spur on their hind legs. Venom is extraordinarily rare in 
mammals, but fairly common in reptiles and insects (Whittington et al 
2008). Platypus (and echidna) also use electroreception (Pettigrew 1999). 
Playtpus hunt small invertebrates by detecting the electrical currents they 
generate.  
The main theme of  this thesis has been how we can use similarities like 
that between duck and platypus feet to inform us about discrepancies like 
that between platypus and typical mammal sensory apparatus.  
To conclude I want to reemphasize what I see as the important lessons 
from the previous chapters. I would like to think that I have made 
arguments which have important consequences for both philosophers and 
scientists, so I will discuss each in turn. 
Scientific work which attempts to retrodict lineages using homology and 
analogy must keep the particular roles they play clearly delineated. If  a 
resemblance is due to descent, then comparative information can play two 
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 roles: it can be used to inform us about the conditions of  the past and it 
can, when contrasted with some adaptive model or final condition, help 
hypothesize difference-makers. If  a resemblance is due to continuity of  
niche, then its most obvious role is in informing us about the relationship 
between the trait we are interested in and environmental variables. I have 
mostly explored these roles in their application to the retrodiction of  outlier 
lineages 
There is reason to be sceptical of  many homologous claims about outlier 
lineages, including our own. Because our clade is impoverished, and many 
of  the traits we are interested in are particularly labile, the probability we 
should attach to some homologous inferences is worryingly low. For 
example, if  we wish to know whether our ancestors were patrilocal like 
chimpanzees and bonobos or matrilocal like many other primates, the 
labiality of  dispersal strategies in primates weakens our commitment to 
developmental entrenchment. The scarcity of  data-points weakens cladistic 
parsimony. Without independence evidence I would be wary of  committing 
to either picture. For a labile trait, discovering a relationship between our 
target and some environment or physiological factor (as we saw in parallel 
modelling) is a better method. 
In the application of  analogues, as well, it is important to ensure that we 
findings are supported by the right kind of  data. If  an analogue is a central 
to a theory, just citing the example is not sufficient. We must also look at 
corroborating evidence for the model we have constructed. We must 
especially look for falsifying cases: our adaptive model will specify a 
particular trait’s relationship with an environment, so if  we discover an 
environment without the trait this gives us an important opportunity to 
refine the model.  
In general, comparative biological data (and, as I have suggested in the 
coda, non-biological data) can provide a rich data-stream for the 
construction and testing of  hypotheses. In the case of  analogies, scientists 
should shift from half-heartedly implying convergences to attempting to 
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 properly incorporate them into their theories.  
I have put emphasis on a synthesized approach to biological explanation. 
When explaining an aspect of  phenotype we must pay attention to the roles 
of  both Natural Selection and Developmental Resources (as well, of  course, 
of  other non-selective processes such as drift).   
Philosophically I have tended to avoid hard and fast definitions of  some 
concepts in the explanatory tool-kit of  evolutionary biology. In some 
quarters this kind of  approach is becoming more popular (see, for instance, 
Godfrey-Smith’s (2009) multi-dimensional definition of  a Darwinian 
Population), and rightly so. Biological phenomena are complex and often 
stochastic, so I don’t think we should expect our concepts to be clearly 
differentiated. It is frequently the case that biological categories are best 
viewed in terms of  continua, so having flexible conceptual tools is an 
advantage.  
I have also emphasized (though not argued for) ecumenism about 
explanation. Leaving metaphysical questions aside, given the complexity of  
nature and our comparatively impoverished epistemic status, the utilization 
of  many explanatory strategies and approaches should not be viewed 
negatively. There are many kinds of  questions we can ask about biological 
phenomena, and correspondingly many kinds of  explanations which can be 
justifiably applied to them.  
Although I have focused on just one possible data-stream available for 
evolutionary biology as an historical science, I hope it has been made clear 
that the main strength of  historical explanations lies in their ability to 
incorporate many data streams. Even if  we have doubts about the 
consilience of  various sciences in terms of  causation – we should have 
none about their explanatory consilience.  
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